This chapter temporarily departs from conventional "orthodoxy" in that the authors set aside the completeness hypothesis and its generalizations. In 1935 A. Einstein and his two younger collaborators, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen (EPR) issued a paper in which they showed that, assuming the validity of but very general and highly plausible assumptions, the incompleteness of quantum mechanics could be demonstrated. The opinion that quantum mechanics is a complete description of the atomic and subatomic phenomena was so much engrained in the mind of the physicists that this EPR result was soon referred to as a "paradox." The EPR argument was based on assumptions, or premises, that, prima facie look most plausible. On the theoretical side it has been shown that the D. Greenberger, M. Home, and A. Zeilinger argument can be developed without involving any spin, essentially by replacing the spin-component measurements by presence measurements performed by means of counters.
This chapter temporarily departs from conventional "orthodoxy" in that the authors set aside the completeness hypothesis and its generalizations. In 1935 A. Einstein and his two younger collaborators, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen (EPR) issued a paper in which they showed that, assuming the validity of but very general and highly plausible assumptions, the incompleteness of quantum mechanics could be demonstrated. The opinion that quantum mechanics is a complete description of the atomic and subatomic phenomena was so much engrained in the mind of the physicists that this EPR result was soon referred to as a "paradox." The EPR argument was based on assumptions, or premises, that, prima facie look most plausible. On the theoretical side it has been shown that the D. Greenberger, M. Home, and A. Zeilinger argument can be developed without involving any spin, essentially by replacing the spin-component measurements by presence measurements performed by means of counters.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper [17] in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete.That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics.There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics.There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality.Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities).The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities.And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades.The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers.It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
When it was first put forward, special relativity struck many people as counterintuitive and possibly inconsistent, as we saw when we considered the twin paradox in Chapter 17. Quantum mechanics had a similar effect, only to a much greater and longer lasting degree, from the time of its inception in the mid 1920s until the present. This reaction to quantum theory was not confined to an initial confusion that often accompanies a new subject, but remained a life-long puzzle for Einstein, to mention only the most prominent opponent of what he took to be the reigning orthodoxy. In this chapter we study a famous attempt by Einstein and two of his colleagues to show that quantum mechanics was, if not logically inconsistent, then at least an incomplete theory. This charge of incompleteness is just that raised by Schrödinger's cat paradox (Section 21.4). THE EPR PARADOX In 1935 Einstein, Boris Podolsky (1896–1966) and Nathan Rosen (1909–1995) (hereafter referred to as EPR) published a paper titled ‘Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?’. They take as their criterion for the completeness of a theory that it contains terms corresponding to every relevant entity found in reality. For example, in the classical description of a system, such as a planet going around the sun, there are symbols representing the position r , the momentum p and so forth for the various parts of the system.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
The ‘EPR paradox’ is directly related to the 1935 paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, even though Einstein did not include the word ‘paradox’ in it. All Einstein and his co authors did was to construct an argument that concluded that quantum mechanics was ‘not complete.’ This EPR conclusion is examined in detail here and found to be based on the erroneous assumption of an ‘all values’ spread in x that leads to an unphysical exact measurement of the momentum p . The word paradox, in relation the second part of the EPR paper, was introduced by Schrödinger in 1936 and popularized by Bohm in the 1950s. Hence, we should not attach responsibility to EPR for the ‘paradox’ situation. It was Schrödinger and Bohm who attached and propagated the term paradox in relation to the EPR paper. And the literature made it famous. This is particularly lamentable since the physics of quantum entanglement is utterly free of paradoxes .