We determine the secrecy capacities of AVQCs (arbitrarily varying quantum channels). Both secrecy capacity with average error probability and with maximal error probability are derived. Both derivations are based on one common code construction. The code we construct fulfills a stringent secrecy requirement, which is called the strong code concept. We determine when the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters and completely characterize its discontinuity points both for average error criterion and for maximal error criterion. Furthermore, we prove the phenomenon “super-activation” for secrecy capacities of AVQCs, i.e., two quantum channels both with zero secrecy capacity, which, if used together, allow secure transmission with positive capacity. We also discuss the relations between the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity for AVQCs.
We determine the secrecy capacities of AVQCs (arbitrarily varying quantum channels). Both secrecy capacity with average error probability and with maximal error probability are derived. Both derivations are based on one common code construction. The code we construct fulfills a stringent secrecy requirement, which is called the strong code concept. We determine when the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters and completely characterize its discontinuity points both for average error criterion and for maximal error criterion. Furthermore, we prove the phenomenon “super-activation” for secrecy capacities of AVQCs, i.e., two quantum channels both with zero secrecy capacity, which, if used together, allow secure transmission with positive capacity. We also discuss the relations between the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity for AVQCs.
We determine the secrecy capacities of arbitrarily varying quantum channels (AVQCs). Both secrecy capacities with average error probability and with maximal error probability are derived. Both derivations are based on one common code construction. The code we construct fulfills a stringent secrecy requirement, which is called the strong code concept. As an application of our result for secret message transmission over AVQCs, we determine when the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters and completely characterize its discontinuity points both for average error criterion and for maximal error criterion. Furthermore, we prove the phenomenon “superactivation” for secrecy capacities of arbitrarily varying quantum channels, i.e., two quantum channels both with zero secrecy capacity, which, if used together, allow secure transmission with positive capacity. We give therewith an answer to the question “When is the secrecy capacity a continuous function of the system parameters?,” which has been listed as an open problem in quantum information problem page of the Institut für Theoretische Physik (ITP) Hannover. We also discuss the relations between the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity for AVQCs. Ahlswede et al. made in 2013 the conjecture that the entanglement generating capacity of an AVQC is equal to its entanglement generating capacity under shared randomness assisted quantum coding. We demonstrate that the validity of this conjecture implies that the entanglement generating capacity, the entanglement distillation capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity of an AVQC are continuous functions of the system parameters. Consequently, under the premise of this conjecture, the secrecy capacities of an AVQC differ significantly from the general quantum capacities.
The question of additivity of the capacity of a channel goes back to Shannon who asked this for the zero error capacity function. Despite the common sense that the capacity is usually additive, there is surprisingly little known for non-trivial channels. This paper addresses this question for the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) which models secure communication in the presence of arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) conditions. For orthogonal AVWCs it has been shown that the non-additivity phenomenon of super-activation occurs; that is, there are orthogonal AVWCs, each having zero secrecy capacity, which allow for transmission with positive secrecy rate if they are used together. It is shown that for such orthogonal AVWCs super-activation is generic in the sense that whenever super-activation is possible, it is possible for all AVWCs in a certain neighborhood as well. Moreover, it is shown that the issue of super-activation and the continuity of the secrecy capacity solely depend on the legitimate link. Accordingly, the single-user AVC is studied and it is shown that in this case, super-activation for non-secure message transmission is not possible, making it a unique feature of secure communication over AVWCs. However, the capacity for message transmission of the single-user AVC is shown to be super-additive including a complete characterization.
The question of whether the capacity of a channel is additive or not goes back to Shannon, who asked this for the zero-error capacity function. Despite the common sense that the capacity is usually additive, there is surprisingly little known for non-trivial channels. This chapter addresses this question for the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC), which models secure communication in the presence of arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) conditions. For orthogonal AVWCs it has been shown that the strongest form of non-additivity occurs: the phenomenon of super-activation. That is, there are orthogonal AVWCs, each having zero secrecy capacity, which allow for transmission with positive rate if they are used together. Subsequently, the single-user AVC is studied and it is shown that in this case, super-activation for non-secure message transmission is not possible, making it a unique feature of secure communication over AVWCs. However, the capacity for message transmission of the single-user AVC is shown to be super-additive, including a complete characterization. Super-activation was known for a long time in the area of quantum communication, where it is common opinion that this is solely a phenomenon of quantum physics and that this cannot occur for classical communication. However, the results in this chapter show that super-activation is indeed a feature of secure communication and therewith occurs in classical, non-quantum, communication as well. Introduction Information theory goes back to Shannon's seminal work “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” [1]. Since then it has been proven to be an indispensable concept for analyzing complex communication systems to obtain insights and optimal design criteria. Among many things, it is used to address the important issue of medium access control: How should available resources be divided among multiple users in the best possible way? This is a crucial question, especially for wireless communication systems since they are usually composed of orthogonal sub-systems such as those that arise via time division multiplexing (TDM) or orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM). Of particular interest then is to know how the capacity of the overall system depends on the orthogonal sub-systems. Common sense tells us that for such systems it should be given by the sum of the capacities of all sub-systems. This goes along with the inherent world view of the additivity of classical resources.
We analyze arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. These channels are subject to two attacks at the same time: one passive (eavesdropping), and one active (jamming). We progress on previous works [5] and [6] by introducing a reduced class of allowed codes that fulfills a more stringent secrecy requirement than earlier definitions. In addition, we prove that non-symmetrizability of the legal link is sufficient for equality of the deterministic and the common randomness assisted secrecy capacities. At last, we focus on analytic properties of both secrecy capacities: We completely characterize their discontinuity points, and their super-activation properties.
We establish the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e., either the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is zero, or it equals its randomness assisted secrecy capacity. We analyze the secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels when the sender and the receiver use various resources. It turns out that having randomness, common randomness, and correlation as resources are very helpful for achieving a positive deterministic secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. We prove the phenomenon “super-activation” for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e., two arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, both with zero deterministic secrecy capacity, if used together allow perfect secure transmission.
We analyze arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. These channels are subject to two attacks at the same time: one passive (eavesdropping) and one active (jamming). We elaborate on our previous studies [H. Boche et al., Quantum Inf. Process. 15(11), 4853–4895 (2016) and H. Boche et al., Quantum Inf. Process. 16(1), 1–48 (2016)] by introducing a reduced class of allowable codes that fulfills a more stringent secrecy requirement than earlier definitions. In addition, we prove that non-symmetrizability of the legal link is sufficient for equality of the deterministic and the common randomness assisted secrecy capacities. Finally, we focus on analytic properties of both secrecy capacities: We completely characterize their discontinuity points and their super-activation properties.