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MNOGI SVJETOVI KVANTNE MEHANIKE I MODALNOG REALIZMA

Milena Radović

Published Aug 26, 2018• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of modal realism and many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics and compare the concepts of many worlds in those two theories. Main source for modal realism is David Lewis' book On the Plurality of Worlds (1986). For many worlds interpretation I rely on Bryce DeWitt and Lev Vaidman. First part of the paper concerns modal realism, second is about many worlds interpretation and third is the comparison of those two. Many worlds in modal realism and many worlds interpretation have the same phenomenology, but are different ontologically. The worlds of modal realism are causally and spatiotemporally separated and have always been, while the worlds of many worlds interpretation are part of a branching universe. That means they were the same world at some point in the past, even though they are equally separated, as the worlds of modal realism are, after the branching.

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The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of modal realism and many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics and compare the concepts of many worlds in those two theories. Main source for modal realism is David Lewis' book On the Plurality of Worlds (1986). For many worlds interpretation I rely on Bryce DeWitt and Lev Vaidman. First part of the paper concerns modal realism, second is about many worlds interpretation and third is the comparison of those two. Many worlds in modal realism and many worlds interpretation have the same phenomenology, but are different ontologically. The worlds of modal realism are causally and spatiotemporally separated and have always been, while the worlds of many worlds interpretation are part of a branching universe. That means they were the same world at some point in the past, even though they are equally separated, as the worlds of modal realism are, after the branching.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
The Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics - arguably our most powerfully predictive scientific theory to date - describes a branching Universe composed of an infinite number of quasi-classical macroscopic physical worlds. Though elegant in its straightforward rendering of the mechanics, the Many Worlds Interpretation presents a challenge for understanding identity over time. If we wish to preserve the notion of strict numerical identity, we are faced with the choice between: denying the transitivity of identity; very short-lived lives with near constant death; or accepting that the world is filled with many more individuals than we previously dreamed. In adopting a perdurantist account of identity over time, I argue for this last option. But questions remain about the relationship that branching individuals have to those from whom they’ve split. In this dissertation, I develop a novel account that I call Many Worlds Counterparts. This theory takes its inspiration from Lewis’s Counterpart Theory in offering a modal analysis of de re possibility, but avoids the major challenges that Lewis’s theory faces.
A brief (subjective) description of the state of the art of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is presented. It is argued that the MWI is the only interpretation which removes action at a distance and randomness from quantum theory. Limitations of the MWI regarding questions of probability which can be legitimately asked are specified. The ontological picture of the MWI as a theory of the universal wave function decomposed into a superposition of world wave functions, the important parts of which are defined in three-dimensional space, is presented from the point of view of our particular branch. Some speculations about misconceptions, which apparently prevent the MWI from being in the consensus, are mentioned.
The articles provides a phenomenological reading of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics and its answer to the measurement problem, or the question of “why only one of a wave function’s probable values is observed when the system is measured.” Transcendental-phenomenological and hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches are employed. The project comprises four parts. Parts one and two review MWI and the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics. Part three reviews the phenomenologies. Part four deconstructs the hermeneutics of MWI. It agrees with the confidence the theory derives from its (1) unforgiving appropriation of the Schrödinger equation and (2) association of branching universes with the evolution of the wave function insofar as that understanding comes from the formalism itself. Part four also reveals the hermeneutical shortcomings of the standard interpretation.
n their contribution to this book, McQueen and Vaidman argue that common sense requires that explanations in physics be not only causal1 but also local. Their main claim is that the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (originally due to Everett) provides local explanations of the outcomes of experiments that in other interpretations of quantum mechanics seem to require (some sort of) nonlocality. Particles in the MWI leave traces both in the world where they exist but also in other worlds in which they do not exist. So the explanation is said to be local because spacetime splits together with the particles so that there is no influence at space-like separation within a world, but the causal influence literally travels across ‘parallel’ worlds. This seems to stretch the concept of locality beyond common sense, if not beyond breaking point, even if one understands causation weakly in terms of counterfactual dependence rather than by straightforward physical interaction.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics due to Everett (1957) postulates the existence of many worlds. The analysis of modality due to Lewis (1986) is supported by the postulation of the existence of many worlds. Accordingly, if we take the modally relevant plurality of worlds (or multiverse) to be the one that this bit of physics gives us, we might obtain a unified and comprehensive naturalistic cosmology: a theory which accounts for all modal truth in terms of being, and which carries the epistemological authority of natural science. Thus the quantum modal realism (QMR) of Alastair Wilson in The Nature of Contingency. This is a thoroughly stimulating and clearly written work that argues for a genuinely big idea. Taking on both the philosophy of physics...