This paper complements an earlier (Nov 2018) paper on the metaphysics of physics. The earlier paper focused on an alternative (realist) interpretation of quantum mechanics. While inspired by the previous one, this follow-up paper is a much simpler one: we just offer very basic thoughts on the most fundamental physical concepts, which are the idea of force, energy and mass. Based on the recent precision measurements of the (electric) charge radius of a proton, we also argue previous reflections on the zbw radius of a proton make more sense now. Needless to say, we also offer our usual reflections on the concept of fields and messenger particles. We think the first is very useful – even if fields are relative. In contrast, we argue that the latter (the idea of virtual photons, gluons or other messenger particles) is purely metaphysical. In other words, we continue to think the idea of messenger particles is a non-scientific successor to aether theories.
This paper complements an earlier (Nov 2018) paper on the metaphysics of physics. The earlier paper focused on an alternative (realist) interpretation of quantum mechanics. While inspired by the previous one, this follow-up paper is a much simpler one: we just offer very basic thoughts on the most fundamental physical concepts, which are the idea of force, energy and mass. Based on the recent precision measurements of the (electric) charge radius of a proton, we also argue previous reflections on the zbw radius of a proton make more sense now. Needless to say, we also offer our usual reflections on the concept of fields and messenger particles. We think the first is very useful – even if fields are relative. In contrast, we argue that the latter (the idea of virtual photons, gluons or other messenger particles) is purely metaphysical. In other words, we continue to think the idea of messenger particles is a non-scientific successor to aether theories.
Quantum mechanics has maintained over the years the reputation of being "the most obscure theory." It works perfectly well, but nobody seems to know why. It has been argued that the difficulty in understanding quantum theory is our failed attempt to force onto it a wrong conceptual scheme, wanting at all costs to think about the objects of the theory as, precisely, objects, i.e., entities having continuously actual spatiotemporal properties. This too restrictive spatiotemporal scheme is most probably at the heart of the problem, as also underlined by the Einsteinian revolution, but then what could be an alternative? Many thinkers have suggested that we must surrender to the fact that our physical world is one of immanent powers and potencies. Aristotle did so ante quantum litteram, followed by scholars like Heisenberg, Primas, Shimony, Piron, Kastner, Kauffman, de Ronde, just to name a few, including the authors, who were both students of Piron in Geneva. However, if on the one hand a potentiality ontology puts the accent on the processes of change, responsible for the incessant shifts between actual and potential properties, on the other hand it does not tell what these changes are all about. In other words, the metaphysical question remains of identifying the nature of the bearer of these potencies, or potentialities, and of the entities that can actualize them. It is the purpose of the present article to emphasize that the above question has found a possible answer in the recent Conceptuality Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, which we believe offers the missing ontology and metaphysics that can make the theory fully intelligible, and even intuitive.
This paper recaps the main results of our photon, proton and electron models and also revisits our earlier hypothesis of the neutrino being the carrier of the strong force carrier. As such, we think this paper contains all necessary ingredients of an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics. We refer to this interpretation as a realist or classical interpretation because it does not require any equations or assumptions beyond the classical framework of physics: Maxwell’s equations and the Planck-Einstein relation are all that is needed. In order to distinguish our approach from mainstream physics (read: the Standard Model), we refer to our ideas as classical quantum physics.
Metaphysical models by which we understand the fundamental make-up of our universe are all the more plausible when informed by empirically confirmed scientific theory. I have argued that contemporary physics tells us that there are no elementary particles , in any metaphysically serious sense of the word “particle”. Quantum phenomena are not concrete particular entities. The replacement of quantum mechanics by quantum field theory has major consequences for our metaphysics, in that it calls into question the tradition of according categorial priority to particular entities. Instead, categorial priority should be accorded to generic processes. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
This is a didactic exploration of the basic assumptions and concepts of the Zitterbewegung interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its novelty is in applying the concepts to photons and relating it to other uses of the wavefunction. As such, we could have chosen another title for this paper: the physics of quantum physics. However, we only present interpretations, hypotheses and assumptions. As such, we thought we should stick to the title above: the metaphysics of physics - which sounds somewhat less arrogant.
When metaphysicians pay attention to theories in fundamental physics, they are usually interested in their implications for fundamental metaphysics: they want to know what the theories imply or suggest concerning the ultimate structure of reality. This essay, by contrast, is concerned with the “derivative metaphysics” of quantum mechanics. I will be considering a certain hypothesis about the fundamental structure of reality, which I will call H. I am interested in H because it strikes me as embodying the most obvious, flat-footed way to read an account of the fundamental structure of reality off the mathematical apparatus of elementary quantum mechanics. But I won’t be defending this claim here, or trying to argue that the members of H are more plausible than other accounts of the fundamental structure of reality inspired by quantum mechanics. Instead, my question is: if H were true, could there be (non-fundamentally speaking, of course) such ordinary objects as plants, planets and people? More specifically: could there be such ordinary objects as ourselves and the things we are familiar with, having more or less the ordinary properties we take them to have? And more generally: given that the fundamental structure of a possible world is such as to make H true, what is its correct description in ordinary terms? Of course, I care about these questions in part because I want to explore the extent to which we might have good reason to believe H, or something akin to it. But even if H turned out to be consistent with our ordinary knowledge about the world of ordinary objects, it would obviously take a lot more work to show that it has any serious claim on our credence. At a minimum, one would have to say something about how likely we should regard our evidence as being, given H; one would want to make some sort of survey of alternative hypotheses; and one would want to take into account our specialised scientific knowledge as well as our ordinary knowledge, including the facts that make trouble for elementary quantum mechanics and force us to look beyond it to quantum field theory and ultimately towards some kind of theory of quantum gravity.