Non-malleable commitments are a fundamental cryptographic tool for preventing (concurrent) man-in-the-middle attacks. Since their invention by Dolev, Dwork, and Naor in 1991, their round-complexity has been extensively studied, leading up to constant-round protocols based on one-way functions (OWFs), and three-round protocols based on sub-exponential OWFs, and standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions such as decisional Diffie--Hellman (DDH) and ZAPs (i.e., two-round witness-indistinguishable proofs). But constructions of two-round, or non-interactive, non-malleable commitments have so far remained elusive; the only known construction relied on a strong and non-falsifiable assumption with a non-malleability flavor. Additionally, a recent result by Pass shows the impossibility of basing two-round non-malleable commitments on falsifiable assumptions using a polynomial-time black-box security reduction. In this work, we show how to overcome this impossibility using super-polynomial-time hardness assumptions. Our main result demonstrates the existence of two-round concurrent non-malleable commitments based on the following four primitives (all with sub-exponential security): (1) non-interactive commitments, (2) ZAPs (i.e., 2-round witness indistinguishable proofs), (3) collision-resistant hash functions, and (4) a “weak” time-lock puzzle. Primitives (1), (2), and (3) can be based on, e.g., the discrete log and the RSA assumption. Time-lock puzzles---puzzles that can be solved by “brute-force” in time
2t, but cannot be solved significantly faster even using parallel computers---were proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner in 1996 and have been extensively studied since. We additionally obtain a non-interactive (i.e., one-message) version of our protocol satisfying concurrent non-malleability w.r.t. uniform attackers and show that our non-malleable commitments satisfy an even stronger notion of chosen commitment attack security.
We consider non-malleable (NM) and universally composable (UC) commitment schemes in the common reference string (CRS) model. We show how to construct non-interactive NM commitments that remain non-malleable even if the adversary has access to an arbitrary number of commitments from honest players - rather than one, as in several previous schemes. We show this is a strictly stronger security notion. Our construction is the first non-interactive scheme achieving this that can be based on the minimal assumption of existence of one-way functions. But it can also be instantiated in a very efficient version based on the strong RSA assumption. For UC commitments, we show that existence of a UC commitment scheme in the CRS model (interactive or not) implies key exchange and - for a uniform reference string - even implies oblivious transfer. This indicates that UC commitment is a strictly stronger primitive than NM. Finally, we show that our strong RSA based construction can be used to improve the most efficient known UC commitment scheme so it can work with a CRS of size independent of the number of players, without loss of efficiency.
We construct two-message non-malleable commitments with respect to opening in the standard model, assuming only one-to-one one-way functions. Our protocol consists of two unidirectional messages by the committer (with no message from the receiver), and is secure against all polynomial-time adversaries in the standard synchronous setting. Pass (TCC 2013) proved that any commitment scheme with non-malleability with respect to commitment, using only 2 rounds of communication, cannot be proved secure via a black-box reduction to any "standard" intractability assumption. We extend this by showing a similar impossibility result for commitments with non-malleability with respect to opening, another standard notion of non-malleability for commitments, for any 2-message challenge-response protocol, as well. However, somewhat surprisingly, we show that this barrier breaks down in the setting of two unidirectional messages by the committer (with no message from the receiver), for non-malleability with respect to opening.°Our protocol makes only black-box use of any non-interactive statistically binding commitment scheme. Such a scheme can be based on any one-to-one one-way function.°Our techniques depart significantly from the commit-challenge-response structure followed by nearly all prior works on non-malleable protocols in the standard model. Our methods are combinatorial in nature.°Our protocol resolves the round complexity of commitments with non-malleability with respect to opening via natural (non-embedding) black-box security reductions. We show that completely non-interactive non-malleable commitments w.r.t. opening cannot be proved secure via most natural black-box reductions. This result extends to also rule out bi-directional two-message non-malleable commitments w.r.t. opening in the synchronous or asynchronous setting.°Our protocol, together with our impossibility result, also resolves the round complexity of block-wise non-malleable codes (Chandran et al) w.r.t. natural black-box reductions.