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IEICE Technical Report; IEICE Tech. Rep.

Computationally Sound Symbolic Criteria for UC-secure Multi-Party Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols

Muratani Hirofumi, Yoshikazu Hanatani

Published Mar 9, 2007• 1 citation
OpenAlex

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