Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Secure and Robust Identification via Classical-Quantum Channels

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe, Andreas Winter

Published Jun 1, 2018• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”), under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we consider first compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper, considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then also the secrecy identification capacity is zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC), with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.

DOI
10.1109/isit.2018.8437893

Related papers

Secure and Robust Identification via Classical-Quantum Channels

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe, Andreas Winter

We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”) under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we first consider compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper by considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then the secrecy identification capacity is also zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC) with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.

arXiv:1801.09967•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Jun 5, 2019•25 citations

Secure Identification for Wiretap Channels; Robustness, Super-Additivity and Continuity

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe

We determine the identification capacity of compound channels in the presence of a wiretapper. It turns out that the secure identification capacity formula fulfills a dichotomy theorem: It is positive and equals the identification capacity of the channel if its message transmission secrecy capacity is positive. Otherwise, the secure identification capacity is zero. Thus, we show in the case that the secure identification capacity is greater than zero we do not pay a price for secure identification, i.e., the secure identification capacity is equal to the identification capacity. This is in strong contrast to the transmission capacity of the compound wiretap channel. We then use this characterization to investigate the analytic behavior of the secure identification capacity. In particular, it is practically relevant to investigate its continuity behavior as a function of the channels. We completely characterize this continuity behavior. We analyze the (dis-) continuity and (super-) additivity of the capacities. In 1998, N. Alon gave a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity of capacity functions in graphs. We show that this maximal violation as well holds for the secure identification capacity of compound wiretap channels. This is the first example of a capacity function exhibiting this behavior.

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security•Jan 23, 2018•65 citations

Robust and secure identification

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe

We determine the identification capacity of compound channels with and without wiretapper. It turned out, that the secure capacity formula fulfill a dichotomy theorem. It is positive if its secure capacity is positive and equals the transmission capacity of the channel. Otherwise the capacity is zero. We analyze the (dis-)continuity and (super-)additivity of the capacities, which we determined. Alon gave in [6] a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity for capacity functions. We show that this maximal violation holds for the secure identification capacity. This is the first example of a capacity function, which has this behavior.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2017•8 citations

New directions in the theory of identification via channels

Rudolf Ahlswede, Z. Zhang

Studies two problems in the theory of identification via channels. The first problem concerns the identification via channels with noisy feedback. Whereas for Shannon's transmission problem the capacity of a discrete memoryless channel does not change with feedback, it is known that the identification capacity is affected by feedback. The authors study its dependence on the feedback channel. They prove both, a direct and a converse coding theorem. Although a gap exists between the upper and lower bounds provided by these two theorems, the known result for channels without feedback and the known result for channels with complete feedback, are both special cases of these two new theorems, because in these cases the bounds coincide. The second problem is the identification via wiretap channels. A secrecy identification capacity is defined for the wiretap channel. A "dichotomy theorem" is proved which says that the second-order secrecy identification capacity is the same as Shannon's capacity for the main channel as long as the secrecy transmission capacity of the wiretap channel is not zero, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, one can say that the identification capacity is not lowered by the presence of a wiretapper as long as 1 bit can be transmitted (or identified) correctly with arbitrarily small error probability. This is in strong contrast to the case of transmission.>

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Jul 1, 1995•71 citations

Secure Deterministic Identification with Feedback and Sensing over State-Dependent Wiretap Channels

Vida Gholamian, Yaning Zhao, Christian Deppe +2 more

Identification differs from classical transmission in that the receiver determines whether a particular identity was sent rather than recovering a message. We study secure deterministic identification over state-dependent discrete memoryless wiretap channels with private noiseless feedback and a sensing distortion constraint. The encoder has no local randomness and uses only the identity and past feedback. A symbol-wise input restriction guarantees the sensing constraint. We show that the secure deterministic identification capacity equals its non-secure feedback counterpart when the admissible main channel has positive ordinary transmission capacity and H(Y|Z,X=x)>0 for some fixed admissible input x. This equality does not require positive classical wiretap secrecy capacity. For achievability, noiseless feedback generates common randomness for identification and enables secret-key extraction by privacy amplification. The extracted key one-time-pad encrypts a short identification tag, whose reliable transmission requires only a sublinear number of additional channel uses. We also present an alternative construction in which feedback-generated randomness replaces the local randomization of a stochastic wiretap encoder. We further prove that secure identification capacity vanishes whenever non-secure identification capacity is zero. We also identify a class of channels with input-independent wiretapper observations that achieves full non-secure identification capacity even when the private conditional feedback entropy is zero, illustrated by a binary state-dependent wiretap channel. Thus, feedback can support both identification and secrecy without local encoder randomization while satisfying sensing constraints.

arXiv:2610.41646•Oct 30, 2026•1 citation

On the Continuity of the Secrecy Capacity of Compound and Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channels

Holger Boche, Rafael F. Schaefer, H. Vincent Poor

The wiretap channel models secure communication between two users in the presence of an eavesdropper who must be kept ignorant of transmitted messages. The performance of such a system is usually characterized by its secrecy capacity which determines the maximum transmission rate of secure communication. In this paper, the issue of whether or not the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters is examined. In particular, this is done for channel uncertainty modeled via compound channels and arbitrarily varying channels, in which the legitimate users know only that the true channel realization is from a prespecified uncertainty set. In the former model, this realization remains constant for the entire duration of transmission, while in the latter the realization varies from channel use to channel use in an unknown and arbitrary manner. These models not only capture the case of channel uncertainty, but are also suitable for modeling scenarios in which a malicious adversary jams or otherwise influences the legitimate transmission. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is shown to be robust in the sense that it is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. Thus, small variations in the uncertainty set lead to small variations in secrecy capacity. On the other hand, the deterministic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is shown to be discontinuous in the uncertainty set meaning that small variations can lead to dramatic losses in capacity.

arXiv:1409.4752•IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security•Aug 13, 2015•51 citations
We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”), under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we consider first compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper, considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then also the secrecy identification capacity is zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC), with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.
We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”) under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we first consider compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper by considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then the secrecy identification capacity is also zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC) with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.
We determine the identification capacity of compound channels in the presence of a wiretapper. It turns out that the secure identification capacity formula fulfills a dichotomy theorem: It is positive and equals the identification capacity of the channel if its message transmission secrecy capacity is positive. Otherwise, the secure identification capacity is zero. Thus, we show in the case that the secure identification capacity is greater than zero we do not pay a price for secure identification, i.e., the secure identification capacity is equal to the identification capacity. This is in strong contrast to the transmission capacity of the compound wiretap channel. We then use this characterization to investigate the analytic behavior of the secure identification capacity. In particular, it is practically relevant to investigate its continuity behavior as a function of the channels. We completely characterize this continuity behavior. We analyze the (dis-) continuity and (super-) additivity of the capacities. In 1998, N. Alon gave a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity of capacity functions in graphs. We show that this maximal violation as well holds for the secure identification capacity of compound wiretap channels. This is the first example of a capacity function exhibiting this behavior.
We determine the identification capacity of compound channels with and without wiretapper. It turned out, that the secure capacity formula fulfill a dichotomy theorem. It is positive if its secure capacity is positive and equals the transmission capacity of the channel. Otherwise the capacity is zero. We analyze the (dis-)continuity and (super-)additivity of the capacities, which we determined. Alon gave in [6] a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity for capacity functions. We show that this maximal violation holds for the secure identification capacity. This is the first example of a capacity function, which has this behavior.
Studies two problems in the theory of identification via channels. The first problem concerns the identification via channels with noisy feedback. Whereas for Shannon's transmission problem the capacity of a discrete memoryless channel does not change with feedback, it is known that the identification capacity is affected by feedback. The authors study its dependence on the feedback channel. They prove both, a direct and a converse coding theorem. Although a gap exists between the upper and lower bounds provided by these two theorems, the known result for channels without feedback and the known result for channels with complete feedback, are both special cases of these two new theorems, because in these cases the bounds coincide. The second problem is the identification via wiretap channels. A secrecy identification capacity is defined for the wiretap channel. A "dichotomy theorem" is proved which says that the second-order secrecy identification capacity is the same as Shannon's capacity for the main channel as long as the secrecy transmission capacity of the wiretap channel is not zero, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, one can say that the identification capacity is not lowered by the presence of a wiretapper as long as 1 bit can be transmitted (or identified) correctly with arbitrarily small error probability. This is in strong contrast to the case of transmission.>
Identification differs from classical transmission in that the receiver determines whether a particular identity was sent rather than recovering a message. We study secure deterministic identification over state-dependent discrete memoryless wiretap channels with private noiseless feedback and a sensing distortion constraint. The encoder has no local randomness and uses only the identity and past feedback. A symbol-wise input restriction guarantees the sensing constraint. We show that the secure deterministic identification capacity equals its non-secure feedback counterpart when the admissible main channel has positive ordinary transmission capacity and H(Y|Z,X=x)>0 for some fixed admissible input x. This equality does not require positive classical wiretap secrecy capacity. For achievability, noiseless feedback generates common randomness for identification and enables secret-key extraction by privacy amplification. The extracted key one-time-pad encrypts a short identification tag, whose reliable transmission requires only a sublinear number of additional channel uses. We also present an alternative construction in which feedback-generated randomness replaces the local randomization of a stochastic wiretap encoder. We further prove that secure identification capacity vanishes whenever non-secure identification capacity is zero. We also identify a class of channels with input-independent wiretapper observations that achieves full non-secure identification capacity even when the private conditional feedback entropy is zero, illustrated by a binary state-dependent wiretap channel. Thus, feedback can support both identification and secrecy without local encoder randomization while satisfying sensing constraints.
The wiretap channel models secure communication between two users in the presence of an eavesdropper who must be kept ignorant of transmitted messages. The performance of such a system is usually characterized by its secrecy capacity which determines the maximum transmission rate of secure communication. In this paper, the issue of whether or not the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters is examined. In particular, this is done for channel uncertainty modeled via compound channels and arbitrarily varying channels, in which the legitimate users know only that the true channel realization is from a prespecified uncertainty set. In the former model, this realization remains constant for the entire duration of transmission, while in the latter the realization varies from channel use to channel use in an unknown and arbitrary manner. These models not only capture the case of channel uncertainty, but are also suitable for modeling scenarios in which a malicious adversary jams or otherwise influences the legitimate transmission. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is shown to be robust in the sense that it is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. Thus, small variations in the uncertainty set lead to small variations in secrecy capacity. On the other hand, the deterministic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is shown to be discontinuous in the uncertainty set meaning that small variations can lead to dramatic losses in capacity.