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Revisit Of McCullagh-Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols.

Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo

Published Jan 1, 2004• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The recently proposed two-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols (with and without escrow) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation by McCullagh & Barreto are revisited. The protocol carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the protocols and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.

Related papers

Revisit of McCullagh-Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo

We revisit the two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol (2P-IDAKA) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation due to McCullagh & Barreto (2005). Protocol 2P-IDAKA carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, we demonstrated why both the protocol and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key (i.e., termed key-replicating attack in recent work of Krawczyk (2005)). We also demonstrate that both protocols do not achieve the key integrity property, first discussed by Janson & Tsudik (1995).

International journal of network security•Nov 1, 2005•29 citations

On Security Proof of McCullagh-Barreto's Key Agreement Protocol and its Variants.

Zhaohui Cheng, Liqun Chen

McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto, and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto’s second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model.

•Jan 1, 2005•12 citations

Cryptanalysis of ID-based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Renwang Su

Authenticated key agreement is an important original language of cryptology.This paper analyzes an ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol,carries a proof of security in the Bellare-Rogaway-93 model,pointes out the protocol is insecure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query.Researches show that the protocol can not resist the key compromise impersonation attack.

Jisuanji gongcheng•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

On security proof of McCullagh Barreto's key agreement protocol and its variants

Zhaohui Cheng, Liqun Chen

McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto's second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the BellareRogaway key agreement model.

International Journal of Security and Networks•Jan 1, 2007•34 citations

On the security of certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol

Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu

Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al. proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack -- key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes,such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.

International Conference on Information Technology in Medicine and Education•Aug 1, 2009•2 citations

Towards Security Two-part Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols.

Songping Li, Quan Yuan, Jin Li

Abstract. We first present a new security 2-AK protocol, which is more secure and more efficient than previously proposed ones. Meanwhile, we point that Xie’s ID-2-AK protocol modified from McCullagh-Barreto in CT-RSA 2005 doesn’t provide protection against KCI attack likewise, and finally utilize the modular arithmetic, first proposed in MQV and also used in Kim, to get a modified new ID-2-AK protocol. On second thoughts, we give another ID-2-AK protocol utilizing the operation of addition in finite field like our forenamed 2-AK protocol. The two ID-2-AK protocols are in possession of all the desired security attributes. We also compare our new protocols with others in terms of computational cost and security properties. Keywords. key management, authenticated protocol, ID-based, Key Compromise Impersonation 1

•Jan 1, 2005•20 citations
The recently proposed two-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols (with and without escrow) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation by McCullagh & Barreto are revisited. The protocol carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the protocols and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.
We revisit the two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol (2P-IDAKA) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation due to McCullagh & Barreto (2005). Protocol 2P-IDAKA carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, we demonstrated why both the protocol and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key (i.e., termed key-replicating attack in recent work of Krawczyk (2005)). We also demonstrate that both protocols do not achieve the key integrity property, first discussed by Janson & Tsudik (1995).
McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto, and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto’s second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model.
McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto's second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the BellareRogaway key agreement model.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al. proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack -- key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes,such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.
Abstract. We first present a new security 2-AK protocol, which is more secure and more efficient than previously proposed ones. Meanwhile, we point that Xie’s ID-2-AK protocol modified from McCullagh-Barreto in CT-RSA 2005 doesn’t provide protection against KCI attack likewise, and finally utilize the modular arithmetic, first proposed in MQV and also used in Kim, to get a modified new ID-2-AK protocol. On second thoughts, we give another ID-2-AK protocol utilizing the operation of addition in finite field like our forenamed 2-AK protocol. The two ID-2-AK protocols are in possession of all the desired security attributes. We also compare our new protocols with others in terms of computational cost and security properties. Keywords. key management, authenticated protocol, ID-based, Key Compromise Impersonation 1