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Practical UC security with a Global Random Oracle.

Ran Canetti, Abhishek Jain, Alessandra Scafuro

Published Jan 1, 2014• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We show that there exist commitment, zero-knowledge and general function evaluation pro-tocols with universally composable security, in a model where all parties and all protocols have access to a single, global, random oracle and no other trusted setup. This model provides sig-nificantly stronger composable security guarantees than the traditional random oracle model of Bellare and Rogaway [CCS’93] or even the common reference string model. Indeed, these latter models provide no security guarantees in the presence of arbitrary protocols that use the same random oracle (or reference string or hash function). Furthermore, our protocols are highly efficient. Specifically, in the interactive setting, our commitment and general computation protocols are much more efficient than the best known ones due to Lindell [Crypto’11,’13] which are secure in the common reference string model. In the non-interactive setting, our protocols are slightly less efficient than the best known ones presented by Afshar et al. [Eurocrypt ’14] but do away with the need to rely on a non-global (programmable) reference string. 1

Related papers

Practical UC security with a Global Random Oracle

Ran Canetti, Abhishek Jain, Alessandra Scafuro

Contrary to prior belief, we show that there exist commitment, zero-knowledge and general function evaluation protocols with universally composable security, in a model where all parties and all protocols have access to a single, global, random oracle and no other trusted setup. This model provides significantly stronger composable security guarantees than the traditional random oracle model of Bellare and Rogaway [CCS'93] or even the common reference string model. Indeed, these latter models provide no security guarantees in the presence of arbitrary protocols that use the {\em same} random oracle (or reference string or hash function).

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Nov 3, 2014•98 citations

Universally Composable Protocols with Relaxed Set-Up Assumptions

Boaz Barak, Ran Canetti, Jesper Buus Nielsen +1 more

A desirable goal for cryptographic protocols is to guarantee security when the protocol is composed with other protocol instances. Universally composable (UC) protocols provide this guarantee in a strong sense: A protocol remains secure even when composed concurrently with an unbounded number of instances of arbitrary protocols. However, UC protocols for carrying out general tasks are known to exist only if a majority of the participants are honest, or in the common reference string (CRS) model where all parties are assumed to have access to a common string that is drawn from some pre-defined distribution. Furthermore, carrying out many interesting tasks in a UC manner and without honest majority or set-up assumptions is impossible, even if ideally authenticated communication is provided. A natural question is thus whether there exist more relaxed set-up assumptions than the CRS model that still allow for UC protocols. We answer this question in the affirmative: we propose alternative and relaxed set-up assumptions and show that they suffice for reproducing the general feasibility results for UC protocols in the CRS model. These alternative assumptions have the flavor of a "public-key infrastructure": parties have registered public keys, no single registration authority needs to be fully trusted, and no single piece of information has to be globally trusted and available. In addition, unlike known protocols in the CRS model, the proposed protocols guarantee some basic level of security even if the set-up assumption is violated.

Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science•Dec 23, 2004•219 citations

Universally Composable Commitments.

Ran Canetti, Marc Fischlin

Abstract. We propose a new security measure for commitment pro-tocols, called Universally Composable (UC) Commitment. The measure guarantees that commitment protocols behave like an \\ideal commitment service, " even when concurrently composed with an arbitrary set of pro-tocols. This is a strong guarantee: it implies that security is maintained even when an unbounded number of copies of the scheme are running concurrently, it implies non-malleability (not only with respect to other copies of the same protocol but even with respect to other protocols), it provides resilience to selective decommitment, and more. Unfortunately, two-party uc commitment protocols do not exist in the plain model. However, we construct two-party uc commitment proto-cols, based on general complexity assumptions, in the common reference string model where all parties have access to a common string taken from a predetermined distribution. The protocols are non-interactive, in the sense that both the commitment and the opening phases consist of a single message from the committer to the receiver.

•Jan 1, 2001•2 citations

On the Limitations of Universally Composable Two-Party Computation Without Set-up Assumptions.

Ran Canetti, Eyal Kushilevitz, Yehuda Lindell

Abstract. The recently proposed universally composable (UC) security framework, for analyzing security of cryptographic protocols, provides very strong security guarantees. In particular, a protocol proven secure in this framework is guaranteed to maintain its security even when deployed in arbitrary multi-party, multi-protocol, multi-execution environments. Protocols for securely carrying out essentially any cryptographic task in a universally composable way exist, both in the case of an honest majority (in the plain model, i.e., without set-up assumptions) and in the case of no honest majority (in the common reference string model). However, in the plain model, little was known for the case of no honest majority and, in particular, for the important special case of two-party protocols. We study the feasibility of universally composable two-party function evaluation in the plain model. Our results show that very few functions can be computed in this model so as to provide the UC security guarantees. Specifically, for the case of deterministic functions, we provide a full characterization of the functions computable in this model. (Essentially, these are the functions that depend on at most one of the parties’ inputs, and furthermore are “efficiently invertible ” in a sense defined within.) For the case of probabilistic functions, we show that the only functions computable in this model are those where one of the parties can essentially uniquely determine the joint output. 1

•Jan 1, 2004•0 citations

On Possibility of Universally Composable Commitments Based on Noisy Channels

Rafael Dowsley, Jörn Müller‐Quade, Anderson C. A. Nascimento

Universally Composable (UC) Commitment is a strong notion that guarantees security even when the commitment protocol is composed with arbitrary protocols running many of their copies in parallel. It is impossible to implement a protocol that realizes UC Commitment without set-up assumptions. However, it has been implemented using such assumptions as common reference string, certified public keys and random oracles. In this paper we prove that the existence of a binary symmetric channel between the parties makes possible the accomplishment of UC Commitment.

•Sep 1, 2008•9 citations

An Efficient Non-interactive Universally Composable String-Commitment Scheme

Ryo Nishimaki, Eiichiro Fujisaki, Keisuke Tanaka

This paper presents a new non-interactive string-commitment scheme that achieves universally composable security. Security is proven under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption (or the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption) in the common reference string (CRS) model. The universal composability (UC) is a very strong security notion. If cryptographic protocols are proven secure in the UC framework, then they remain secure even if they are composed with arbitrary protocols and polynomially many copies of the protocols are run concurrently. Many UC commitment schemes in the CRS model have been proposed, but they are either interactive commitment or bit-commitment (not string-commitment) schemes. We note, however, that although our scheme is the first non-interactive UC string-commitment scheme, a CRS is not reusable. We use an extension of all-but-one trapdoor functions (ABO-TDFs) proposed by Peikert and Waters at STOC 2008 as an essential building block. Our main idea is to extend (original deterministic) ABO-TDFs to probabilistic ones by using the homomorphic properties of their function indices. The function indices of ABO-TDFs consist of ciphertexts of homomorphic encryption schemes (such as ElGamal, and Damgård-Jurik encryption). Therefore we can re-randomize the output of ABO-TDFs by re-randomization of ciphertexts. This is a new application of ABO-TDFs.

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences•Jan 1, 2012•5 citations
We show that there exist commitment, zero-knowledge and general function evaluation pro-tocols with universally composable security, in a model where all parties and all protocols have access to a single, global, random oracle and no other trusted setup. This model provides sig-nificantly stronger composable security guarantees than the traditional random oracle model of Bellare and Rogaway [CCS’93] or even the common reference string model. Indeed, these latter models provide no security guarantees in the presence of arbitrary protocols that use the same random oracle (or reference string or hash function). Furthermore, our protocols are highly efficient. Specifically, in the interactive setting, our commitment and general computation protocols are much more efficient than the best known ones due to Lindell [Crypto’11,’13] which are secure in the common reference string model. In the non-interactive setting, our protocols are slightly less efficient than the best known ones presented by Afshar et al. [Eurocrypt ’14] but do away with the need to rely on a non-global (programmable) reference string. 1
Contrary to prior belief, we show that there exist commitment, zero-knowledge and general function evaluation protocols with universally composable security, in a model where all parties and all protocols have access to a single, global, random oracle and no other trusted setup. This model provides significantly stronger composable security guarantees than the traditional random oracle model of Bellare and Rogaway [CCS'93] or even the common reference string model. Indeed, these latter models provide no security guarantees in the presence of arbitrary protocols that use the {\em same} random oracle (or reference string or hash function).
A desirable goal for cryptographic protocols is to guarantee security when the protocol is composed with other protocol instances. Universally composable (UC) protocols provide this guarantee in a strong sense: A protocol remains secure even when composed concurrently with an unbounded number of instances of arbitrary protocols. However, UC protocols for carrying out general tasks are known to exist only if a majority of the participants are honest, or in the common reference string (CRS) model where all parties are assumed to have access to a common string that is drawn from some pre-defined distribution. Furthermore, carrying out many interesting tasks in a UC manner and without honest majority or set-up assumptions is impossible, even if ideally authenticated communication is provided. A natural question is thus whether there exist more relaxed set-up assumptions than the CRS model that still allow for UC protocols. We answer this question in the affirmative: we propose alternative and relaxed set-up assumptions and show that they suffice for reproducing the general feasibility results for UC protocols in the CRS model. These alternative assumptions have the flavor of a "public-key infrastructure": parties have registered public keys, no single registration authority needs to be fully trusted, and no single piece of information has to be globally trusted and available. In addition, unlike known protocols in the CRS model, the proposed protocols guarantee some basic level of security even if the set-up assumption is violated.
Abstract. We propose a new security measure for commitment pro-tocols, called Universally Composable (UC) Commitment. The measure guarantees that commitment protocols behave like an \\ideal commitment service, " even when concurrently composed with an arbitrary set of pro-tocols. This is a strong guarantee: it implies that security is maintained even when an unbounded number of copies of the scheme are running concurrently, it implies non-malleability (not only with respect to other copies of the same protocol but even with respect to other protocols), it provides resilience to selective decommitment, and more. Unfortunately, two-party uc commitment protocols do not exist in the plain model. However, we construct two-party uc commitment proto-cols, based on general complexity assumptions, in the common reference string model where all parties have access to a common string taken from a predetermined distribution. The protocols are non-interactive, in the sense that both the commitment and the opening phases consist of a single message from the committer to the receiver.
Abstract. The recently proposed universally composable (UC) security framework, for analyzing security of cryptographic protocols, provides very strong security guarantees. In particular, a protocol proven secure in this framework is guaranteed to maintain its security even when deployed in arbitrary multi-party, multi-protocol, multi-execution environments. Protocols for securely carrying out essentially any cryptographic task in a universally composable way exist, both in the case of an honest majority (in the plain model, i.e., without set-up assumptions) and in the case of no honest majority (in the common reference string model). However, in the plain model, little was known for the case of no honest majority and, in particular, for the important special case of two-party protocols. We study the feasibility of universally composable two-party function evaluation in the plain model. Our results show that very few functions can be computed in this model so as to provide the UC security guarantees. Specifically, for the case of deterministic functions, we provide a full characterization of the functions computable in this model. (Essentially, these are the functions that depend on at most one of the parties’ inputs, and furthermore are “efficiently invertible ” in a sense defined within.) For the case of probabilistic functions, we show that the only functions computable in this model are those where one of the parties can essentially uniquely determine the joint output. 1
Universally Composable (UC) Commitment is a strong notion that guarantees security even when the commitment protocol is composed with arbitrary protocols running many of their copies in parallel. It is impossible to implement a protocol that realizes UC Commitment without set-up assumptions. However, it has been implemented using such assumptions as common reference string, certified public keys and random oracles. In this paper we prove that the existence of a binary symmetric channel between the parties makes possible the accomplishment of UC Commitment.
This paper presents a new non-interactive string-commitment scheme that achieves universally composable security. Security is proven under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption (or the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption) in the common reference string (CRS) model. The universal composability (UC) is a very strong security notion. If cryptographic protocols are proven secure in the UC framework, then they remain secure even if they are composed with arbitrary protocols and polynomially many copies of the protocols are run concurrently. Many UC commitment schemes in the CRS model have been proposed, but they are either interactive commitment or bit-commitment (not string-commitment) schemes. We note, however, that although our scheme is the first non-interactive UC string-commitment scheme, a CRS is not reusable. We use an extension of all-but-one trapdoor functions (ABO-TDFs) proposed by Peikert and Waters at STOC 2008 as an essential building block. Our main idea is to extend (original deterministic) ABO-TDFs to probabilistic ones by using the homomorphic properties of their function indices. The function indices of ABO-TDFs consist of ciphertexts of homomorphic encryption schemes (such as ElGamal, and Damgård-Jurik encryption). Therefore we can re-randomize the output of ABO-TDFs by re-randomization of ciphertexts. This is a new application of ABO-TDFs.