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Bidirectional Asynchronous Ratcheted Key Agreement without Key-Update Primitives.

F. Betül Durak, Serge Vaudenay B

Published Jan 1, 2018• 6 citations
OpenAlex

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Cross-Epoch Key Verification with Zero Knowledge for Asynchronous Group Key Agreement in UAV Swarm

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UAV swarm is characterized by intermittent connectivity and frequent membership changes, which substantially complicate the design of secure group communication mechanisms. Asynchronous group key agreement (AGKA) allows members to update keys asynchronously, but achieving post-compromise secrecy requires heavy coordination. Moreover, using zero-knowledge proofs to verify key updates according to the prescribed rules can incur significantly high verification overhead. To address this, we propose a post-quantum cross-epoch key verification framework for a UAV swarm. We design an RLWE-based folding UPKE scheme that combines a left proof tree with a folding accumulator, allowing a returning UAV to verify cross-epoch key update using only a logarithmic-size proof path. We further develop a ZKLaBoo protocol that uses (k,n+1)-decomposition for the RLWE-based circuit, enabling zero-knowledge verification of both single-epoch update and cross-epoch chase without revealing update token materials. Our approaches reduce encryption and decryption times and verification time, and are well-suited to a UAV swarm under AGKA.

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SAID: Reshaping Signal into an Identity-Based Asynchronous Messaging Protocol with Authenticated Ratcheting

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As messaging applications are becoming increasingly popular, it is of utmost importance to analyze their security and mitigate existing weaknesses. This paper focuses on one of the most acclaimed messaging applications: Signal. Signal is a protocol that provides end-to-end channel security, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security. These features are achieved thanks to a key-ratcheting mechanism that updates the key material at every message. Due to its high security impact, Signal's key-ratcheting has recently been formalized, along with an analysis of its security. In this paper, we revisit Signal, describing some attacks against the original design and proposing SAID: Signal Authenticated and IDentity-based. As the name indicates, our protocol relies on an identity-based setup, which allows us to dispense with Signal's centralized server. We use the identity-based long-term secrets to obtain persistent and explicit authentication, such that SAID achieves higher security guarantees than Signal. We prove the security of SAID not only in the Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) model (as done by previous work), but also in the Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) model, which we adapted and redefined for SAID and asynchronous messaging protocols in general into a model we call identity-based Multistage Asynchronous Messaging (iMAM). We believe our model to be more faithful in particular to the true security of Signal, whose use of the message keys prevents them from achieving the composable guarantee claimed by previous analysis.

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UAV swarm is characterized by intermittent connectivity and frequent membership changes, which substantially complicate the design of secure group communication mechanisms. Asynchronous group key agreement (AGKA) allows members to update keys asynchronously, but achieving post-compromise secrecy requires heavy coordination. Moreover, using zero-knowledge proofs to verify key updates according to the prescribed rules can incur significantly high verification overhead. To address this, we propose a post-quantum cross-epoch key verification framework for a UAV swarm. We design an RLWE-based folding UPKE scheme that combines a left proof tree with a folding accumulator, allowing a returning UAV to verify cross-epoch key update using only a logarithmic-size proof path. We further develop a ZKLaBoo protocol that uses (k,n+1)-decomposition for the RLWE-based circuit, enabling zero-knowledge verification of both single-epoch update and cross-epoch chase without revealing update token materials. Our approaches reduce encryption and decryption times and verification time, and are well-suited to a UAV swarm under AGKA.
As messaging applications are becoming increasingly popular, it is of utmost importance to analyze their security and mitigate existing weaknesses. This paper focuses on one of the most acclaimed messaging applications: Signal. Signal is a protocol that provides end-to-end channel security, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security. These features are achieved thanks to a key-ratcheting mechanism that updates the key material at every message. Due to its high security impact, Signal's key-ratcheting has recently been formalized, along with an analysis of its security. In this paper, we revisit Signal, describing some attacks against the original design and proposing SAID: Signal Authenticated and IDentity-based. As the name indicates, our protocol relies on an identity-based setup, which allows us to dispense with Signal's centralized server. We use the identity-based long-term secrets to obtain persistent and explicit authentication, such that SAID achieves higher security guarantees than Signal. We prove the security of SAID not only in the Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) model (as done by previous work), but also in the Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) model, which we adapted and redefined for SAID and asynchronous messaging protocols in general into a model we call identity-based Multistage Asynchronous Messaging (iMAM). We believe our model to be more faithful in particular to the true security of Signal, whose use of the message keys prevents them from achieving the composable guarantee claimed by previous analysis.