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Improved No-Go for Quantum Seals

Shelby Kimmel, Shimon Kolkowitz

Published Feb 27, 2018• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We investigate the feasibility of quantum seals. A quantum seal is a state provided by Alice to Bob along with information which Bob can use to make a measurement, break the seal, and read the classical message stored inside. There are two success criteria for a seal: the probability Bob can successfully read the message without any further information from Alice must be high, and if Alice asks for the state back from Bob, the probability Alice can tell if Bob broke the seal without permission must be high. We build on the work of [Chau, PRA 2007], which gave optimal bounds on these criteria, showing that they are mutually exclusive for high probability. We weaken the assumptions of this previous work by providing Bob with only a classical description of a prescribed measurement, rather than classical descriptions of the possible seal states. We show that this weakening does not affect the bounds but does simplify the analysis. We also prove upper and lower bounds on an alternative operational metric for measuring the success criteria.

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We investigate the feasibility of quantum seals. A quantum seal is a state provided by Alice to Bob along with information which Bob can use to make a measurement, break the seal, and read the classical message stored inside. There are two success criteria for a seal: the probability Bob can successfully read the message without any further information from Alice must be high, and if Alice asks for the state back from Bob, the probability Alice can tell if Bob broke the seal without permission must be high. We build on the work of [Chau, PRA 2007], which gave optimal bounds on these criteria, showing that they are mutually exclusive for high probability. We weaken the assumptions of this previous work by providing Bob with only a classical description of a prescribed measurement, rather than classical descriptions of the possible seal states. We show that this weakening does not affect the bounds but does simplify the analysis. We also prove upper and lower bounds on an alternative operational metric for measuring the success criteria.
Consider two parties: Alice and Bob and suppose that Bob is given a qubit system in a quantum state ϕ , unknown to him. Alice knows ϕ and she is supposed to convince Bob that she knows ϕ sending some test message. Is it possible for her to convince Bob providing him "zero knowledge" i. e. no information about ϕ he has? We prove that there is no "zero knowledge" protocol of that kind. In fact it turns out that basing on Alice message, Bob (or third party - Eve - who can intercept the message) can synthetize a copy of the unknown qubit state ϕ with nonzero probability. This "no-go" result puts general constrains on information processing where information about quantum state is involved.
Consider two parties: Alice and Bob and suppose that Bob is given a qubit system in a quantum state phi\\phiphi, unknown to him. Alice knows phi\\phiphi and she is supposed to convince Bob that she knows phi\\phiphi sending some test message. Is it possible for her to convince Bob providing him "zero knowledge" i. e. no information about phi\\phiphi he has? We prove that there is no "zero knowledge" protocol of that kind. In fact it turns out that basing on Alice message, Bob (or third party - Eve - who can intercept the message) can synthetize a copy of the unknown qubit state phi\\phiphi with nonzero probability. This "no-go" result puts general constrains on information processing where information {\\it about} quantum state is involved.
Abstract: A quantum sealing protocol is a quantum cryptographic protocol that can detect unsealing of a message. It is known that quantum bit sealing is insecure. However, this does not imply that quantum string sealing is also insecure. So the possibility of quantum string sealing has been studied. In this paper, we propose a quantum sealing protocol and give an information theoretic analysis. We also show that our protocol is almost optimal for uniformly distributed inputs in the sense that the upper bound of information leaks almost matches the trivial lower bound.
In this paper, we propose a method of enciphering quantum states of two-state systems (qubits) for sending them in secrecy without entangled qubits shared by two legitimate users (Alice and Bob). This method has the following two properties. First, even if an eavesdropper (Eve) steals qubits, she can extract information from them with only a certain probability at most. Second, Alice and Bob can confirm that the qubits are transmitted between them correctly by measuring a signature. If Eve measures m qubits one by one from n enciphered qubits and sends alternative ones (the intercept/resend attack), the probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's action is equal to (3/4) m or less. Passwords for decryption and the signature are given by classical binary strings and they are disclosed through a public channel. Enciphering classical information by this method is equivalent to the one-time pad method with distributing a classical key (random binary string) by the BB84 protocol. If Eve takes away qubits, Alice and Bob lose the original quantum information. If we apply our method to a state in iteration, Eve's success probability decreases exponentially. We cannot examine security against the case that Eve makes an attack using entanglement. This remains to be solved in the future.
We consider the following simple scenario: Alice has one of many possible messages, drawn from a known distribution, and wants to maximize the probability that Bob guesses her message correctly. We prove that if Alice can send only a qudit to Bob, without preshared entanglement, there is never any advantage over sending him a classical dit. This result was previously known only for a uniform distribution. We also prove a mixed-state generalization of this result in the form of an upper bound on the success probability of discriminating between mixed quantum states with a single measurement. This bound is based solely on the dimension, probability distribution, and eigenvalues of the states and is sharp among such bounds.
Seal in classical information is simply impossible. Since classical information can be easily copied any number of times. Based on quantum information, esp. quantum unclonable theorem, quantum seal maybe constructed perfectly. But it is shown that perfect quantum seal is impossible, and the success probability is bounded. In this paper, we show how to exceed the optimal bound by using the TCF (Trapdoor Claw Free) functions, which can be constructed based on LWE assumption. Hence it is post-quantum secure.