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International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)

Post-Quantum Cryptography in Embedded Systems

Soundes Marzougui, Juliane Krämer

Published Aug 9, 2019• 14 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum computers that can run Shor's algorithm are expected to become available in the next decade. These algorithms can be used to break conventional digital signature schemes (e.g. RSA or ECDSA), which are widely used in embedded systems today. This puts these systems at risk when they are used in safety-relevant long-term applications such as automotive systems or critical infrastructures. To mitigate this risk, classical digital signature schemes used must be replaced by schemes secure against quantum computer based attacks.

DOI
10.1145/3339252.3341475

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Quantum computers that can run Shor's algorithm are expected to become available in the next decade. These algorithms can be used to break conventional digital signature schemes (e.g. RSA or ECDSA), which are widely used in embedded systems today. This puts these systems at risk when they are used in safety-relevant long-term applications such as automotive systems or critical infrastructures. To mitigate this risk, classical digital signature schemes used must be replaced by schemes secure against quantum computer based attacks.
The rapid development of quantum computing has introduced serious concerns for modern cryptography, especially in embedded systems. These devices typically rely on well-established cryptographic techniques like RSA and ECC, which have provided secure communications and authentication for ages. However, with the advancement of quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's, these classical approaches are now at risk. Once large-scale quantum computers become operational, they could easily break public-key encryption and weaken symmetric encryption, putting embedded devices at significant risk, especially those that remain in use for over a decade with limited or no ability to receive updates. That's why adopting post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming urgent, not because quantum computers are already here, but because the systems we build today may still be running a decade from now, when those threats become real. Additionally, “record now, decrypt later” attacks mean that sensitive data being encrypted today could be compromised in the future, even if it seems safe now. To respond to this challenge, several possible PQC algorithms have been developed and standardized. NIST has selected Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium and SPHINCS+ for digital signatures, and other algorithms like FALCON and SABER are being evaluated for more specialized use. However, implementing these algorithms in embedded environments is quite tricky due to concrete hardware and software constraints like RAM restrictions, CPU power limits, and certainly vulnerability to other independent attacks. In summary, this work discusses the challenges mentioned above and outlines the migration strategies, including cryptographic inventory, hybrid approaches to adoption, and systems with cryptoagility. The report provides a view of how embedded systems can be made ready to become secure in a post-quantum future, relying on literature, governmental resolutions, and real-world implementations.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing presents a significant challenge to classical cryptographic systems that underpin modern digital security infrastructures. In particular, RSA-2048 encryption, widely deployed in banking and financial institutions for secure transactions, relies on the computational hardness of integer factorization. However, the emergence of quantum algorithms—especially Shor’s algorithm—poses a fundamental threat to RSA security by enabling polynomial-time factorization of large integers on sufficiently powerful quantum computers. This case study investigates the vulnerability of RSA-2048 within a banking environment, analyzing the mathematical foundations of the threat, potential timelines for quantum feasibility, and associated cybersecurity risks. The study further examines the implications for financial data protection, digital signatures, and secure communication channels. In response to these emerging risks, the paper explores post-quantum cryptographic alternatives, including lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based schemes, and evaluates their suitability for banking applications. The findings emphasize the urgency of transitioning toward quantum-resistant cryptographic frameworks and propose strategic recommendations for proactive cryptographic migration to ensure long-term data confidentiality and system resilience.
The advent of quantum computing presents a significant threat to the security of modern cryptographic systems, particularly those underpinning critical infrastructure such as power grids, financial networks, healthcare systems, telecommunications, and industrial control systems. Shor’s algorithm, when executed on a sufficiently powerful fault-tolerant quantum computer, has the potential to break widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms, including RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), thereby compromising data confidentiality, authentication, and secure communication. This paper examines the role of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in preparing critical infrastructure for the emerging quantum threat. It explores the principles of quantum resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based approaches, and highlights standardized solutions such as ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA. Furthermore, the study discusses the challenges associated with transitioning legacy systems to quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms, including interoperability, computational overhead, resource constraints, and long-term infrastructure compatibility. It also emphasizes the importance of cryptographic inventory management, crypto-agility, hybrid cryptographic deployments, and phased migration strategies to mitigate risks such as “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents a fundamental challenge to widely deployed classical cryptographic systems.Public-key algorithms such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) rely on mathematical problems that are considered computationally infeasible for classical computers but can potentially be solved efficiently by sufficiently capable quantum computers using Shor's algorithm.Symmetric cryptography is less severely affected, although Grover's algorithm reduces the effective security provided by a fixed key length.Replacing every existing cryptographic system immediately with post-quantum cryptography is neither technically nor operationally straightforward.Financial institutions, government organisations and large enterprises operate extensive cryptographic infrastructures involving legacy applications, APIs, certificates, hardware security modules, databases, digital signatures, mobile applications and third-party systems.This paper proposes a Classical Cryptography Quantum Hardening Framework (CCQHF) that combines cryptographic inventory, risk classification, hybrid cryptographic mechanisms, increased symmetric-key strength, cryptographic agility, key-management improvements and staged adoption of post-quantum cryptography.The framework does not claim to make RSA or ECC resistant to Shor's algorithm.Instead, it proposes a controlled architecture in which classical cryptography is retained where appropriate while quantum-vulnerable components are protected through hybrid mechanisms and ultimately replaced by standardised post-quantum algorithms.
Traditional cryptographic systems that are based on algorithms such as RSA, ECC, and DH are becoming increasingly vulnerable to quantum-based attacks. This is especially the case attributable to algorithms such as Shor’s, which are able to factor large integers and solve discrete logarithms in an efficient manner. There has been a rapid advancement in quantum computing. There is a significant risk to the integrity, confidentiality, and security of the data that a result of this. Cryptographic algorithms that are immune to both classical and quantum attacks are the goal of post-quantum cryptography, often known as PQC. The purpose of this study is to investigate a variety of post-quantum algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, and to evaluate the possibility of these algorithms to successfully defend against future quantum attacks. Within the context of real-world applications, we dissect the security assumptions, performance indicators, and issues that these algorithms present. In addition to this, we investigate the current efforts that are being made to standardize PQC through projects such as the NIST post-quantum cryptography work. In order to ensure the safety of data over the long term, this study offers some insights into the process of developing cryptographic methods that are durable in preparation for the era of quantum computing.