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Physical Review A

Implementation security of quantum key distribution due to polarization-dependent efficiency mismatch

Kejin Wei, Weijun Zhang, Yan-Lin Tang, Lixing You, Feihu Xu

Published Aug 20, 2019• 48 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) is a promising candidate for achieving high-rate quantum key distribution (QKD) over long distances, and it has been widely employed in recent QKD experiments. However, SNSPD is naturally polarization sensitive, which, if unchecked, could leave a back door for an eavesdropper to perform quantum hacking. Here, we experimentally study the polarization dependency on the detection efficiency of SNSPD and propose a quantum hacking attack to exploit this vulnerability. We experimentally characterize the polarization-dependent efficiencies of different SNSPDs and perform risk analysis on the security of a standard phase-encoding QKD implementation. Our experimental data and security analysis show that, if the effect of polarization-dependent efficiency is unnoticed, an eavesdropper can successfully hack the QKD implementation using the polarization-rotation attack. Countermeasures are also discussed. The result is important for the future design of secure implementations of QKD.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.100.022325

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Superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) is a promising candidate for achieving high-rate quantum key distribution (QKD) over long distances, and it has been widely employed in recent QKD experiments. However, SNSPD is naturally polarization sensitive, which, if unchecked, could leave a back door for an eavesdropper to perform quantum hacking. Here, we experimentally study the polarization dependency on the detection efficiency of SNSPD and propose a quantum hacking attack to exploit this vulnerability. We experimentally characterize the polarization-dependent efficiencies of different SNSPDs and perform risk analysis on the security of a standard phase-encoding QKD implementation. Our experimental data and security analysis show that, if the effect of polarization-dependent efficiency is unnoticed, an eavesdropper can successfully hack the QKD implementation using the polarization-rotation attack. Countermeasures are also discussed. The result is important for the future design of secure implementations of QKD.
The recent advances in superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD or SSPD) technology has enabled long distance quantum key distribution (QKD) over an optical fiber. We point out that the performance of SNSPDs play a crucial role in achieving a secure transmission distance of 100 km or longer. We analyze such an impact from a simplified model and use it to interpret results from our differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD experiment. This allows us to discuss the optimization of the detection time window and the clock frequency given the detector characteristics such as dark count rate, detection efficiency, and timing jitter.
We explore bright-light control of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) in the shunted configuration (a practical measure to avoid latching). In an experiment, we simulate an illumination pattern the SNSPD would receive in a typical quantum key distribution system under hacking attack. We show that it effectively blinds and controls the SNSPD. The transient blinding illumination lasts for a fraction of a microsecond and produces several deterministic fake clicks during this time. This attack does not lead to elevated timing jitter in the spoofed output pulse, and hence does not introduce significant errors. Five different SNSPD chip designs were tested. We consider possible countermeasures to this attack.
We demonstrate a practical countermeasure against a well-known class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that exploit detection efficiency mismatch, where the receiver's detectors do not exhibit identical responses to incoming photons across all degrees of freedom. This class of quantum hacking strategies is broad and significantly includes the time-shift attack, which targets an arrival-time-dependent side channel at the receiver. The four-state countermeasure, previously only proven to be secure in theory, is implemented here on a GHz-clocked prototype QKD system and evaluated for its security and performance. We show that its presence enables almost complete recovery of the system's ideal secret key rate. Our results provide strong justification for adopting this countermeasure as a standard component in future scalable and practical QKD systems.
The forthcoming era of quantum computers can be a threat to the conventional cryptography and data security. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides unconditional security under real-life conditions with several protocols over long distances in fibre and free space communication. Superconducting Nanowire Single Photon Detectors (SNSPDs) are becoming a dominant technology for QKD thanks to their unique characteristics, such as a near-unity efficiency in the infrared, low dark counts and picoseconds time resolution. Where the detector is typically a weakness of QKD, these SNSPDs characteristics make exploitation difficult. In this work, we characterized NbN SNSPDs at 2.2 K, using a CW laser source at 1550 nm, varying both bias currents and input photon rates to prove their high efficiency at low dark counts with a high counting rate, consistent with the requirements for QKD over long distances or with a high secure key rate.
Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of quantum key distribution systems. Even though such attacks are technically challenging to implement, it is important to consider countermeasures to avoid information leakage. In this paper, we present a countermeasure against these kinds of attacks based on the use of multipixel detectors. We show that with this method, we are able to estimate an upper bound on the information an eavesdropper could have on the key exchanged. Finally, we test a multipixel detector based on superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors to show it can fulfill all the requirements for our countermeasure to be effective.
In free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), the sensitivity of the receiver's detector channels may depend differently on the spatial mode of incoming photons. Consequently, an attacker can control the spatial mode to break security. We experimentally investigate a standard polarization QKD receiver and identify sources of efficiency mismatch in its optical scheme. We model a practical intercept-and-resend attack and show that it would break security in most situations. We show experimentally that adding an appropriately chosen spatial filter at the receiver's entrance may be an effective countermeasure.