Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

An implementation of the Paillier crypto system with threshold decryption without a trusted dealer

Thijs Veugen, Thomas Attema, Gabriele Spini

Published Jan 1, 2019• 6 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We consider the problem of securely generating the keys of the Paillier crypto system [11] with (t; n) threshold decryption, without a trusted dealer. Nishide and Sakurai [10] describe a solution, secure inthe malicious model. We use their ideas to make a simpler solution for the semi-honest model, and further introduce a few optimisations. We implement the secure key generation protocol on a single computer, andconsider its performance.

Related papers

Efficient RSA Key Generation and Threshold Paillier in the Two-Party Setting

Carmit Hazay, Gert Læssøe Mikkelsen, Tal Rabin +2 more

The problem of generating an RSA composite in a distributed manner without leaking its factorization is particularly challenging and useful in many cryptographic protocols. Our first contribution is the first non-generic fully simulatable protocol for distributively generating an RSA composite with security against malicious behavior. Our second contribution is a complete Paillier (in: EUROCRYPT, pp 223–238, 1999 ) threshold encryption scheme in the two-party setting with security against malicious attacks. We further describe how to extend our protocols to the multiparty setting with dishonest majority. Our RSA key generation protocol is comprised of the following subprotocols: ( i ) a distributed protocol for generation of an RSA composite and ( ii ) a biprimality test for verifying the validity of the generated composite. Our Paillier threshold encryption scheme uses the RSA composite for the public key and is comprised of the following subprotocols: ( i ) a distributed generation of the corresponding secret key shares and ( ii ) a distributed decryption protocol for decrypting according to Paillier.

Journal of Cryptology•Feb 5, 2018•81 citations

Fast Distributed RSA Key Generation for Semi-honest and Malicious Adversaries

Tore Kasper Frederiksen, Yehuda Lindell, Valery Osheter +1 more

We present two new, highly efficient, protocols for securely generating a distributed RSA key pair in the two-party setting. One protocol is semi-honestly secure and the other maliciously secure. Both are constant round and do not rely on any specific number-theoretic assumptions and improve significantly over the state-of-the-art by allowing a slight leakage (which we show to not affect security). For our maliciously secure protocol our most significant improvement comes from executing most of the protocol in a “strong” semi-honest manner and then doing a single, light, zero-knowledge argument of correct execution. We introduce other significant improvements as well. One such improvement arrives in showing that certain, limited leakage does not compromise security, which allows us to use lightweight subprotocols. Another improvement, which may be of independent interest, comes in our approach for multiplying two large integers using OT, in the malicious setting, without being susceptible to a selective-failure attack. Finally, we implement our malicious protocol and show that its performance is an order of magnitude better than the best previous protocol, which provided only semi-honest security. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2018•42 citations

A Note on the Relation between the Definitions of Security for Semi-Honest and Malicious Adversaries.

Carmit Hazay, Yehuda Lindell

In secure computation, a set of parties wish to jointly compute some function of their private inputs while preserving security properties like privacy, correctness and more. The two main adversary models that have been considered are semi-honest adversaries who follow the prescribed protocol but try to glean more information than allowed from the protocol transcript, and malicious adversaries who can run any efficient strategy in order to carry out their attack. As such they can deviate at will from the prescribed protocol. One would naturally expect that any protocol that is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries will automatically be secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. However, due to a technicality in the definition, this is not necessarily true. In this brief note, we explain why this is the case, and show that a slight modification to the definition of semi-honest adversaries (specifically, allowing a semi-honest adversary to change its received input) suffices for fixing this anomaly. Our aim in publishing this note is to make this curious fact more known to the wider cryptographic community. 1 Malicious Versus Semi-honest Adversaries

•Jan 1, 2010•12 citations

An unbreakable cryptosystem

Arindam Mitra

The remarkably long-standing problem of cryptography is to generate completely secure key. It is widely believed that the task cannot be achieved within classical cryptography. However, there is no proof in support of this belief. We present an incredibly simple classical cryptosystem which can generate completely secure key.

arXiv:cs/0412099•Dec 22, 2004•6 citations

Secure Judgment of Point and Line Relationship Against Malicious Adversaries and Its Applications

Xin Liu Xin Liu, Yang Xu Xin Liu, Gang Xu Yang Xu +2 more

With the rapid development of the Internet and information technology, the problem of zero-trust networks has become increasingly prominent, and secure multi-party computation has become a research hotspot to solve the problem of zero-trust networks. The secure judgment of point and line relationship is an important research branch of secure computing set geometry. However, most of resent secure computing protocols of point and line relationship are designed in the semi-honest model and cannot resist malicious attacks. Therefore, this paper analyzes the possible malicious adversary behaviors and designs a secure protocol in the malicious model. In this paper, the Paillier cryptosystem, zero- knowledge proof, and cut-choose method are used to resist malicious behavior, and the real/ideal model paradigm method is used to prove the security of the protocol. Compared with the existing solutions, the malicious model protocol is still efficient and widely used in real applications.

網際網路技術學刊•Sep 1, 2022•4 citations

Semi-Quantum Random Number Generation

Julia Guskind, Walter O. Krawec

Semi-quantum cryptography involves at least one user who is semi-quantum or “classical” in nature. Such a user can only interact with the quantum channel in a very restricted way. Many semi-quantum key distribution protocols have been developed, some with rigorous proofs of security. Here we show for the first time that quantum random number generation is possible in the semi-quantum setting. We also develop a rigorous proof of security, deriving a bound on the random bit generation rate of the protocol as a function of noise in the channel. Our protocol and proof may be broadly applicable to other quantum and semi-quantum cryptographic scenarios where users are limited in their capabilities.

arXiv:2210.16427•IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)•Sep 17, 2023•3 citations
We consider the problem of securely generating the keys of the Paillier crypto system [11] with (t; n) threshold decryption, without a trusted dealer. Nishide and Sakurai [10] describe a solution, secure inthe malicious model. We use their ideas to make a simpler solution for the semi-honest model, and further introduce a few optimisations. We implement the secure key generation protocol on a single computer, andconsider its performance.
The problem of generating an RSA composite in a distributed manner without leaking its factorization is particularly challenging and useful in many cryptographic protocols. Our first contribution is the first non-generic fully simulatable protocol for distributively generating an RSA composite with security against malicious behavior. Our second contribution is a complete Paillier (in: EUROCRYPT, pp 223–238, 1999 ) threshold encryption scheme in the two-party setting with security against malicious attacks. We further describe how to extend our protocols to the multiparty setting with dishonest majority. Our RSA key generation protocol is comprised of the following subprotocols: ( i ) a distributed protocol for generation of an RSA composite and ( ii ) a biprimality test for verifying the validity of the generated composite. Our Paillier threshold encryption scheme uses the RSA composite for the public key and is comprised of the following subprotocols: ( i ) a distributed generation of the corresponding secret key shares and ( ii ) a distributed decryption protocol for decrypting according to Paillier.
We present two new, highly efficient, protocols for securely generating a distributed RSA key pair in the two-party setting. One protocol is semi-honestly secure and the other maliciously secure. Both are constant round and do not rely on any specific number-theoretic assumptions and improve significantly over the state-of-the-art by allowing a slight leakage (which we show to not affect security). For our maliciously secure protocol our most significant improvement comes from executing most of the protocol in a “strong” semi-honest manner and then doing a single, light, zero-knowledge argument of correct execution. We introduce other significant improvements as well. One such improvement arrives in showing that certain, limited leakage does not compromise security, which allows us to use lightweight subprotocols. Another improvement, which may be of independent interest, comes in our approach for multiplying two large integers using OT, in the malicious setting, without being susceptible to a selective-failure attack. Finally, we implement our malicious protocol and show that its performance is an order of magnitude better than the best previous protocol, which provided only semi-honest security. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
In secure computation, a set of parties wish to jointly compute some function of their private inputs while preserving security properties like privacy, correctness and more. The two main adversary models that have been considered are semi-honest adversaries who follow the prescribed protocol but try to glean more information than allowed from the protocol transcript, and malicious adversaries who can run any efficient strategy in order to carry out their attack. As such they can deviate at will from the prescribed protocol. One would naturally expect that any protocol that is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries will automatically be secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. However, due to a technicality in the definition, this is not necessarily true. In this brief note, we explain why this is the case, and show that a slight modification to the definition of semi-honest adversaries (specifically, allowing a semi-honest adversary to change its received input) suffices for fixing this anomaly. Our aim in publishing this note is to make this curious fact more known to the wider cryptographic community. 1 Malicious Versus Semi-honest Adversaries
With the rapid development of the Internet and information technology, the problem of zero-trust networks has become increasingly prominent, and secure multi-party computation has become a research hotspot to solve the problem of zero-trust networks. The secure judgment of point and line relationship is an important research branch of secure computing set geometry. However, most of resent secure computing protocols of point and line relationship are designed in the semi-honest model and cannot resist malicious attacks. Therefore, this paper analyzes the possible malicious adversary behaviors and designs a secure protocol in the malicious model. In this paper, the Paillier cryptosystem, zero- knowledge proof, and cut-choose method are used to resist malicious behavior, and the real/ideal model paradigm method is used to prove the security of the protocol. Compared with the existing solutions, the malicious model protocol is still efficient and widely used in real applications.
Semi-quantum cryptography involves at least one user who is semi-quantum or “classical” in nature. Such a user can only interact with the quantum channel in a very restricted way. Many semi-quantum key distribution protocols have been developed, some with rigorous proofs of security. Here we show for the first time that quantum random number generation is possible in the semi-quantum setting. We also develop a rigorous proof of security, deriving a bound on the random bit generation rate of the protocol as a function of noise in the channel. Our protocol and proof may be broadly applicable to other quantum and semi-quantum cryptographic scenarios where users are limited in their capabilities.