Despite its enormous practical success, many physicists and philosophers alike agree that the quantum theory is full of contradictions and paradoxes which are difficult to solve consistently. Even after 90 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the socalled quantum measurement problem can be defined as follows: the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values.
Despite its enormous practical success, many physicists and philosophers alike agree that the quantum theory is full of contradictions and paradoxes which are difficult to solve consistently. Even after 90 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the socalled quantum measurement problem can be defined as follows: the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values.
Despite its enormous practical success, quantum theory is so contrary to intuition that, even after 45 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed?
Despite its enormous practical success, quantum theory is so contrary to intuition that, even after 45 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed?
Standard quantum theory is highly successful in all its applications, from photons and atoms, to semiconductors, superconductors, quarks, and so on. Yet the need to understand what the theory is really trying to tell us about the nature of the world beyond specific predictions forces us into the realm of philosophy, or, as some have dubbed it, quantum metaphysics: the study of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. There is a wide range of opinions regarding the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics. This chapter focuses on two of the most prominent interpretations: the Copenhagen interpretation, and one alternative interpretation that has been gaining some support in recent years, the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), also known as the many universes interpretation. The central issues of contention are: firstly, that the measurement of some attribute of a quantum system generally involves the probabilistic collapse, or reduction, of the state vector where the probabilistic nature of the process is inherent—that is, not reducible to a more fundamental, deterministic explanation; and, secondly, the problem of bringing a measurement to a completion—a problem generally known as the measurement paradox.
Despite the spectacular success of quantum mechanics (QM) over the last 80 years in explaining phenomena observed at the atomic and subatomic level, the conceptual status of the theory is still a topic of lively controversy. Most of the discussion centers around two famous paradoxes (or, as some would have it, pseudoparadoxes) associated, respectively, with the names of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) and with Schrodinger's cat. In this Viewpoint, I will concentrate on the paradox of Schrodinger's cat or, as it is often known (to my mind somewhat misleadingly), the quantum measurement paradox.
Although it is 70 years old, there are still areas of quantum theory which are open to interpretation. This book deals with such interpretational problems, and in particular with the issue of the measurement process. The main theme is whether quantum mechanics can be viewed as a (semantically) complete theory, namely as a theory capable of describing not only the physical object under observation but also the measuring instruments used to detect the properties of that physical object. The problematic aspects arise from the fact that the measuring instruments themselves behave as classical physical systems. Thus, we are faced with the open problem of the transition from the quantum to the classical, or more explicitly, the problem of why the composition of many quantum micro-objects gives rise to classical macro-objects. This book goes carefully, exhaustively, and deeply into the interpretational problems of quantum mechanics induced by the measurement process. The solution of many relevant issues, as well as the problems that remain unsolved, emerge clearly. The discussion itself is self-contained and the technical parts are reader-friendly. This book is of value to graduate students and researchers who have an interest in the physical, mathematical, and philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics.
Abstract This book presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s. The standard theory of quantum mechanics is in one sense the most successful physical theory ever, predicting the behaviour of the basic constituents of all physical things; no other theory has ever made such accurate empirical predictions. However, if one tries to understand the theory as providing a complete and accurate framework for the description of the behaviour of all physical interactions, it becomes evident that the theory is ambiguous, or even logically inconsistent. The most notable attempt to formulate the theory so as to deal with this problem, the quantum measurement problem, was initiated by Hugh Everett III in the 1950s. This book gives a careful and challenging examination and evaluation of the work of Everett and those who have followed him. The informal approach, minimizing technicality, makes the book accessible and illuminating for philosophers and physicists alike.