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Journal of Computer Research and Development

Post Quantum Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Ring Learning with Errors Problem

Zichen Li, Ting Xie, Juanmei Zhang, Ronghua Xu

Published Dec 1, 2019• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.7544/issn1000-1239.2019.20180874

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The Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem has emerged as a foundational hardness assumption for post-quantum authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In this paper, we propose a post-quantum and efficient RLWE-Based AKE protocol for mobile devices. We provide formal security reduction in the random oracle model under the decisional RLWE and PRF assumptions. We also show that our scheme is safe against key mismatch attack, signal leakage attack, and provide informal analysis of all standard AKE security properties. Further, we showcase that our scheme also provides perfect forward secrecy and replay attack resistance. Finally, we compare our scheme with several other existing schemes in terms of various security attributes along with computational efficiency to demonstrate its practicality and advantages over the other schemes.
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Ring learning with errors (RLWE) is used to construct anti-quantum key exchange protocols cryptography algorithms, which is hard to solve for quantum computers. In this work, we provide a certificateless authenticated key exchange protocol based on RLWE problem. This proposed protocol implements user identity authentication by certificateless public key cryptosystem, and uses Ding error reconciled function to eliminate the error caused by the introduction of interference term in RLWE problem. We analyzed the correctness of the protocol in detail, and proved the security of the protocol under the improved extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model.