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History of philosophy & logical analysis

Quantum Mechanics and the Limits of Empiricism: Recent Challenges to the Orthodox Theory

Christopher Norris

Published Apr 5, 2004• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.30965/26664275-00701013

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Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist Approach

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This chapter first examines the four ways in which quantum theory poses a challenge for aim-oriented empiricism. It then enumerates the six defects of the orthodox quantum theory. It also looks into the nature of the propensiton quantum theory. The last three sections of the chapter discuss one approach to developing a fully micro-realistic version of quantum theory, free of the defects which deface orthodox quantum theory. The chapter notes that this plausible view would not have been ignored if aim-oriented empiricism had been generally accepted. It argues that these defects result from failure to solve the wave/particle dilemma. The chapter suggests that theoretical physics should seriously consider the two interrelated questions in which orthodox quantum theory is so evasive: What is the nature of quantum objects? Is Nature probabilistic or deterministic?

Oxford University Press eBooks•Jan 16, 2003•0 citations

Empiricist and realist interpretations of quantum mechanics

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Quantum mechanics and the limits of empiricism: Recent challenges to the orthodox theory

Christopher Norris

In this book Christopher Norris develops the case for scientific realism by tackling various adversary arguments from a range of anti-realist positions. Through a close critical reading he shows how they fail to make adequate sense on any rational, consistent, and scientifically-informed survey of the evidence. Along the way he incorporates a number of detailed case-studies from the history and philosophy of science. Norris devotes much of his discussion to some of the most prominent and widely influential source-texts of anti-realism. Also included are the sophisticated versions of verificationism developed - albeit in very different ways - by thinkers such as Michael Dummett and Bas van Fraassen. Central to Norris's argument is a prolonged engagement with the once highly influential but nowadays neglected work of Norwood Russell Hanson. This book will be welcomed especially by readers who possess some knowledge of the background debate and who wish to deepen and extend their understanding of these issues beyond an introductory level.

Taylor & Francis eBooks•Feb 16, 2010•0 citations

Quantum mechanics and the limits of empiricism

Christopher Norris

The measurement problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up during the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy – or ‘completeness’ – of the orthodox (Copenhagen) theory.1 As we have seen, it is a topic central to Hanson’s thinking not only with regard to quantum mechanics but also for its wider bearing on the scope and limits of scientific knowledge, the theory-laden character of observations, and the underdetermination of theory by evidence.2 Thus it is frequently adduced in support of his proto-Kuhnian claim that scientists working within different paradigms must be thought of as observing different things or inhabiting ‘different worlds’.3 What I propose to do now is look in more detail at the arguments surrounding this topic and, especially, at various proposals – from Einstein down – for a realist construal of the quantum data (i.e., the empirical measurement-results) that would offer an alternative to Hanson’s idea of the uncertainty principle as placing an absolute limit on our knowledge of objects and events in the microphysical domain. Having set out his arguments already in chapters 4 and 5, I shall not make any further detailed reference to Hanson’s work but assume that the reader who has come this far will have them clearly in mind. Thus my purpose in the remainder of this book is to raise the question: what becomes of the paradigm-relativist approach to issues in the history and philosophy of science if it derives so much of its suasive force from an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has proved increasingly open to challenge?

Routledge eBooks•Jun 2, 2004•0 citations

Limits of Validity of Quantum Mechanics

Gleb Wataghin

Nature•Oct 28, 1939•0 citations
This chapter first examines the four ways in which quantum theory poses a challenge for aim-oriented empiricism. It then enumerates the six defects of the orthodox quantum theory. It also looks into the nature of the propensiton quantum theory. The last three sections of the chapter discuss one approach to developing a fully micro-realistic version of quantum theory, free of the defects which deface orthodox quantum theory. The chapter notes that this plausible view would not have been ignored if aim-oriented empiricism had been generally accepted. It argues that these defects result from failure to solve the wave/particle dilemma. The chapter suggests that theoretical physics should seriously consider the two interrelated questions in which orthodox quantum theory is so evasive: What is the nature of quantum objects? Is Nature probabilistic or deterministic?
In this book Christopher Norris develops the case for scientific realism by tackling various adversary arguments from a range of anti-realist positions. Through a close critical reading he shows how they fail to make adequate sense on any rational, consistent, and scientifically-informed survey of the evidence. Along the way he incorporates a number of detailed case-studies from the history and philosophy of science. Norris devotes much of his discussion to some of the most prominent and widely influential source-texts of anti-realism. Also included are the sophisticated versions of verificationism developed - albeit in very different ways - by thinkers such as Michael Dummett and Bas van Fraassen. Central to Norris's argument is a prolonged engagement with the once highly influential but nowadays neglected work of Norwood Russell Hanson. This book will be welcomed especially by readers who possess some knowledge of the background debate and who wish to deepen and extend their understanding of these issues beyond an introductory level.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up during the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy – or ‘completeness’ – of the orthodox (Copenhagen) theory.1 As we have seen, it is a topic central to Hanson’s thinking not only with regard to quantum mechanics but also for its wider bearing on the scope and limits of scientific knowledge, the theory-laden character of observations, and the underdetermination of theory by evidence.2 Thus it is frequently adduced in support of his proto-Kuhnian claim that scientists working within different paradigms must be thought of as observing different things or inhabiting ‘different worlds’.3 What I propose to do now is look in more detail at the arguments surrounding this topic and, especially, at various proposals – from Einstein down – for a realist construal of the quantum data (i.e., the empirical measurement-results) that would offer an alternative to Hanson’s idea of the uncertainty principle as placing an absolute limit on our knowledge of objects and events in the microphysical domain. Having set out his arguments already in chapters 4 and 5, I shall not make any further detailed reference to Hanson’s work but assume that the reader who has come this far will have them clearly in mind. Thus my purpose in the remainder of this book is to raise the question: what becomes of the paradigm-relativist approach to issues in the history and philosophy of science if it derives so much of its suasive force from an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has proved increasingly open to challenge?