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Opto-Electronics and Communications Conference (OECC)

A quantum hacking method without Eve’s detection and generation device

Min Soo Lee, Sang-Wook Han, Sung Moon

Published Jul 1, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We develop quantum hacking method without requires complex devices including cost high and has moderate quantum efficiency. Using the proposed quantum hacking method, we confirm that Eve can acquire quantum key without revealing her presence.
DOI
10.1109/oecc.2018.8729906

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