Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Towards a practical security analysis of continuous-variable quantum key distribution: new developments and limitations

Cosmo Lupo

Published Nov 1, 2019• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Practical security analysis of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with jitter in clock synchronization

Cailang Xie, Ying Guo, Qin Liao +4 more

Physics Letters A•Jan 10, 2018•17 citations

Inter-Symbol-Interference Reduction in Continuous Variable QKD Using Equalization

Xinke Tang, Rupesh Kumar, D. G. Cunningham +3 more

Inter-symbol-interference (ISI) noise in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) is caused by the overlap between the consecutive detected signals. In practice, this problem limits the repetition rate of the quantum signals for a given bandwidth detector and hence reduces the rate of secure key generation. We propose a method of using equalization to mitigate ISI noise in CVQKD systems. Its feasibility is studied using an analytical model with practical parameters. The improved performance of CVQKD detection is investigated using secure key analysis. The simulation results show an increase of 12.8 Mbits/s in secure key rate for a 1GHz bandwidth CVQKD system operating over a 20 km link.

IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps)•Dec 1, 2018•2 citations

A Review on Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Security

Aida Garcia-Callejo, Andrés Ruiz-Chamorro, Daniel Cano +1 more

Lecture notes in networks and systems•Nov 20, 2022•6 citations

Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution: current status and prospects

Takuya Hirano

The Japan Society of Applied Physics•Jul 6, 2021•0 citations

Generalized security analysis framework for continuous-variable quantum key distribution

Vladyslav C. Usenko

Security of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution is addressed and a security analysis framework, which does not rely on phase-space symmetries of signal states and correlations, is developed. In a general purification-based approach, following optimality of Gaussian collective attacks, it is suggested to find an equivalent generally mixed two-mode state shared between the trusted parties and then purifying it using Bloch-Messiah decomposition. This allows to assess security of the schemes with arbitrary parameters, which can be typically expected in experiments. It also allows to theoretically predict the role of asymmetries of signals and correlations on security of the protocols. The method can be used for security analysis of practical continuous-variable schemes directly from the measured data without any symmetrization assumptions.

arXiv:1908.01127•Aug 3, 2019•3 citations

Quantum Hacking: Induced‐Photorefraction Attack on a Practical Continuous‐Variable Quantum Key Distribution System

Yiliang Wang, Yi Zheng, Chenlei Fang +2 more

Abstract In a practical continuous‐variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, a new security loophole opened by the photorefractive effect of lithium niobate‐based (LN‐based) modulators is explored. Exploiting this loophole, a quantum hacking strategy called the induced‐photorefraction attack is proposed. This strategy utilizes the induced photorefraction on the LN‐based modulators to conceal a classical intercept‐resend attack. Specifically, the induced photorefraction biases the response curve of the LN‐based modulator, which affects the intensity of the modulated signal. Based on the investigation of channel parameter estimation and the analysis of the secret key rate of the practical CVQKD system, the simulation results show that the communication parties overestimate the secret key rate, which reveals that Eve can actively open a security loophole via the induced‐photorefraction attack to obtain secret key information. To defend against this attack, a random monitoring scheme for modulation variance is proposed to detect the attack, along with an improved optical power limiter to mitigate the irradiation beam. Additionally, a Sagnac‐based IM is suggested to stabilize the practical CVQKD system. Furthermore, the impact of this attack is analyzed on continuous‐variable measurement‐device‐independent QKD systems ((CV‐MDI‐QKD) and on local‐local‐oscillator (LLO) systems and propose countermeasures for each. Finally, the passive‐state‐preparation CVQKD protocol is proposed to fundamentally close the security loopholes originating from the modulators.

arXiv:2409.08017•Advanced Quantum Technologies•Jul 1, 2025•9 citations
Inter-symbol-interference (ISI) noise in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) is caused by the overlap between the consecutive detected signals. In practice, this problem limits the repetition rate of the quantum signals for a given bandwidth detector and hence reduces the rate of secure key generation. We propose a method of using equalization to mitigate ISI noise in CVQKD systems. Its feasibility is studied using an analytical model with practical parameters. The improved performance of CVQKD detection is investigated using secure key analysis. The simulation results show an increase of 12.8 Mbits/s in secure key rate for a 1GHz bandwidth CVQKD system operating over a 20 km link.
Security of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution is addressed and a security analysis framework, which does not rely on phase-space symmetries of signal states and correlations, is developed. In a general purification-based approach, following optimality of Gaussian collective attacks, it is suggested to find an equivalent generally mixed two-mode state shared between the trusted parties and then purifying it using Bloch-Messiah decomposition. This allows to assess security of the schemes with arbitrary parameters, which can be typically expected in experiments. It also allows to theoretically predict the role of asymmetries of signals and correlations on security of the protocols. The method can be used for security analysis of practical continuous-variable schemes directly from the measured data without any symmetrization assumptions.
Abstract In a practical continuous‐variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, a new security loophole opened by the photorefractive effect of lithium niobate‐based (LN‐based) modulators is explored. Exploiting this loophole, a quantum hacking strategy called the induced‐photorefraction attack is proposed. This strategy utilizes the induced photorefraction on the LN‐based modulators to conceal a classical intercept‐resend attack. Specifically, the induced photorefraction biases the response curve of the LN‐based modulator, which affects the intensity of the modulated signal. Based on the investigation of channel parameter estimation and the analysis of the secret key rate of the practical CVQKD system, the simulation results show that the communication parties overestimate the secret key rate, which reveals that Eve can actively open a security loophole via the induced‐photorefraction attack to obtain secret key information. To defend against this attack, a random monitoring scheme for modulation variance is proposed to detect the attack, along with an improved optical power limiter to mitigate the irradiation beam. Additionally, a Sagnac‐based IM is suggested to stabilize the practical CVQKD system. Furthermore, the impact of this attack is analyzed on continuous‐variable measurement‐device‐independent QKD systems ((CV‐MDI‐QKD) and on local‐local‐oscillator (LLO) systems and propose countermeasures for each. Finally, the passive‐state‐preparation CVQKD protocol is proposed to fundamentally close the security loopholes originating from the modulators.