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Physics World

Beyond the quantum

Antony Valentini

Published Nov 1, 2009• 50 citations
Publisher

Abstract

After some 80 years, the meaning of quantum theory remains as controversial as ever. The theory, as presented in textbooks, involves a human observer performing experiments with microscopic quantum systems using macroscopic classical apparatus. The quantum system is described by a wavefunction – a mathematical object that is used to calculate probabilities but which gives no clear description of the state of reality of a single system. In contrast, the observer and apparatus are described classically and are assumed to have definite states of reality. For example, a pointer on a measuring device will show a particular reading, or a particle detector will "fire" a definite number of times. Quantum systems seem to inhabit a fuzzy, indefinite realm, while our everyday macroscopic world does not, even though the latter is ultimately built from the former.

DOI
10.1088/2058-7058/22/11/36

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After some 80 years, the meaning of quantum theory remains as controversial as ever. The theory, as presented in textbooks, involves a human observer performing experiments with microscopic quantum systems using macroscopic classical apparatus. The quantum system is described by a wavefunction – a mathematical object that is used to calculate probabilities but which gives no clear description of the state of reality of a single system. In contrast, the observer and apparatus are described classically and are assumed to have definite states of reality. For example, a pointer on a measuring device will show a particular reading, or a particle detector will "fire" a definite number of times. Quantum systems seem to inhabit a fuzzy, indefinite realm, while our everyday macroscopic world does not, even though the latter is ultimately built from the former.
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Quantum mechanics marks a radical departure from the classical understanding of Nature, fostering an inherent randomness which forbids a deterministic description; yet the most fundamental departure arises from something different. As shown by Bell [1] and Kochen-Specker [2], quantum mechanics portrays a picture of the world in which reality loses its objectivity and is in fact created by observation. Quantum mechanics predicts phenomena which cannot be explained by any theory with objective realism, although our everyday experience supports the hypothesis that macroscopic objects, despite being made of quantum particles, exist independently of the act of observation; in this paper we identify this behavior as classical. Here we show that this seemingly obvious classical behavior of the macroscopic world cannot be experimentally tested and belongs to the realm of ontology similar to the dispute on the interpretations of quantum mechanics [3,4]. For small systems such as a single photon [5] or a pair [6], it has been experimentally proven that a classical description cannot be sustained. Recently, there have also been experiments that claim to have demonstrated quantum behavior of relatively large objects such as interference of fullerenes [7], the violation of Leggett-Garg inequality in Josephson junction [8], and interference between two condensed clouds of atoms [9], which suggest that there is no limit to the size of the system on which the quantum-versus-classical question can be tested. These behaviors, however, are not sufficient to refute classical description in the sense of objective reality. Our findings show that once we reach the regime where an Avogadro number of particles is present, the quantum-versus-classical question cannot be answered experimentally.
Despite its enormous practical success, quantum theory is so contrary to intuition that, even after 45 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed?
Despite its enormous practical success, quantum theory is so contrary to intuition that, even after 45 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed?
An objective physics must keep the observer at bay. The goal of keeping the observer outside can, paradoxically, be achieved only if the observer is explicitly included in a larger picture — which then is observer-independent again. When proceeding in this way, one realizes that the world is necessarily defined only on the interface between the observer and the rest of the universe. Since this interface is inaccessible as an object, there seems to be no solution left for internal observers like us. We cannot step out of our own world in order to adopt the role of a "superobserver." Hence we cannot understand the world. Unexpectedly, there is a loophole: "model universes" can be set up which contain an explicit (microscopically specified) internal observer. As an example, it is possible to set up a classical molecular dynamics simulation of an excitable system which would act as a simplified "observer" in a larger artificial universe simulated in the same manner. One then, in addition to the observer, needs a "measuring apparatus" and an "object." The former could be a fluidic amplifier that acts like a power brake; the latter could be an ordinary particle in the universe in question that acts on the input piston of the pressure amplifier. (Three "reservoirs" would also be needed as an initial condition: "food" for the observer, a high pressure compartment to power the amplifier, and a set of "cool" particles allowing one to keep the first amplifier of the measuring chain sensitive for a while.) In such a scenario, the "interface" can be studied by us since we are on the outside. While it is still too early to do this explicitly in detail, it perhaps already makes sense to think about it and look at simplified cases. We may for example assume that all micromotions in the observer fall into two equivalence classes — backward and forward motion — that are pairwise identical under time reversal. This would occur, for example, if the observer consisted of many equal pendulums of the same period. Such an idealization is admissible for starters. Then, while in reality it is the observer who alternates between black and white time slices — in the sense that every motion in the observer repeats itself in the opposite direction — to the observer it is the rest of the universe which alternates between being time-inverted or not. That is, relative to the observer, the external reality is subject to a succession of rapid causality reversals. This impression will be incorrigible. The incorrigibility goes so far that even macroscopic records cannot correct for the "hallucinatory" impressions generated in the internal observer by the behavior of a micro-object. This is counterintuitive. At first sight there is no reason apparent why an "objectively presenting machinery" should not be able to overcome the limitation. However, a causality vacillation is "too deep" a property of the interface to be overridden by any auxiliary machinery in the universe in question. From this fact it follows that many objective features of the world (including macroscopic ones) which appear on the interface are only "observer-objective" but not really (exo) objective. Collectively, these properties form a set undetectable to the observer since the fact that they exist only for him is nowhere represented. In the absence of a "tag" they represent what could be called the "Kafkaesque part of physics." A cure for this disability is impossible to obtain from the inside of the universe in question. Nevertheless the inhabitants can embark on an endophysical program of their own in principle — if we assume they are sophisticated enough on the macro level (consisting, for example, of many excitable systems as an advanced neuronal network). That is, they can build a still lower level universe themselves. Endophysics therefore becomes "level invariant" science. In this way the inhabitants can begin to doubt the exo-objective nature of certain phenomena. In particular, "observer-centered" phenomena are likely to kindle their suspicion. Does it make sense in our own world to mark observer-centered phenomena with an "exophysical question mark" as well? At least five types of phenomena in our own world are "observer-centered." They each arise from a privilege, viz.: • Bohr's privilege ("Which reality am I to create by deciding to measure either the position or the momentum?") • Heisenberg's privilege ("Where in the chain am I to place the cut?") • Wheeler's privilege. ("For how long am I to wait before choosing what to measure?") • Bell's privilege ("Which nonlocal correlations at a distance am I to generate?") • Everett's privilege ("What choice of world am I happy with?") Analogs of all these suspicion-generating privileges exist in the model universe. The possibility of doing "meta-experiments" (as one would advise the inhabitants of the lower world to perform) therefore arises as an option for the inhabitants — as well as us. A glimpse of what lies behind the curtain is therefore accessible in principle, it appears.