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Cambridge University Press eBooks

The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation: Measurement, Invariance, and Ontology

Olímpia Lombardi

Published Apr 11, 2019• 7 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1017/9781108562218.004

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Quantum modal indeterminacy

Claudio Calosi

The paper investigates the existence and the nature of quantum indeterminacy in a particular realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, the Modal Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI)-together with an ontology of properties for quantum systems. In doing so, it serves a twofold purpose. First, it advances the debate on quantum ontology by showing precisely how and why indeterminacy arises in a quantum world-as described by the MHI. Second, it offers a naturalistic example of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy, an example coming from our best physics.

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The quantum ontology as a domain without objects

Bruno José Borge, Olímpia Lombardi

Standard quantum mechanics poses serious challenges to some principles deeply entrenched in traditional metaphysics. In particular, the theory defies the ontological category of individual object through three of its features: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. The difficulties have prompted the development of non-traditional ontological frameworks intended to account for the quantum domain. Some approaches advocate replacing the classical conception of a realm of objects endowed with properties by an ontology that either dispenses with the category of object altogether or treats it as a derivative notion. The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI) of quantum mechanics and Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) exemplify this position. MHI proposes an ontology in which quantum systems are non-objectual bundles of properties linked by definite physical relations. The OSR defends the ontological primacy of structures, within which objects are construed as nodes of relations. The aim of this article is to compare these two ontological approaches, highlighting both their points of convergence and their divergences, particularly in light of the ontological challenges posed by quantum mechanics. With this aim, the article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the ontology of MHI, introducing the distinction between type-properties and case-properties, characterizing quantum systems as non-objectual bundles, and analyzing the role of symmetry groups in providing physical content to the theory and governing actualization. Section 3 turns to OSR, examining its motivations, its distinction between physical and mathematical structures, and the modal character of structures. Section 4 offers a systematic comparison of the two approaches, considering their respective motivations and scope, their shared commitment to an object-free ontology, the role played by symmetry groups within each framework, and their contrasting interpretations of modality. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.

•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations
The paper investigates the existence and the nature of quantum indeterminacy in a particular realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, the Modal Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI)-together with an ontology of properties for quantum systems. In doing so, it serves a twofold purpose. First, it advances the debate on quantum ontology by showing precisely how and why indeterminacy arises in a quantum world-as described by the MHI. Second, it offers a naturalistic example of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy, an example coming from our best physics.
Standard quantum mechanics poses serious challenges to some principles deeply entrenched in traditional metaphysics. In particular, the theory defies the ontological category of individual object through three of its features: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. The difficulties have prompted the development of non-traditional ontological frameworks intended to account for the quantum domain. Some approaches advocate replacing the classical conception of a realm of objects endowed with properties by an ontology that either dispenses with the category of object altogether or treats it as a derivative notion. The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI) of quantum mechanics and Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) exemplify this position. MHI proposes an ontology in which quantum systems are non-objectual bundles of properties linked by definite physical relations. The OSR defends the ontological primacy of structures, within which objects are construed as nodes of relations. The aim of this article is to compare these two ontological approaches, highlighting both their points of convergence and their divergences, particularly in light of the ontological challenges posed by quantum mechanics. With this aim, the article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the ontology of MHI, introducing the distinction between type-properties and case-properties, characterizing quantum systems as non-objectual bundles, and analyzing the role of symmetry groups in providing physical content to the theory and governing actualization. Section 3 turns to OSR, examining its motivations, its distinction between physical and mathematical structures, and the modal character of structures. Section 4 offers a systematic comparison of the two approaches, considering their respective motivations and scope, their shared commitment to an object-free ontology, the role played by symmetry groups within each framework, and their contrasting interpretations of modality. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.