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Springer eBooks

Quantum Mechanics Shows the Limit of Naïve Realism

Bhakti Vijnana Muni

Published Jan 1, 2019• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-981-13-1957-0_16

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arXiv:quant-ph/0503006•Mar 1, 2005•3 citations
With Bell (1964) and his EPR-based mathematics contradicted by experiments, at least one step in his supposedly commonsense theorem must be false. Defining commonsense local realism as the fusion of local-causality (no causal influence propagates superluminally) and physical-realism (some physical properties change interactively), we eliminate all such contradictions and make EPR correlations intelligible by completing the quantum mechanical account in a classical way. Thus refuting the famous inequality at the heart of Bell's mathematics, we show that Bell's theorem is limited by Bell's use of naive realism. Validating the classical mantra that correlated tests on correlated things produce correlated results without mystery, we conclude that Bell's theorem and related experiments negate naive realism, not commonsense local realism.
I reinterpret Bohr's attitude towards quantum mechanical formalism and its empirical content, based on his understanding of the correspondence principle and its approximate applicability. I suggest that Bohr understood complementarity as a limitation imposed by the commutation relations upon the applicability of the idealizations which had grounded the use of the correspondence principle. By discussing this interpretation against the contemporary background of discussions regarding “naïve realism” about operators (as observables), I suggest that a Bohrian view on the empirical content of quantum mechanical operators may provide a middle ground between complete contextualism and an untenable realism about quantum properties.
In Bohm's version of the EPR gedanken experiment, the spin of the second particle along any vector is minus the spin of the other particle along the same vector. It seems that either the choice of vector along which one projects the spin of the first particle influences at superluminal speed the state of the second particle, or naive realism holds true i.e., the projections of the spin of any EPR particle along all the vectors are determined before any measurement occurs). Naive realism is negated by Bell's theory that originated and is still most often presented as related to non-locality, a relation whose necessity has recently been proven to be false. I advocate here that the solution of the apparent paradox lies in the fact that the spin of the second particle is determined along any vector, but not along all vectors. Such an any-all distinction was already present in quantum mechanics, for instance in the fact that the spin can be measured along any vector but not at once along all vectors, as a result of the Uncertainty Principle. The time symmetry of the any-all distinction defended here is in fact reminiscent of (and I claim, due to) the time symmetry of the Uncertainty Principle described by Einstein, Tolman, and Podolsky in 1931, in a paper entitled ``Knowledge of Past and Future in Quantum Mechanics" that is enough to negate naive realism and to hint at the any-all distinction. A simple classical model is next built, which captures aspects of the any-all distinction: the goal is of course not to have a classical exact model, but to provide a caricature that might help some people.