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CRC Press eBooks

Possible Views on Nonseparability

Bernard d’Espagnat

Published Mar 5, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

As a matter of fact, no serious description of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem uses the incriminated postulate that the state vector is objective. The most straightforward case is that of realism. Realism, however, is not universally accepted. In Neil Bohr's philosophy, nonseparability is also present, but it has a very different meaning. The nonseparability of the quantum world is thus transferred, in this philosophy, from the system of the microparticles to the systems that each of these micro-objects constitutes with its instrument. In regard to Lorentz invariance, the transition from the pure case to the mixture—the reduction of the wave packet—raises less acute problems in Bohr's philosophy than it does in other approaches. Moreover, Bohr's philosophy obviously implies some restrictions on our freedom to imagine an independent external reality. The reason for this is that this conception endows the instruments with virtues that clearly transcend their status as mere physical systems —indeed, it ultimately defines instruments with reference to the desires.

DOI
10.1201/9780429501449-12

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CRC Press eBooks•Mar 5, 2018•0 citations
As a matter of fact, no serious description of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem uses the incriminated postulate that the state vector is objective. The most straightforward case is that of realism. Realism, however, is not universally accepted. In Neil Bohr's philosophy, nonseparability is also present, but it has a very different meaning. The nonseparability of the quantum world is thus transferred, in this philosophy, from the system of the microparticles to the systems that each of these micro-objects constitutes with its instrument. In regard to Lorentz invariance, the transition from the pure case to the mixture—the reduction of the wave packet—raises less acute problems in Bohr's philosophy than it does in other approaches. Moreover, Bohr's philosophy obviously implies some restrictions on our freedom to imagine an independent external reality. The reason for this is that this conception endows the instruments with virtues that clearly transcend their status as mere physical systems —indeed, it ultimately defines instruments with reference to the desires.
All alternative interpretations have at their roots some form of disgust at the Copenhagen–Gottingen philosophy, and all have a desire to seek an alternative truth for the understanding of quantum mechanics. The alternative view is of an intrinsic reality prior to the measurement, as discussed by A. Einstein, and by most of the founders of the wave theory of quantum mechanics. A key point of Neils Bohr’s arguments with Einstein, particularly with regard to the Einstein–B. Podolsky–N. Rosen type of experiments, was that one could not make multiple measurements on the same particle, or quantum system. In his view, the measurement itself defined the quantum system. With the arrival of the Schrodinger equation, quantum mechanics had a causal, deterministic equation of motion for the wave function. Perturbation theory, based upon the Schrodinger equation, provided transition details that undermined the assertions of quantum jumps.
The objective of this article is to demonstrate how the historical debate between materialism and idealism, in the field of Philosophy, extends, in new clothes, to the field of Quantum Physics characterized by realism and anti-realism. For this, we opted for a debate, also historical, between the realism of Albert Einstein, for whom reality exists regardless of the existence of the knowing subject, and Niels Bohr, for whom we do not have access to the ultimate reality of the matter, unless conditioning it to the existence of an observer endowed with rationality, position adopted in the Interpretation of Complementarity (1927) – posture that was expanded in 1935 when Bohr assumed a “relationalist” conception, according to which the quantum state is defined by the relationship between the quantum object and the entire measuring device. This is an extremely important debate, as it further consolidates the results of nascent Quantum Mechanics, guaranteeing Bohr the leadership of the orthodoxy based on the interpretation of complementarity. Here, when dealing with Quantum Theory, we will not make any distinction between the terms Quantum Physics, Quantum Theory or Quantum Mechanics. The entire discussion will be held under the name “Quantum Theory”. Theory that tries to analyze and describe the behavior of physical systems of reduced dimensions, close to the sizes of molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. We hope that the reader will appreciate the genius of these two titans in this field of Physics when they magnificently formulate the arguments that support the object of their defenses.
The Bohr-Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism (held by Einstein) and phenomenalism (held by Bohr). An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme-logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality.
This talk is about quantum logic, and before we engage in the subject proper let me say how much I appreciate the invitation to deliver it that was extended to me by the Japanese Society for the Philosophy of Science.In particular because I feel that such a meeting is really the place that is most adequate for the discussion of these matters.Let us introduce the subject by mentioning a few general points.First of all, logics deals with propositions.Hence we shall be concerned with propositions.But in fact our interest will be exclusively focused on what is-or what should be the simplest type of propositions: the propositions by means of which a physicist expresses what he knows about a physical system.A priori, our subject should then be very simple.Indeed the elementary books about logic tell us that the rules concerning these propositions can be formalized.That, for example, the propositions can be combined by means of two rules, corresponding to and and to or, and that the resulting structure is just that of a Boolean Algebra.We would expect this to hold for any system.However, as you know, a major difficulty already creeps in at this point when we want to deal with atomic systems.This is because a very simple word such as "and" may well have no obvious meaning in that case.And when we try to force a meaning to it was sometimes encounter quite unpleasant surprises, exemplified by the Heisenberg relations.Among the founders of quantum physics the reactions to such a fact were quite varied as is well known.Some of them sort of hoped that the difficulty just came from our using the wrong concepts.For example, it is quite obvious that if we try to describe as a particle something which is really a wave, we are heading for trouble and we are bound to formulate some meaningless propositions.However, this remark did not lead to a satisfactory solution in the end.Other physicists notably the Copenhagen group took a very different standpoint.Substantially, what they said boiled to this: since we cannot "see" the elementary particles, let us refrain from formulating directly propositions bearing on them.Ultimately, there fore, all their propositions bear on the instruments; or should be interpreted in terms of such propositions.This is -it turned out a very good recipe.Of course, propositions bearing on instruments are propositions of classical, macroscopic physcis.As such, they fall -57-
This article presents a general discussion of several aspects of our present understanding of quantum mechanics. The emphasis is put on the very special correlations that this theory makes possible: They are forbidden by very general arguments based on realism and local causality. In fact, these correlations are completely impossible in any circumstance, except for very special situations designed by physicists especially to observe these purely quantum effects. Another general point that is emphasized is the necessity for the theory to predict the emergence of a single result in a single realization of an experiment. For this purpose, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces a special postulate: the reduction of the state vector, which comes in addition to the Schrödinger evolution postulate. Nevertheless, the presence in parallel of two evolution processes of the same object (the state vector) may be a potential source for conflicts; various attitudes that are possible to avoid this problem are discussed in this text. After a brief historical introduction, recalling how the very special status of the state vector has emerged in quantum mechanics, various conceptual difficulties are introduced and discussed. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) theorem is presented with the help of a botanical parable, in a way that emphasizes how deeply the EPR reasoning is rooted into what is often called “scientific method.” In another section the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger argument, the Hardy impossibilities, as well as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem are introduced in simple terms. The final two sections attempt to give a summary of the present situation: One section discusses nonlocality and entanglement as we see it presently, with brief mention of recent experiments; the last section contains a (nonexhaustive) list of various attitudes that are found among physicists, and that are helpful to alleviate the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics.
The difference between the conceptual framework of classical physics and that of quantum physics which is due to the nonseparability property of the latter theory is better understood in specific examples. This chapter uses some specific examples to test the validity, both in classical and in quantum mechanics, of two conceptual principles. First is Reality Principle . The very concept of a reality may be criticized by philosophically minded empiricists. A widespread opinion, however, is that somehow a physical reality does exist, which should not just amount to the talks we give about it. In their search for a criterion that would make it possible to recognize elements of reality, A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen had to take such considerations into account. Second, Principle of the Separability of Mechanically Isolated Systems, one can easily guess that this second principle, which remains somewhat implicit in the work of Einstein and his colleagues may well be the source of insuperable difficulties.