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Two-Prover Bit-Commitments : Classical, Quantum and Non-Signaling

Max Fillinger

Published Mar 19, 2019• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This thesis considers multi-prover commitment schemes whose security is based on restrictions on the communication between the provers. The results are applicable to so-called relativistic commitment schemes: schemes whose security is guaranteed by the fact that information does not travel faster than the speed of light. A commitment scheme is a cryptographic protocol solving the following problem: One party, the prover, has selected a value which he wants to keep secret at first. The prover wants to have the option to reveal it to the other party, the verifier, at a later time, but the verifier wants a guarantee that no value other than the originally selected one can be revealed. Standard commitment schemes can only be proven secure with computational hardness assumptions. This can be circumvented by splitting the prover into multiple entities and restricting their communication, e.g., no communication at all, or communication only with a delay (as in relativistic commitment schemes). This dissertation introduces new methods for analyzing and designing such multi-prover schemes. As an application, we show that the Lunghi et al. commitment scheme from 2015 has much stronger security that their original analysis indicated.

Related papers

Multi-Prover Commitments Against Non-Signaling Attacks

Serge Fehr, Max Fillinger

We reconsider the concept of multi-prover commitments, as introduced in the late eighties in the seminal work by Ben-Or et al. As was recently shown by Crépeau et al., the security of known two-prover commitment schemes not only relies on the explicit assumption that the provers cannot communicate, but also depends on their information processing capabilities. For instance, there exist schemes that are secure against classical provers but insecure if the provers have quantum information processing capabilities, and there are schemes that resist such quantum attacks but become insecure when considering general so-called non-signaling provers, which are restricted solely by the requirement that no communication takes place. This poses the natural question whether there exists a two-prover commitment scheme that is secure under the sole assumption that no communication takes place; no such scheme is known. In this work, we give strong evidence for a negative answer: we show that any single-round two-prover commitment scheme can be broken by a non-signaling attack. Our negative result is as bad as it can get: for any candidate scheme that is (almost) perfectly hiding, there exists a strategy that allows the dishonest provers to open a commitment to an arbitrary bit (almost) as successfully as the honest provers can open an honestly prepared commitment, i.e., with probability (almost) 1 in case of a perfectly sound scheme. In the case of multi-round schemes, our impossibility result is restricted to perfectly hiding schemes. On the positive side, we show that the impossibility result can be circumvented by considering three provers instead: there exists a three-prover commitment scheme that is secure against arbitrary non-signaling attacks.

arXiv:1505.03040•May 12, 2015•2 citations

Robust relativistic bit commitment

Kaushik Chakraborty, André Chailloux, Anthony Leverrier

Relativistic cryptography exploits the fact that no information can travel faster than the speed of light in order to obtain security guarantees that cannot be achieved from the laws of quantum mechanics alone. Recently, Lunghi et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 030502 (2015)] presented a bit-commitment scheme where each party uses two agents that exchange classical information in a synchronized fashion, and that is both hiding and binding. A caveat is that the commitment time is intrinsically limited by the spatial configuration of the players, and increasing this time requires the agents to exchange messages during the whole duration of the protocol. While such a solution remains computationally attractive, its practicality is severely limited in realistic settings since all communication must remain perfectly synchronized at all times. In this work, we introduce a robust protocol for relativistic bit commitment that tolerates failures of the classical communication network. This is done by adding a third agent to both parties. Our scheme provides a quadratic improvement in terms of expected sustain time compared with the original protocol, while retaining the same level of security.

arXiv:1608.03398•Physical Review A•Dec 12, 2016•2 citations

On the Composition of Two-Prover Commitments, and Applications to Multi-Round Relativistic Commitments

Serge Fehr, Max Fillinger

We consider the related notions of two-prover and of relativistic commitment schemes. In recent work, Lunghi et al. proposed a new relativistic commitment scheme with a multi-round sustain phase that enables to keep the binding property alive as long as the sustain phase is running. They prove security of their scheme against classical attacks; however, the proven bound on the error parameter is very weak: it blows up doubly exponentially in the number of rounds. In this work, we give a new analysis of the multi-round scheme of Lunghi et al., and we show a linear growth of the error parameter instead (also considering classical attacks only). Our analysis is based on a new and rather general composition theorem for two-prover commitment schemes. The proof of our composition theorem is based on a better understanding of the binding property of two-prover commitments that we provide in the form of new definitions and relations among them. These new insights are certainly of independent interest and are likely to be useful in other contexts as well. Finally, our work gives rise to several interesting open problems, for instance extending our results to the quantum setting, where the dishonest provers are allowed to perform measurements on an entangled quantum state in order to try to break the binding property.

arXiv:1507.00240•Jul 1, 2015•5 citations

Practical Relativistic Bit Commitment

Tommaso Lunghi, Jędrzej Kaniewski, Félix Bussières +4 more

Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which Alice wishes to commit a secret bit to Bob. Perfectly secure bit commitment between two mistrustful parties is impossible through an asynchronous exchange of quantum information. Perfect security is, however, possible when Alice and Bob each split into several agents exchanging classical information at times and locations suitably chosen to satisfy specific relativistic constraints. In this Letter we first revisit a previously proposed scheme [C. Crépeau et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 7073, 407 (2011)] that realizes bit commitment using only classical communication. We prove that the protocol is secure against quantum adversaries for a duration limited by the light-speed communication time between the locations of the agents. We then propose a novel multiround scheme based on finite-field arithmetic that extends the commitment time beyond this limit, and we prove its security against classical attacks. Finally, we present an implementation of these protocols using dedicated hardware and we demonstrate a 2 ms-long bit commitment over a distance of 131 km. By positioning the agents on antipodal points on the surface of Earth, the commitment time could possibly be extended to 212 ms.

arXiv:1411.4917•Physical Review Letters•Jul 13, 2015•56 citations

Studies in Non-Malleable Commitment

Chen-Kuei Lee

Non-malleable commitment is one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives in that it is often used as a basic building block in modern cryptography. Briefly, a commitment scheme allows a sender to commit to a value while keeping the value secret from the receiver. In addition, when the commitment is opened in a later stage, the scheme guarantees that the sender can reveal only the unique value being committed to in the previous stage. A commitment scheme is said to be non-malleable if no adversary can succeed in committing to a related massage m', after seeing a commitment of a message m. In this dissertation, we study the construction of non-malleable commitments and some of their applications.A black-box construction of non-malleable commitment is presented in the first part of this dissertation. Our protocol requires only a constant number of rounds and satisfies the standard notion of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment. Our technique is based on ideas from the ``zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation'' paradigm by Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2007). Furthermore, our construction only uses one-way functions as a black-box and thus does not depend on the actual implementation details of the functions. Prior to our result, under the standard notion of security, no black-box construction of constant-round non-malleable commitment was known. Hence, our main result closes the gap between black-box and non-black-box constructions for the problem of non-malleable commitment.In the second part of this dissertation, we show that our technique can be applied to multiple applications. Specifically, we extend our work to obtain a constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitment, a constant-round multi-party parallel coin tossing, and a non-malleable statistically hiding commitment (according to the notion of non-malleability w.r.t. opening.) Additionally, all results mentioned above are based only on a black-box use of one-way functions.

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations

Relativistic verifiable delegation of quantum computation

Alex B. Grilo

The importance of being able to verify quantum computation delegated to remote servers increases with recent development of quantum technologies. In some of the proposed protocols for this task, a client delegates her quantum computation to non-communicating servers. The fact that the servers do not communicate is not physically justified and it is essential for the proof of security of such protocols. For the best of our knowledge, we present in this work the first verifiable delegation scheme where a classical client delegates her quantum computation to two entangled servers that are allowed to communicate, but respecting the plausible assumption that information cannot be propagated faster than speed of light. We achieve this result by proposing the first one-round two-prover game for the Local Hamiltonian problem where provers only need polynomial time quantum computation and access to copies of the groundstate of the Hamiltonian.

•Nov 27, 2017•0 citations
This thesis considers multi-prover commitment schemes whose security is based on restrictions on the communication between the provers. The results are applicable to so-called relativistic commitment schemes: schemes whose security is guaranteed by the fact that information does not travel faster than the speed of light. A commitment scheme is a cryptographic protocol solving the following problem: One party, the prover, has selected a value which he wants to keep secret at first. The prover wants to have the option to reveal it to the other party, the verifier, at a later time, but the verifier wants a guarantee that no value other than the originally selected one can be revealed. Standard commitment schemes can only be proven secure with computational hardness assumptions. This can be circumvented by splitting the prover into multiple entities and restricting their communication, e.g., no communication at all, or communication only with a delay (as in relativistic commitment schemes). This dissertation introduces new methods for analyzing and designing such multi-prover schemes. As an application, we show that the Lunghi et al. commitment scheme from 2015 has much stronger security that their original analysis indicated.
We reconsider the concept of multi-prover commitments, as introduced in the late eighties in the seminal work by Ben-Or et al. As was recently shown by Crépeau et al., the security of known two-prover commitment schemes not only relies on the explicit assumption that the provers cannot communicate, but also depends on their information processing capabilities. For instance, there exist schemes that are secure against classical provers but insecure if the provers have quantum information processing capabilities, and there are schemes that resist such quantum attacks but become insecure when considering general so-called non-signaling provers, which are restricted solely by the requirement that no communication takes place. This poses the natural question whether there exists a two-prover commitment scheme that is secure under the sole assumption that no communication takes place; no such scheme is known. In this work, we give strong evidence for a negative answer: we show that any single-round two-prover commitment scheme can be broken by a non-signaling attack. Our negative result is as bad as it can get: for any candidate scheme that is (almost) perfectly hiding, there exists a strategy that allows the dishonest provers to open a commitment to an arbitrary bit (almost) as successfully as the honest provers can open an honestly prepared commitment, i.e., with probability (almost) 1 in case of a perfectly sound scheme. In the case of multi-round schemes, our impossibility result is restricted to perfectly hiding schemes. On the positive side, we show that the impossibility result can be circumvented by considering three provers instead: there exists a three-prover commitment scheme that is secure against arbitrary non-signaling attacks.
Relativistic cryptography exploits the fact that no information can travel faster than the speed of light in order to obtain security guarantees that cannot be achieved from the laws of quantum mechanics alone. Recently, Lunghi et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 030502 (2015)] presented a bit-commitment scheme where each party uses two agents that exchange classical information in a synchronized fashion, and that is both hiding and binding. A caveat is that the commitment time is intrinsically limited by the spatial configuration of the players, and increasing this time requires the agents to exchange messages during the whole duration of the protocol. While such a solution remains computationally attractive, its practicality is severely limited in realistic settings since all communication must remain perfectly synchronized at all times. In this work, we introduce a robust protocol for relativistic bit commitment that tolerates failures of the classical communication network. This is done by adding a third agent to both parties. Our scheme provides a quadratic improvement in terms of expected sustain time compared with the original protocol, while retaining the same level of security.
We consider the related notions of two-prover and of relativistic commitment schemes. In recent work, Lunghi et al. proposed a new relativistic commitment scheme with a multi-round sustain phase that enables to keep the binding property alive as long as the sustain phase is running. They prove security of their scheme against classical attacks; however, the proven bound on the error parameter is very weak: it blows up doubly exponentially in the number of rounds. In this work, we give a new analysis of the multi-round scheme of Lunghi et al., and we show a linear growth of the error parameter instead (also considering classical attacks only). Our analysis is based on a new and rather general composition theorem for two-prover commitment schemes. The proof of our composition theorem is based on a better understanding of the binding property of two-prover commitments that we provide in the form of new definitions and relations among them. These new insights are certainly of independent interest and are likely to be useful in other contexts as well. Finally, our work gives rise to several interesting open problems, for instance extending our results to the quantum setting, where the dishonest provers are allowed to perform measurements on an entangled quantum state in order to try to break the binding property.
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which Alice wishes to commit a secret bit to Bob. Perfectly secure bit commitment between two mistrustful parties is impossible through an asynchronous exchange of quantum information. Perfect security is, however, possible when Alice and Bob each split into several agents exchanging classical information at times and locations suitably chosen to satisfy specific relativistic constraints. In this Letter we first revisit a previously proposed scheme [C. Crépeau et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 7073, 407 (2011)] that realizes bit commitment using only classical communication. We prove that the protocol is secure against quantum adversaries for a duration limited by the light-speed communication time between the locations of the agents. We then propose a novel multiround scheme based on finite-field arithmetic that extends the commitment time beyond this limit, and we prove its security against classical attacks. Finally, we present an implementation of these protocols using dedicated hardware and we demonstrate a 2 ms-long bit commitment over a distance of 131 km. By positioning the agents on antipodal points on the surface of Earth, the commitment time could possibly be extended to 212 ms.
Non-malleable commitment is one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives in that it is often used as a basic building block in modern cryptography. Briefly, a commitment scheme allows a sender to commit to a value while keeping the value secret from the receiver. In addition, when the commitment is opened in a later stage, the scheme guarantees that the sender can reveal only the unique value being committed to in the previous stage. A commitment scheme is said to be non-malleable if no adversary can succeed in committing to a related massage m', after seeing a commitment of a message m. In this dissertation, we study the construction of non-malleable commitments and some of their applications.A black-box construction of non-malleable commitment is presented in the first part of this dissertation. Our protocol requires only a constant number of rounds and satisfies the standard notion of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment. Our technique is based on ideas from the ``zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation'' paradigm by Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2007). Furthermore, our construction only uses one-way functions as a black-box and thus does not depend on the actual implementation details of the functions. Prior to our result, under the standard notion of security, no black-box construction of constant-round non-malleable commitment was known. Hence, our main result closes the gap between black-box and non-black-box constructions for the problem of non-malleable commitment.In the second part of this dissertation, we show that our technique can be applied to multiple applications. Specifically, we extend our work to obtain a constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitment, a constant-round multi-party parallel coin tossing, and a non-malleable statistically hiding commitment (according to the notion of non-malleability w.r.t. opening.) Additionally, all results mentioned above are based only on a black-box use of one-way functions.
The importance of being able to verify quantum computation delegated to remote servers increases with recent development of quantum technologies. In some of the proposed protocols for this task, a client delegates her quantum computation to non-communicating servers. The fact that the servers do not communicate is not physically justified and it is essential for the proof of security of such protocols. For the best of our knowledge, we present in this work the first verifiable delegation scheme where a classical client delegates her quantum computation to two entangled servers that are allowed to communicate, but respecting the plausible assumption that information cannot be propagated faster than speed of light. We achieve this result by proposing the first one-round two-prover game for the Local Hamiltonian problem where provers only need polynomial time quantum computation and access to copies of the groundstate of the Hamiltonian.