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Experiment, time and theory : on the scientific exploration of the unobservable

J.A.M. Potters

Published Jan 1, 2019• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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The philosophy of experiment

Erwin Schrödinger

Il Nuovo Cimento•Jan 1, 1955•25 citations

In Defence of `This Worldly' Causality: Comments on van Fraassen's Laws and Symmetry

Nancy Delaney Cartwright

Recall van Fraassen's general scheme. Scientific models can depict both observable and unobservable processes. Science itself is supposed to tell us what is and what is not observable. We are to accept the theory if it gets right all that is observable; the rest can be of no matter to us, van Fraassen has suggested, because we could have no evidence about whether the model gets it right or not. We may believe in the model's picture of the unobservable world but that belief is based on faith not evidence, and should be recognised as such. Most of the stuff of modem physics, then, turns out to be in the unobservable part of the model: photons, quarks, gravity-waves, the electromagnetic field, forces, I suppose and even space-time itself. Where are causes? that is the question I want to discuss. We can begin with causal laws. They are surely for van Fraassen not in the model itself any more than any other kinds of laws. They enter, rather, as a constraint on the kinds of structures we will allow our models to have. In a full model for the entire history of the world, or more realistically, in a small model for a given scientific experiment, event-kinds will recur with some frequency. These frequencies are represented by probabilities-though note that the probabilities are not in the models either. If we insist that our scientific theory in a given domain be causal, that will restrict the form of the probability functions which are allowed and hence, in some way, constrain the actual models, which have finite frequencies in them only. Some patterns of correlation will be allowed and some will be prohibited. Consider van Fraassen's discussion of the Einstein-Podalsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox in the follow-up to Laws and Symmetry, Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View.' There van Fraassen takes a particular relationship between probabilities-calledfactoriz-

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Scientific realism and quantum theory: on the status of the ‘unobservables’

Arunima Chakraborty

Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.

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Quantum Theory finally reconciled with Special Relativity

Daniele Tommasini

In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) pointed out that Quantum Mechanics apparently implied some mysterious, instantaneous action at a distance. This paradox is supposed to be related to the probabilistic nature of the theory, but since deterministic alternatives involving "Hidden Variables" hardly agree with the experiments, the scientific community is now accepting this ``quantum nonlocality" as if it were a reality. However, I have argued recently that Quantum Electrodynamics is free from the EPR paradox, due to an indetermination on the number of the unobserved "soft photons" that can be present in any step of any experiment. Here, I will provide a more general proof, based on an approach to the "problem of measurement" that implies the full reconciliation of Quantum Field Theory with Special Relativity. I will then conclude with some considerations on the interpretation of the Quantum Theory itself.

arXiv:quant-ph/0111083•Nov 15, 2001•2 citations
Recall van Fraassen's general scheme. Scientific models can depict both observable and unobservable processes. Science itself is supposed to tell us what is and what is not observable. We are to accept the theory if it gets right all that is observable; the rest can be of no matter to us, van Fraassen has suggested, because we could have no evidence about whether the model gets it right or not. We may believe in the model's picture of the unobservable world but that belief is based on faith not evidence, and should be recognised as such. Most of the stuff of modem physics, then, turns out to be in the unobservable part of the model: photons, quarks, gravity-waves, the electromagnetic field, forces, I suppose and even space-time itself. Where are causes? that is the question I want to discuss. We can begin with causal laws. They are surely for van Fraassen not in the model itself any more than any other kinds of laws. They enter, rather, as a constraint on the kinds of structures we will allow our models to have. In a full model for the entire history of the world, or more realistically, in a small model for a given scientific experiment, event-kinds will recur with some frequency. These frequencies are represented by probabilities-though note that the probabilities are not in the models either. If we insist that our scientific theory in a given domain be causal, that will restrict the form of the probability functions which are allowed and hence, in some way, constrain the actual models, which have finite frequencies in them only. Some patterns of correlation will be allowed and some will be prohibited. Consider van Fraassen's discussion of the Einstein-Podalsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox in the follow-up to Laws and Symmetry, Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View.' There van Fraassen takes a particular relationship between probabilities-calledfactoriz-
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) pointed out that Quantum Mechanics apparently implied some mysterious, instantaneous action at a distance. This paradox is supposed to be related to the probabilistic nature of the theory, but since deterministic alternatives involving "Hidden Variables" hardly agree with the experiments, the scientific community is now accepting this ``quantum nonlocality" as if it were a reality. However, I have argued recently that Quantum Electrodynamics is free from the EPR paradox, due to an indetermination on the number of the unobserved "soft photons" that can be present in any step of any experiment. Here, I will provide a more general proof, based on an approach to the "problem of measurement" that implies the full reconciliation of Quantum Field Theory with Special Relativity. I will then conclude with some considerations on the interpretation of the Quantum Theory itself.