Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Non-Commutative Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Bailey Stewart

Published Jan 1, 2018• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Unbounded Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Protocols for NP

Huang, Guifang, Lin +1 more

Chinese Journal of Electronics•Jan 1, 2009•0 citations

Quantum protocols for zero-knowledge systems

José Cláudio do Nascimento, Rubens Viana Ramos

Quantum Information Processing•Aug 10, 2009•6 citations

Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Zero-Knowledge Authentication Protocol

Pedro Hecht

In this paper, we present a simple bare-bones solution of a Zero-Knowledge authentication protocol which uses non-commutative algebra and a variation of the generalized symmetric decomposition problem (GSDP) as a one-way function. The cryptographic security is assured as long the GSDP problem is computationally hard to solve in non-commutative algebraic structures and belongs currently to the PQC category as no quantum computer attack is likely to exists.

arXiv:1703.08630•Mar 25, 2017•3 citations

Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Multi-Party Protocols

Kaoru Kurosawa, Tatsuaki Okamoto

情報処理•Jun 15, 1991•0 citations

Two Prover Perfect Zero Knowledge for MIP*

Kieran Mastel, William Slofstra

The recent MIP*=RE theorem of Ji, Natarajan, Vidick, Wright, and Yuen shows that the complexity class MIP* of multiprover proof systems with entangled provers contains all recursively enumerable languages. Prior work of Grilo, Slofstra, and Yuen [FOCS '19] further shows (via a technique called simulatable codes) that every language in MIP* has a perfect zero knowledge (PZK) MIP* protocol. The MIP*=RE theorem uses two-prover one-round proof systems, and hence such systems are complete for MIP*. However, the construction in Grilo, Slofstra, and Yuen uses six provers, and there is no obvious way to get perfect zero knowledge with two provers via simulatable codes. This leads to a natural question: are there two-prover PZK-MIP* protocols for all of MIP*? In this paper, we show that every language in MIP* has a two-prover one-round PZK-MIP* protocol, answering the question in the affirmative. For the proof, we use a new method based on a key consequence of the MIP*=RE theorem, which is that every MIP* protocol can be turned into a family of boolean constraint system (BCS) nonlocal games. This makes it possible to work with MIP* protocols as boolean constraint systems, and in particular allows us to use a variant of a construction due to Dwork, Feige, Kilian, Naor, and Safra [Crypto '92] which gives a classical MIP protocol for 3SAT with perfect zero knowledge. To show quantum soundness of this classical construction, we develop a toolkit for analyzing quantum soundness of reductions between BCS games, which we expect to be useful more broadly. This toolkit also applies to commuting operator strategies, and our argument shows that every language with a commuting operator BCS protocol has a two prover PZK commuting operator protocol.

arXiv:2404.00926•ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•Jun 10, 2024•14 citations

Concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge and simultaneous resettable non-malleable zero-knowledge in constant rounds

Zhenbin Yan, Yi Deng, Yiru Sun

Concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge ( CNMZK ) considers the concurrent execution of zero-knowledge protocols in a setting even when adversaries can simultaneously corrupt multiple provers and verifiers. As far as we know, the round complexity of all the constructions of CNMZK arguments for NP is at least ω (log n ). In this paper, we provide the first construction of a constant-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge argument for every language in NP . Our protocol relies on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash functions , one-way permutations and indistinguishability obfuscators . As an additional contribution, we study the composition of two central notions in zero knowledge, the simultaneously resettable zero-knowledge and non-malleable zero-knowledge , which seemingly have stronger proved security guarantees. We give the first construction of a constant-round simultaneously-resettable non-malleable zero-knowledge . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to combine the two security concepts described above together in the zero-knowledge protocols.

Cybersecurity•Sep 29, 2018•2 citations
The recent MIP*=RE theorem of Ji, Natarajan, Vidick, Wright, and Yuen shows that the complexity class MIP* of multiprover proof systems with entangled provers contains all recursively enumerable languages. Prior work of Grilo, Slofstra, and Yuen [FOCS '19] further shows (via a technique called simulatable codes) that every language in MIP* has a perfect zero knowledge (PZK) MIP* protocol. The MIP*=RE theorem uses two-prover one-round proof systems, and hence such systems are complete for MIP*. However, the construction in Grilo, Slofstra, and Yuen uses six provers, and there is no obvious way to get perfect zero knowledge with two provers via simulatable codes. This leads to a natural question: are there two-prover PZK-MIP* protocols for all of MIP*? In this paper, we show that every language in MIP* has a two-prover one-round PZK-MIP* protocol, answering the question in the affirmative. For the proof, we use a new method based on a key consequence of the MIP*=RE theorem, which is that every MIP* protocol can be turned into a family of boolean constraint system (BCS) nonlocal games. This makes it possible to work with MIP* protocols as boolean constraint systems, and in particular allows us to use a variant of a construction due to Dwork, Feige, Kilian, Naor, and Safra [Crypto '92] which gives a classical MIP protocol for 3SAT with perfect zero knowledge. To show quantum soundness of this classical construction, we develop a toolkit for analyzing quantum soundness of reductions between BCS games, which we expect to be useful more broadly. This toolkit also applies to commuting operator strategies, and our argument shows that every language with a commuting operator BCS protocol has a two prover PZK commuting operator protocol.
Concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge ( CNMZK ) considers the concurrent execution of zero-knowledge protocols in a setting even when adversaries can simultaneously corrupt multiple provers and verifiers. As far as we know, the round complexity of all the constructions of CNMZK arguments for NP is at least ω (log n ). In this paper, we provide the first construction of a constant-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge argument for every language in NP . Our protocol relies on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash functions , one-way permutations and indistinguishability obfuscators . As an additional contribution, we study the composition of two central notions in zero knowledge, the simultaneously resettable zero-knowledge and non-malleable zero-knowledge , which seemingly have stronger proved security guarantees. We give the first construction of a constant-round simultaneously-resettable non-malleable zero-knowledge . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to combine the two security concepts described above together in the zero-knowledge protocols.