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Lecture notes in computer science

A New Secure Matrix Multiplication from Ring-LWE

Lihua Wang, Yoshinori Aono, Le Trieu Phong

Published Jan 1, 2018• 6 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-02641-7_5

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Tighter Reduction for Lattice-Based Multisignature

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Multisignatures enable multiple users to sign a message interactively. Many instantiations are proposed for multisignatures, however, most of them are quantum-insecure, because these are based on the integer factoring assumption or the discrete logarithm assumption. Although there exist some constructions based on the lattice problems, which are believed to be quantum-secure, their security reductions are loose. In this paper, we aim to improve the security reduction of lattice-based multisignature schemes concerning tightness. Our basic strategy is combining the multisignature scheme proposed by El Bansarkhani and Sturm with the lattice-based signature scheme by Abdalla, Fouque, Lyubashevsky, and Tibouchi which has a tight security reduction from the Ring-LWE (Ring Learning with Errors) assumption. Our result shows that proof techniques for standard signature schemes can be applied to multisignature schemes, then we can improve the polynomial loss factor concerning the Ring-LWE assumption. Our second result is to address the problem of security proofs of existing lattice-based multisignature schemes pointed out by Damgård, Orlandi, Takahashi, and Tibouchi. We employ a new cryptographic assumption called the Rejected-Ring-LWE assumption, to complete the security proof.

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Efficient protocols for oblivious linear function evaluation from ring-LWE1

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An oblivious linear function evaluation protocol, or OLE, is a two-party protocol for the function f ( x ) = a x + b, where a sender inputs the field elements a, b, and a receiver inputs x and learns f ( x ). OLE can be used to build secret-shared multiplication, and is an essential component of many secure computation applications including general-purpose multi-party computation, private set intersection and more. In this work, we present several efficient OLE protocols from the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. Technically, we build two new passively secure protocols, which build upon recent advances in homomorphic secret sharing from (R)LWE (Boyle et al. in: EUROCRYPT 2019, Part II (2019) 3–33 Springer), with optimizations tailored to the setting of OLE. We upgrade these to active security using efficient amortized zero-knowledge techniques for lattice relations (Baum et al. in: CRYPTO 2018, Part II (2018) 669–699 Springer), and design new variants of zero-knowledge arguments that are necessary for some of our constructions. Our protocols offer several advantages over existing constructions. Firstly, they have the lowest communication complexity amongst previous, practical protocols from RLWE and other assumptions; secondly, they are conceptually very simple, and have just one round of interaction for the case of OLE where b is randomly chosen. We demonstrate this with an implementation of one of our passively secure protocols, which can perform more than 1 million OLEs per second over the ring Z m , for a 120-bit modulus m, on standard hardware.

Journal of Computer Security•Nov 5, 2021•7 citations
Multisignatures enable multiple users to sign a message interactively. Many instantiations are proposed for multisignatures, however, most of them are quantum-insecure, because these are based on the integer factoring assumption or the discrete logarithm assumption. Although there exist some constructions based on the lattice problems, which are believed to be quantum-secure, their security reductions are loose. In this paper, we aim to improve the security reduction of lattice-based multisignature schemes concerning tightness. Our basic strategy is combining the multisignature scheme proposed by El Bansarkhani and Sturm with the lattice-based signature scheme by Abdalla, Fouque, Lyubashevsky, and Tibouchi which has a tight security reduction from the Ring-LWE (Ring Learning with Errors) assumption. Our result shows that proof techniques for standard signature schemes can be applied to multisignature schemes, then we can improve the polynomial loss factor concerning the Ring-LWE assumption. Our second result is to address the problem of security proofs of existing lattice-based multisignature schemes pointed out by Damgård, Orlandi, Takahashi, and Tibouchi. We employ a new cryptographic assumption called the Rejected-Ring-LWE assumption, to complete the security proof.
An oblivious linear function evaluation protocol, or OLE, is a two-party protocol for the function f ( x ) = a x + b, where a sender inputs the field elements a, b, and a receiver inputs x and learns f ( x ). OLE can be used to build secret-shared multiplication, and is an essential component of many secure computation applications including general-purpose multi-party computation, private set intersection and more. In this work, we present several efficient OLE protocols from the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. Technically, we build two new passively secure protocols, which build upon recent advances in homomorphic secret sharing from (R)LWE (Boyle et al. in: EUROCRYPT 2019, Part II (2019) 3–33 Springer), with optimizations tailored to the setting of OLE. We upgrade these to active security using efficient amortized zero-knowledge techniques for lattice relations (Baum et al. in: CRYPTO 2018, Part II (2018) 669–699 Springer), and design new variants of zero-knowledge arguments that are necessary for some of our constructions. Our protocols offer several advantages over existing constructions. Firstly, they have the lowest communication complexity amongst previous, practical protocols from RLWE and other assumptions; secondly, they are conceptually very simple, and have just one round of interaction for the case of OLE where b is randomly chosen. We demonstrate this with an implementation of one of our passively secure protocols, which can perform more than 1 million OLEs per second over the ring Z m , for a 120-bit modulus m, on standard hardware.