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Losing information

Rafail Ostrovsky, Brett Hemenway

Published Jan 1, 2010• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

In the first part of this work, Chapter 3 we present new and general constructions of lossy encryption schemes. The Selective Opening problem is as follows: suppose an adversary receives n commitments (or encryptions) of (possibly) correlated messages, and now the adversary can choose n/2 of the messages, and receive de-commitments (or decryptions and the randomness used to encrypt them). Do the unopened commitments (encryptions) remain secure? A protocol achieving this type of security is called secure against a selective opening adversary (SOA). This question arises naturally in the context of Byzantine Agreement and Secure Multiparty Computation, where an active adversary is able to eavesdrop on all the wires, and then choose a subset of players to corrupt. Unfortunately, the traditional definitions of security (IND-CPA, IND-CCA) do not guarantee security in this setting. In this paper: · We formally define re-randomizable encryption and show that every re-randomizable encryption scheme gives rise to efficient encryptions secure against a selective opening adversary. (Very informally, an encryption is re-randomizable, if given any ciphertext, there is an efficient way to map it to an almost uniform re-encryption of the same underlying message). · We show that statistically-hiding 2-round Oblivious Transfer (OT) implies Lossy Encryption and so do smooth hash proof systems, as defined by Cramer-Shoup. Combining this with known results immediately shows that Private Information Retrieval and homomorphic encryption both imply Lossy Encryption, and thus Selective Opening Secure Public Key Encryption. In the second part of this work, Chapter 4, we focus on constructing lossy trapdoor functions. Lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) were introduced by Peikert and Waters in STOC '08. Since their introduction, lossy trapdoor functions have found many uses in cryptography. In the work of Peikert and Waters, lossy trapdoor functions were used to give an efficient construction of a chosen-ciphertext secure (IND-CCA2) cryptosystem. Lossy trapdoor functions were then shown to imply deterministic encryption by Boldyreva, Fehr and O'Neill in CRYPTO '08. In TCC '09, Rosen and Segev showed that lossy trapdoor functions are correlated product secure, meaning that they remain one-way even when evaluated on correlated inputs. In this section we extend the notion of smooth hash proof systems as defined by Cramer and Shoup in Eurocrypt '02, to include an additional homomorphic property. We call this primitive smooth homomorphic hash proof systems . We show that smooth homomorphic projective hash proof systems include all Diverse Group Systems, as defined by Cramer and Shoup. Using this definition, we show that · Smooth homomorphic hash proof systems imply LTDFs. · Diverse group systems as defined in [CS02] imply LTDFs. These are the first known generic constructions of LTDFs. · Applying our generic construction the specific constructions of smooth hash proof systems given by Cramer and Shoup, we obtain the first construction of fully lossy trapdoor functions from the quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption. We also obtain a novel construction of LTDFs from Paillier's decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. · Applying the black-box separation results of Rosen and Segev, we show that there is a black-box separation between smooth homomorphic hash proof systems and one-way trapdoor permutations. In the third part of this work, Chapter 5, we examine in what situations we can construct lossy trapdoor functions from the seemingly weaker primitive lossy encryption. Injective one-way trapdoor functions are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. In this section we give a novel construction of injective trapdoor functions based on oblivious transfer for long strings. Our main result is to show that any 2-message statistically sender-private semi-honest oblivious transfer (OT) for strings longer than the sender randomness implies the existence of injective one-way trapdoor functions. This is perhaps surprising given the black box separation of injective one-way trapdoor functions from many common cryptographic protocols, e.g. IND-CCA encryption. As a tool for creating injective one-way trapdoor functions, we define a new notion of security for a public key encryption scheme called Randomness Dependent Message (RDM) security, and use it as a stepping stone for creating injective one-way trapdoor functions. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations
In the first part of this work, Chapter 3 we present new and general constructions of lossy encryption schemes.
The Selective Opening problem is as follows: suppose an adversary receives n commitments (or encryptions) of (possibly) correlated messages, and now the adversary can choose n/2 of the messages, and receive de-commitments (or decryptions and the randomness used to encrypt them). Do the unopened commitments (encryptions) remain secure? A protocol achieving this type of security is called secure against a selective opening adversary (SOA). This question arises naturally in the context of Byzantine Agreement and Secure Multiparty Computation, where an active adversary is able to eavesdrop on all the wires, and then choose a subset of players to corrupt. Unfortunately, the traditional definitions of security (IND-CPA, IND-CCA) do not guarantee security in this setting. In this paper: · We formally define re-randomizable encryption and show that every re-randomizable encryption scheme gives rise to efficient encryptions secure against a selective opening adversary. (Very informally, an encryption is re-randomizable, if given any ciphertext, there is an efficient way to map it to an almost uniform re-encryption of the same underlying message). · We show that statistically-hiding 2-round Oblivious Transfer (OT) implies Lossy Encryption and so do smooth hash proof systems, as defined by Cramer-Shoup. Combining this with known results immediately shows that Private Information Retrieval and homomorphic encryption both imply Lossy Encryption, and thus Selective Opening Secure Public Key Encryption.
In the second part of this work, Chapter 4, we focus on constructing lossy trapdoor functions.
Lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) were introduced by Peikert and Waters in STOC '08. Since their introduction, lossy trapdoor functions have found many uses in cryptography. In the work of Peikert and Waters, lossy trapdoor functions were used to give an efficient construction of a chosen-ciphertext secure (IND-CCA2) cryptosystem. Lossy trapdoor functions were then shown to imply deterministic encryption by Boldyreva, Fehr and O'Neill in CRYPTO '08. In TCC '09, Rosen and Segev showed that lossy trapdoor functions are correlated product secure, meaning that they remain one-way even when evaluated on correlated inputs.
In this section we extend the notion of smooth hash proof systems as defined by Cramer and Shoup in Eurocrypt '02, to include an additional homomorphic property. We call this primitive smooth homomorphic hash proof systems . We show that smooth homomorphic projective hash proof systems include all Diverse Group Systems, as defined by Cramer and Shoup. Using this definition, we show that · Smooth homomorphic hash proof systems imply LTDFs. · Diverse group systems as defined in [CS02] imply LTDFs. These are the first known generic constructions of LTDFs. · Applying our generic construction the specific constructions of smooth hash proof systems given by Cramer and Shoup, we obtain the first construction of fully lossy trapdoor functions from the quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption. We also obtain a novel construction of LTDFs from Paillier's decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. · Applying the black-box separation results of Rosen and Segev, we show that there is a black-box separation between smooth homomorphic hash proof systems and one-way trapdoor permutations.
In the third part of this work, Chapter 5, we examine in what situations we can construct lossy trapdoor functions from the seemingly weaker primitive lossy encryption.
Injective one-way trapdoor functions are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. In this section we give a novel construction of injective trapdoor functions based on oblivious transfer for long strings. Our main result is to show that any 2-message statistically sender-private semi-honest oblivious transfer (OT) for strings longer than the sender randomness implies the existence of injective one-way trapdoor functions. This is perhaps surprising given the black box separation of injective one-way trapdoor functions from many common cryptographic protocols, e.g. IND-CCA encryption. As a tool for creating injective one-way trapdoor functions, we define a new notion of security for a public key encryption scheme called Randomness Dependent Message (RDM) security, and use it as a stepping stone for creating injective one-way trapdoor functions. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
We initiate the study of one-wayness under correlated products. We are interested in identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for a function f and a distribution on inputs (x1,…,xk)(x_1,\dots,x_k)(x1​,…,xk​) so that the function (f(x1),…,f(xk))(f(x_1),\dots,f(x_k))(f(x1​),…,f(xk​)) is one-way. The main motivation of this study is the construction of public-key encryption schemes that are secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs). We show that any collection of injective trapdoor functions that is secure under a very natural correlated product can be used to construct a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme. The construction is simple, black-box, and admits a direct proof of security. It can be viewed as a simplification of the seminal work of Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [SIAM J. Comput., 30 (2000), pp. 391–437], while relying on a seemingly incomparable assumption. We provide evidence that security under correlated products is achievable by demonstrating that lossy trapdoor functions [Peikert and Waters, Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2008, pp. 187–196] yield injective trapdoor functions that are secure under the above-mentioned correlated product. Although we currently base security under correlated products on existing constructions of lossy trapdoor functions, we argue that the former notion is potentially weaker as a general assumption. Specifically, there is no fully black-box construction of lossy trapdoor functions from trapdoor functions that are secure under correlated products.
Injective one-way trapdoor functions are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. In this work we give a novel construction of injective trapdoor functions based on oblivious transfer for long strings. Our main result is to show that any 2-message statistically sender-private semihonest oblivious transfer (OT) for strings longer than the sender randomness implies the existence of injective one-way trapdoor functions. This is perhaps surprising given given the black box separation of injective one-way trapdoor functions from many common cryptographic protocols, e.g. IND-CCA encryption. As a tool for creating injective one-way trapdoor functions, we define a new notion of security for a public key encryption scheme called Randomness Dependent Message (RDM) security, and use it as a stepping stone for creating injective one-way trapdoor functions. Our main result has a number of interesting corollaries: • Applying the results of Mol and Yilek (PKC ’10), we also show that Lossy Encryption with long plaintexts implies correlated product secure functions and INDCCA secure encryption. • Lossy encryption with long plaintexts implies a weak form of RDM security. In addition, Hemenway, Libert, Ostrovsky and Vergnaud (ePrint ’09) showed that statistically-hiding 2-round Oblivious Transfer (OT) is equivalent to Lossy Encryption, where if OT uses randomness shorter than the message so does Lossy Encryption and vice versa. Thus, our main result also implies an injective one-way trapdoor function from any lossy encryption with short randomness. This is somewhat surprising since injective trapdoor functions are deterministic and, given the trapdoor, allow recovery of a complete inverse, while public-key encryptions are probabilistic and recover only the plaintext and not necessarily the randomness used in the encryption process. Our result corroborates the previous result of Bellare, Halevi, Sahai and Vadhan (CRYPTO ’98) showing that IND-CPA secure encryption implies injective one-way trapdoor permutations in the random oracle model. We stress that in our work we do not make use of a random oracle.
We propose a general cryptographic primitive called lossy trapdoor functions (lossy TDFs), and we use it to develop new approaches for constructing several important cryptographic tools, including (injective) trapdoor functions, collision-resistant hash functions, oblivious transfer, and chosen ciphertext-secure cryptosystems (in the standard model). All of these constructions are simple, efficient, and black-box. We realize lossy TDFs based on a variety of cryptographic assumptions, including the hardness of the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) problem and the hardness of the “learning with errors” problem (which is implied by the worst-case hardness of various lattice problems). Taken together, our results resolve some long-standing open problems in cryptography. They give the first injective TDFs based on problems not directly related to integer factorization and provide the first chosen ciphertext-secure cryptosystem based solely on worst-case complexity assumptions.
In public-key encryption (PKE), ciphertexts received by a receiver may be possibly correlated and the security of a PKE relies on honestly generated system parameters. Security against selective opening attacks (SOA) for PKE guarantees that even when an attacker has broken into a subset of honestly generated ciphertexts and opened them (i.e., seeing plaintexts and random bits), the unopened ciphertexts remain secure. While security against parameter subversion attacks (PSA) for PKE requires that even when the public system parameters are maliciously generated, a PKE scheme should be secure. In this paper, we initiate the study of PKE secure against both SOA and PSA. To capture SOA and PSA simultaneously, we formulate a new security notion called indistinguishability under selective opening attacks and parameter subversion attacks (IND-SO-PSA). Further, we define the lossy trapdoor function and all-but-many lossy trapdoor function in the presence of PSA (LTF-PSA and ABM-LTF-PSA correspondingly) and propose an instantiation with the efficiently-embeddable group (EG). Applying these new primitives, we construct a PKE scheme that is proven to be IND-SO-PSA secure.
We introduce a general construction of fully simulatable oblivious transfer based on lossy encryption. Furthermore, we extend the common definition of lossy encryption by introducing the notion of computationally lossy encryption. If the cryptosystem used is computationally lossy, our general construction yields oblivious transfer protocols with computational security for both parties. Otherwise, when regular statistically lossy cryptosystems are employed in this construction, it yields oblivious transfer protocols with statistical security for the sender. The construction introduced in this paper is realizable from rerandomizable, homomorphic and lossy cryptosystems in general. Thus, it yields specific constructions based on different assumptions, such as DDH, LWE and McEliece. Moreover, it proves the equivalence of fully simulatable oblivious transfer and lossy encryption.
In a selective opening (SO) attack an adversary breaks into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts and tries to learn information on the plaintexts of some untouched (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Contrary to intuition, standard security notions do not always imply security against this type of adver-sary, making SO security an important standalone goal. In this paper we study receiver security, where the attacker is allowed to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts. First we study the relation between two existing security definitions, one based on simulation and the other based on indistinguishability, and show that the former is strictly stronger. We continue with feasibility results for both notions which we show can be achieved from (variants of) non-committing encryption schemes. In particular, we show that indistinguishability-based SO security can be achieved from a tweaked variant of non-committing encryption which, in turn, can be instantiated from a variety of basic, well-established, assumptions. We conclude our study by showing that SO security is however strictly weaker than all variants of non-committing encryption that we consider, leaving potentially more efficient constructions as an interesting open problem.