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Biostatistics and Biometrics Open Access Journal

On Quantum 3-Pass Protocol

Ehasan Ahmed

Published Feb 1, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Some proposed 3-pass protocols in quantum cryptography assumes that the qbits are 2-component.Here we propose a protocol without this assumption.
DOI
10.19080/bboaj.2018.04.555648

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Abstract In device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), an adversary prepares a device consisting of two components, distributed to Alice and Bob, who use the device to generate a secure key. The security of existing DIQKD schemes holds under the assumption that the two components of the device cannot communicate with one another during the protocol execution. This is called the no-communication assumption in DIQKD. Here, we show how to replace this assumption, which can be hard to enforce in practice, by a standard computational assumption from post-quantum cryptography: we give a protocol that produces secure keys even when the components of an adversarial device can exchange arbitrary quantum communication, assuming the device is computationally bounded. Importantly, the computational assumption only needs to hold during the protocol execution—the keys generated at the end of the protocol are information-theoretically secure as in standard DIQKD protocols.