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Elimination of Spatial Side-Channel Information for Compact Quantum Key Distribution Sendersb

Wei-Shao Huang, Wei Zhang, Yidong Huang

Published Sep 1, 2019• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

For a compact quantum key distribution (QKD) sender for the polarization encoding BB84 protocol, an eavesdropper could take a side-channel attack by measuring the spatial information of photons to infer their polarizations. The possibility of this attack can be reduced by introducing an aperture in the QKD sender, however, the effect of the aperture on the QKD security lacks of quantitative analysis. In this paper, we analyze the mutual information between the actual keys encoded at this QKD sender and the inferred keys at the eavesdropper (Eve), demonstrating the effect of the aperture to eliminate the spatial side-channel information quantitatively. It shows that Eve’s potential on eavesdropping spatial side-channel information is totally dependent on the optical design of the QKD sender, including the source arrangement and the aperture. The height of compact QKD senders with integrated light-emitting diode (LED) arrays could be controlled under several millimeters, showing great potential on applications in portable equipment.

DOI
10.11989/jest.1674-862x.90416014

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•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations
For a compact quantum key distribution (QKD) sender for the polarization encoding BB84 protocol, an eavesdropper could take a side-channel attack by measuring the spatial information of photons to infer their polarizations. The possibility of this attack can be reduced by introducing an aperture in the QKD sender, however, the effect of the aperture on the QKD security lacks of quantitative analysis. In this paper, we analyze the mutual information between the actual keys encoded at this QKD sender and the inferred keys at the eavesdropper (Eve), demonstrating the effect of the aperture to eliminate the spatial side-channel information quantitatively. It shows that Eve’s potential on eavesdropping spatial side-channel information is totally dependent on the optical design of the QKD sender, including the source arrangement and the aperture. The height of compact QKD senders with integrated light-emitting diode (LED) arrays could be controlled under several millimeters, showing great potential on applications in portable equipment.
A typical implementation of BB84 protocol for quantum communication uses four laser diodes for transmitting weak coherent pulses, which may not have the same characteristics. We have characterized these lasers for mismatch in various parameters such as spectral width, pulse width, spatial mode, peak wavelength, polarization and their arrival times at the receiver. This information is utilized to calculate possible information leakage through side channel attacks by evaluating mutual information between source and eavesdropper. Based on our experimental observations of cross correlation between parameter values for different laser diodes, we suggest methods to reduce information leakage to Eve.
The quantum key distribution protocol uses one degree of freedom of a single quantum system to encode information. If this information has correlations with the system's other degrees of freedom, or if the measurement efficiencies on the receiver side depend on them, a security loophole called side channel is created. An eavesdropper can exploit it to gain information without disturbing the system, and thus, without revealing the attack. Here, we analyze side channels in a free-space QKD sender and receiver implementation and focus especially on the dependencies and side channels for the spatial degree of freedom.
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum states, which can lead to temporal, spectral and/or spatial differences among them that can be exploited by a malicious party to extract information of the key. In this work we characterize, and experimentally verify, a side-channel attack on spatially distinguishable states against free-space QKD systems with misaligned laser sources. Specifically, for those emitting Gaussian beams, which is the most common case in free-space QKD. The attack makes theoretically unsafe any QKD system with any angular misalignment between the laser sources. Finally, we propose two countermeasures to eliminate the spatial distinguishability and secure the key exchange.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide secure communication even when an eavesdropper (the villainous ``Eve'') completely controls the channel. In practice, though, side-channel effects exist due to device imperfections, and Eve can still intercept information via a side channel. Thus the authors devise a QKD scheme that is both free of side channels in the source state and measurement-device-independent. While some other protocols can also achieve side-channel-free security, this one is based on mature technology without any demand for local detection efficiency, and works for distances greater than 200 km, even though the misalignment error rate may be as large as 20%.
The rate at which a secure key can be generated in a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is limited by the channel loss and the quantum bit-error rate (QBER). Increases to the QBER can stem from detector noise, channel noise, or the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Eve is capable of obtaining information of the unsecure key by performing an attack on the quantum channel or by listening to all discussion performed via a noiseless public channel. Conventionally a QKD protocol will perform the information reconciliation over the authenticated public channel, revealing the parity bits used to correct for any quantum bit errors. In this invited paper, the possibility of limiting the information revealed to Eve during the information reconciliation is considered. Using a covert communication channel for the transmission of the parity bits, secure key rates are possible at much higher QBERs. This is demonstrated through the simulation of a polarization based QKD system implementing the BB84 protocol, showing significant improvement of the SKRs over the conventional QKD protocols.
Quantum key distribution is one of the essential developments to reduce the vulnerability in the security of the systems due to the emergence of quantum computers. As long as large-scale quantum computers emerge, all the systems will be vulnerable to attack. To secure the communication, we can use quantum key distribution protocols in the near future. In this work, I have experimentally verified the BB84 protocol with an eavesdropper. We have used a classical channel to send polarization states of light. Our source is a readily available He-Ne laser (632.8nm). To send secret Information in a secure way, we use Quantum key distribution. Sender Alice sends randomly chosen polarization states of light to Bob. The states Alice sends are |H>,|V>,|D>, and |A>, and similarly, Bob also selects some random basis and detects this Information. In this experiment, |H>,|V> states belong to the '+' basis and |D>,|A> on the 'X' basis. Detecting |H>,|D> states at the detector is considered as '1' and detecting |V>,|A> represents the '0' bit as the output. Alice and Bob can choose the basis randomly. We got these | H>,|V>,|D>, and |A> states by rotating the half-wave plate at angles respectively 0°,90°,45°, and -45°. We used a motorized rotator to rotate the two half-wave plates, one at Alice's side and one at Bob's side, to select the basis and generate these states. The motorized rotator runs on a python code. Python code is designed in such a way that it can generate random bits and can run Alice and Bob parts simultaneously. A polarized beam splitter is used just before the detector to split the beam into | H> and |V> states with 100% intensity at one detector and 0% at the other and |D> and |A> states with 50:50 intensity. Therefore we used one half-wave plate just before the PBS, which can convert |H> and |V> states into |D> and |A> states when we rotate at these particular angles. Using this, we can detect |D> and |A> states with 100% intensity at one detector and 0% at the other. Based upon the basic choices of Alice and Bob, at the receiver part, Bob will receive the bits. At the end of the process, both parties will verify the basis. When the basis is matching, they will keep those bits, and which are not matching, they will discard them. The successful bits will become the encryption key. I did this experiment by sending 1000 bits, and 452 bits among them were successful. For the security analysis of this protocol, we implemented a third-person Eve who tries to steal the Information Alice sends to Bob. Eve used one Beam splitter to take half part of the light intensity and sent another half to Bob. Eve's part has one 50:50 beam splitter, which splits the beam into two. Then, one beam goes to a PBS, then to the detectors, and the other beam goes to a setup that has HWP and PBS, then to the detectors. In this experiment, Eve is successful in stealing the Information correctly. As we are using classical light, which has a huge number of photons, anyone can take some photons and execute a photon number splitting attack; the security of this process is very low. We need a single-photon source and a single photon detector to get total security from this protocol. Right now, I have done this experiment with the available pieces of equipment I have. When the needed types of equipment are available to me, I can implement the single-photon QKD experiment also. After the experiment, we realized that the superposition of states always holds in this experiment, but states do not collapse, as we are not performing the quantum measurement. Also, I have implemented the QKD protocol in the IBM Quantum lab, where Alice sends 1000 bits to Bob, and 474 bits among them were successful. Also, Eve’s interception was detected successfully.