Monitoring scheme against local oscillator attacks for practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution systems in complex communication environments
In a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution (CVQKD) system, a strong local oscillator (LO) signal in a quantum channel may be manipulated by eavesdropper Eve to steal information about secret keys through general attacks (e.g., entangling cloner attack or intercept-resend attack) without being detected, which is an effective quantum hacking strategy, i.e., LO attacks. To guarantee the practical security of the system, a general monitoring scheme has been previously demonstrated to resist this quantum hacking attack, where the channel transmittance was regarded as a fixed value related to transmission distance. However, practical communication environments are complex, which may result in the time-varying transmittance. This deviation may affect the effectiveness of this monitoring scheme. In this paper, we investigate the monitoring of CVQKD systems running in complex communication environments. We first model the LO attacks on practical CVQKD systems in complex environments, where the channel transmittance is assumed to obey a fixed distribution. Then, the low bound of intensity disturbance of the LO signal for Eve successfully concealing herself is obtained based on this model, where we consider all noise that can be used by Eve in complex communication environments. Simultaneously, we obtain an optimal monitoring condition to resist the LO attacks. Our numerical analysis confirms that the proposed monitoring scheme can effectively resist the LO attacks on practical CVQKD systems in complex environments. Subsequently, the feasibility of this way is again demonstrated by using a quantitative example. It is important that this monitoring scheme can also be extended to resist other quantum hacking attacks.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution (CVQKD) system, a strong local oscillator (LO) signal in a quantum channel may be manipulated by eavesdropper Eve to steal information about secret keys through general attacks (e.g., entangling cloner attack or intercept-resend attack) without being detected, which is an effective quantum hacking strategy, i.e., LO attacks. To guarantee the practical security of the system, a general monitoring scheme has been previously demonstrated to resist this quantum hacking attack, where the channel transmittance was regarded as a fixed value related to transmission distance. However, practical communication environments are complex, which may result in the time-varying transmittance. This deviation may affect the effectiveness of this monitoring scheme. In this paper, we investigate the monitoring of CVQKD systems running in complex communication environments. We first model the LO attacks on practical CVQKD systems in complex environments, where the channel transmittance is assumed to obey a fixed distribution. Then, the low bound of intensity disturbance of the LO signal for Eve successfully concealing herself is obtained based on this model, where we consider all noise that can be used by Eve in complex communication environments. Simultaneously, we obtain an optimal monitoring condition to resist the LO attacks. Our numerical analysis confirms that the proposed monitoring scheme can effectively resist the LO attacks on practical CVQKD systems in complex environments. Subsequently, the feasibility of this way is again demonstrated by using a quantitative example. It is important that this monitoring scheme can also be extended to resist other quantum hacking attacks.
How to guarantee the practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system has been an important issue in the quantum cryptography applications. In contrast to the previous practical security strategies, which focus on the intercept-resend attack or the Gaussian attack, we investigate the practical security strategy based on a general attack, i.e., an arbitrated individual attack or collective attack on the system by Eve in this paper. The low bound of intensity disturbance of the local oscillator signal for eavesdropper successfully concealing herself is obtained, considering all noises can be used by Eve in the practical environment. Furthermore, we obtain an optimal monitoring condition for the practical CVQKD system so that legitimate communicators can monitor the general attack in real-time. As examples, practical security of two special systems, i.e., the Gaussian modulated coherent state CVQKD system and the middle-based CVQKD system, are investigated under the intercept-resend attacks.
Recently, several practical attacks on continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) were proposed based on faking the estimated value of channel excess noise to hide the intercept-and-resend eavesdropping strategy, including the local oscillator (LO) fluctuation, calibration, wavelength, and saturation attacks. However, the known countermeasures against all these practical attacks will inevitably increase the complexity of the implementation of CVQKD and affect its performance. We develop here an asynchronous countermeasure strategy without structural modifications of the conventional CVQKD scheme. In particular, two robust countermeasures are proposed by adding peak-valley seeking and Gaussian postselection steps in conventional data postprocessing procedure. The analysis shows that the peak-valley seeking method naturally make the schemes immune to all known types of calibration attacks even when Eve simultaneously performs wavelength or LO fluctuation attacks and exhibit simpler implementation and better performance than the known countermeasures. Meanwhile, since the Gaussian postselection is able to resist the saturation attacks, the proposed schemes are secure against all known types of practical attacks.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with a real local oscillator (LO) is confronted with new security problems due to the reference pulses transmitted together with quantum signals over the insecure quantum channel. In this paper, we propose a method of phase attack on reference pulses of the CVQKD with real LOs. Under the phase attack, the phase drifts of reference pulses are manipulated by eavesdroppers, and then the phase compensation error is increased. Consequently, the secret key rate is reduced due to the imperfect phase compensation for quantum signals. Based on the noise model of imperfect phase compensation, the practical security of the CVQKD under phase attack is analyzed. Besides, we propose an effective method to detect the intensity of phase attack, in which the deviation of phase compensation error on quantum signals and that on reference signals are monitored in real time. The simulation results show that the security analysis is accurate and the method of phase attack detection is feasible.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the optical attenuator can adjust the Gaussian-modulated coherent states and the local oscillator signal to an optimal value for guaranteeing the security of the system and optimizing the performance of the system. However, the performance of the optical attenuator may deteriorate due to the intentional and unintentional damage of the device. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with reduced optical attenuation. We find that the secret key rate of the system may be overestimated based on the investigation of parameter estimation under the effects of reduced optical attenuation. This opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack in a practical CVQKD system. To close this loophole, we add an optical fuse at Alice's output port and design a scheme to monitor the level of optical attenuation in real time, which can make the secret key rate of the system evaluated precisely. The analysis shows that these countermeasures can effectively resist this potential attack.
Continuous-variable measure-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) is proposed to remove all imperfections originating from detection. However, there are still some inevitable imperfections in a practical CV-MDI QKD system. For example, there is a fluctuating channel transmittance in the complex communication environments. Here we investigate the security of the system under the effects of the fluctuating channel transmittance, where the transmittance is regarded as a fixed value related to communication distance in theory. We first discuss the parameter estimation in fluctuating channel transmittance based on these establishing of channel models, which has an obvious deviation compared with the estimated parameters in the ideal case. Then, we show the evaluated results when the channel transmittance respectively obeys the two-point distribution and the uniform distribution. In particular, the two distributions can be easily realized under the manipulation of eavesdroppers. Finally, we analyze the secret key rate of the system when the channel transmittance obeys the above distributions. The simulation analysis indicates that a slight fluctuation of the channel transmittance may seriously reduce the performance of the system, especially in the extreme asymmetric case. Furthermore, the communication between Alice, Bob and Charlie may be immediately interrupted. Therefore, eavesdroppers can manipulate the channel transmittance to complete a denial-of-service attack in a practical CV-MDI QKD system. To resist this attack, the Gaussian post-selection method can be exploited to calibrate the parameter estimation to reduce the deterioration of performance of the system.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum-key distribution (CVQKD), the fluctuations of the local oscillator (LO) not only make the normalization of Bob's measurement outcomes difficult, but also can change the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of an imperfect balanced homodyne detector (BHD), which may lead the security of a practical system of CVQKD to be compromised severely. In this paper, we propose that the LO intensity can be manipulated by the legitimate parties, i.e., being tuned and stabilized to a required constant value, to eliminate the impact of LO fluctuations and defeat Eve's potential attack on the LO. Moreover, we show that the secret key rate can be increased over a noisy channel, especially the channels of metropolitan QKD networks, by tuning the intensity of LO and thus the SNR of a practical BHD to an optimal value, and we find that, counterintuitively, the requirement on BHD (i.e., high detection efficiency and low electronic noise) can also be reduced in this case. To realize this manipulation, we give a schematic setup which, thus, can be used to enhance the security of a practical CVQKD system.