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Südwestdeutscher Verlag für Hochschulschriften eBooks

Information-theoretic Security in Practice

Stefan Raß

Published Sep 12, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Information-theoretic secrecy is the strongest known security notion. Despite perfect secrecy being theoretically well-understood, one faces substantial practical difficulties when attempting to build communication systems providing this highest level of security. We consider two major approaches to perfectly secure communication: multipath transmission and quantum key distribution. The latter has seen a promising evolution over the last decades, culminating in the recent presentations of the world’s first real-life quantum networks. This book advocates a combination of the two techniques in order to complement each other and to overcome existing limitations in both worlds. Getting started with a graph-theoretic groundwork for multipath transmission networks, we continue by deriving results about multipath channel coding and interactive error correction. Based on game-theory, we introduce a general quantitative security valuation enjoying broad applicability. For a given network, the security measure indicates the quality of protection as well as it permits security infrastructure optimization. Both topics receive attention in dedicated chapters.

Related papers

Information-Theoretic Security as an Optimization Problem

Stefan Raß

Quantum key distribution is renowned for information-theoretic security on point-to-point connections, while it is by itself not directly capable of end-to-end security. Multipath transmission is known for perfect end-to-end security, provided that perfect point-to-point security is achievable. The marriage of the two is as natural as it is difficult to achieve in real life networks: secure multipath transmission imposes stringent requirements on the network connectivity, perhaps rarely found in a real-life network infrastructure. We consider the problem of network augmentation to support perfect end-to-end security in a network in which adjacent nodes share a perfectly confidential channel. Quantum networks are one example for this. Starting with a decision-theoretic formalization of risk and confidentiality, we cast the network augmentation task into a nonlinear optimization problem, whose computational complexity is studied. With the problem turning out NP-hard in at least two of its variants, we sketch heuristics that can help to keep calculations feasible in practical applications.

Journal of Next Generation Information Technology•Aug 31, 2011•2 citations

Quantum Key Distribution: Bridging Theoretical Security Proofs, Practical Attacks, and Error Correction for Quantum-Augmented Networks

Nitin Jha, Abhishek Parakh, Mahadevan Subramaniam

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is revolutionizing cryptography by promising information-theoretic security through the immutable laws of quantum mechanics. Yet, the challenge of transforming these idealized security models into practical, resilient systems remains a pressing issue, especially as quantum computing evolves. In this review, we critically dissect and synthesize the latest advancements in QKD protocols and their security vulnerabilities, with a strong emphasis on rigorous security proofs. We actively categorize contemporary QKD schemes into three key classes: uncertainty principle-based protocols (e.g., BB84), hybrid architectures that enable secure direct communication (eg, three-stage protocol), and continuous-variable frameworks. We further include two modern classes of QKD protocols, namely Twin-field QKD and Device-Independent QKD, both of which were developed to have practical implementations over the last decade. Moreover, we highlight important experimental breakthroughs and innovative mitigation strategies, including the deployment of advanced Quantum Error Correction Codes (QECCs), that significantly enhance channel fidelity and system robustness. By mapping the current landscape, from sophisticated quantum attacks to state-of-the-art error correction methods, this review fills an important gap in the literature. To bring everything together, the relevance of this review concerning quantum augmented networks (QuANets) is also presented. This allows the readers to gain a comprehensive understanding of the security promises of quantum key distribution from theoretical proofs to experimental validations.

quant-pharXiv:2511.20602•Cryptologia•Nov 26, 2025•5 citations

Information Theoretic Security

Yingbin Liang, H. Vincent Poor, Shlomo Shitz Shamai

Security is one of the most important issues in communications. Security issues arising in communication networks include confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Attacks on the security of communication networks can be divided into two basic types: passive attacks and active attacks. An active attack corresponds to the situation in which a malicious actor intentionally disrupts the system. A passive attack corresponds to the situation in which a malicious actor attempts to interpret source information without injecting any information or trying to modify the information; i.e., passive attackers listen to the transmission without modifying it. Information Theoretic Security focuses on confidentiality issues, in which passive attacks are of primary concern. The information theoretic approach to achieving secure communication opens a promising new direction toward solving wireless networking security problems. Compared to contemporary cryptosystems, information theoretic approaches offer advantages such as eliminating the key management issue; are less vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle and achieve provable security that is robust to powerful eavesdroppers possessing unlimited computational resources, knowledge of the communication strategy employed including coding and decoding algorithms, and access to communication systems either through perfect or noisy channels. Information Theoretic Security surveys the research dating back to the 1970s which forms the basis of applying this technique in modern systems. It proceeds to provide an overview of how information theoretic approaches are developed to achieve secrecy for a basic wire-tap channel model as well as for its extensions to multiuser networks. It is an invaluable resource for students and researchers working in network security, information theory and communications.

now publishers, Inc. eBooks•Jan 1, 2007•708 citations

Quantum Communication and Security

Marek Żukowski, S. Ia. Kilin, Janusz S. Kowalik

This volume aims to assess the state-of-the-art in the field of Quantum Communication and Security and to identify new research challenges. The papers in this book concentrate mainly on quantum cryptography (both technical and experimental aspects and pure theory), general problems of theoretical quantum information and its realizations (laboratories and applied physics), and finally the related topics concerning quantum theory itself - the most fundamental questions. This publication is divided into four chapters: Quantum Cryptography; Theory of Quantum Information; Production of Entangled States, Experimental Techniques; and Quantum Communication and Computation. The editors hope to disseminate a broad spectrum of advances in quantum information and communication with this book.

•Jul 15, 2007•7 citations

Security as a Game – Decisions from Incomplete Models

Stefan Raß, Peter Schartner, Raphael Wigoutschnigg

Decision Support Systems 392 1.1 The problem of perfect end-to-end secrecy Quantum cryptography claims to bring perfect secrecy to a given line, but speaking honestly, it is no more than this.Using a carrier that is sufficiently fragile to rule out copying it, naturally raises the question of how much distance can be bridged?In fact, nowadays available quantum cryptography allows for communication over a distance of up to 144 km, as demonstrated by Schmitt-Manderbach et al. (2007), but arbitrary distances can yet not be bridged.Although theoretical results due to Lo & Chau (1999) indicate that the noise problem can be overcome, making arbitrary ranges theoretically possible, building networks is inevitable for a global roll-out.Existing solutions mostly rely on trusted relay for that matter.However, why attack the quantum line, if attacking a relay node is fully sufficient?Under the assumption of perfectly protected lines, recent results indicate that without preexisting secrets that are exclusively known to the sender and the receiver, end-to-endsecurity is only achievable under hard constraints on the network topology.To be more precise, let G be a graph that models a network.Let V(G), E(G) be the sets of vertices and edges of G, and assume the sender s and receiver r to be parts of G, that is {s, r} ⊆ V(G).The adversary can be modelled by a set A ⊆ 2 V(G)\{s, r} (the powerset of V(G)\{s, r}), that is we assume that a selection of subsets of vertices can be compromised.If k such sets can become conquered simultaneously, then we face a k-active adversary.An infected vertex v is assumed fully under the adversary's control, so a message passing through v can be read, blocked or modified and v is free to create as many new messages as desired.There is no limitation on computational power or knowledge of the adversary.If removing from G the vertices in any k sets in the adversary structure A cannot disconnect s and r in G, then we call the graph A (k) (s,r)-subconnected.If, by doing so, the network cannot be disconnected at all, then the graph is said to be A (k) -subconnected.Referring to these notions, a network permits perfectly secure message delivery from s to r if and only if the graph G is A (2) (s,r)-subconnected.The reader may consult Ashwin Kumar et al. (2002) for a proof.Different, yet no less stringent requirements are imposed by Wang & Desmedt (2008): among related results, the following necessary condition best highlights the difficulty of achieving unconditional security in a real-life network: if for u ≥ 1, 3(ku) + 1 ≥ k + 1 directed node-disjoint paths from s to r exist, then a necessary condition for perfectly secure message transmission from s to r against a k-active adversary is that there are u directed node disjoint paths (these u paths are also disjoint from the 3(ku) + 1 paths from s to r) from r to s.The described adversary model applies to many situations, as for example machines running certain software may all suffer from the same security holes.Networks equipped with devices from different vendors may be considered vulnerable if one vendor's devices turn out to be insecure.A k-active adversary would correspond to k vendors cooperating, or equivalently arise, if k vendors obtained the same malicious module from a single fraudulent manufacturer, turning a heterogeneous set of products into a possible backdoor for an adversary. Decision theory and system securityMany results either guarantee or rule out perfectly secret communication, but this might not be satisfactory.If perfectly secure communication is not possible, then how much is achievable with the given resources?A variety of security metrics has been proposed, but a measure of security is yet missing.This work summarizes a decision-theoretic approach to quantifying risk in terms that can be specified to best suit the application at hand.www.intechopen.

InTech eBooks•Jan 1, 2010•1 citation

Theory and Practice of Quantum Secure Communication

Wang Yun-bing

Recently,many important results on quantum secure communication,especially on quantum key distribution(QKD),have been achieved. QKD,being physically secure in theory,however,is not so easy in realizing an ideal QKD system. How to evaluate the security of QKD system in practice? Can free space QKD network provide secure communication under information war? Can QKD protect information security against quantum computer attack? Studies on all these problems both in theory and practice undoubtedly play an important role in practice.

Information Security and Communications Privacy•Jan 1, 2012•0 citations
Information-theoretic secrecy is the strongest known security notion. Despite perfect secrecy being theoretically well-understood, one faces substantial practical difficulties when attempting to build communication systems providing this highest level of security. We consider two major approaches to perfectly secure communication: multipath transmission and quantum key distribution. The latter has seen a promising evolution over the last decades, culminating in the recent presentations of the world’s first real-life quantum networks. This book advocates a combination of the two techniques in order to complement each other and to overcome existing limitations in both worlds. Getting started with a graph-theoretic groundwork for multipath transmission networks, we continue by deriving results about multipath channel coding and interactive error correction. Based on game-theory, we introduce a general quantitative security valuation enjoying broad applicability. For a given network, the security measure indicates the quality of protection as well as it permits security infrastructure optimization. Both topics receive attention in dedicated chapters.
Quantum key distribution is renowned for information-theoretic security on point-to-point connections, while it is by itself not directly capable of end-to-end security. Multipath transmission is known for perfect end-to-end security, provided that perfect point-to-point security is achievable. The marriage of the two is as natural as it is difficult to achieve in real life networks: secure multipath transmission imposes stringent requirements on the network connectivity, perhaps rarely found in a real-life network infrastructure. We consider the problem of network augmentation to support perfect end-to-end security in a network in which adjacent nodes share a perfectly confidential channel. Quantum networks are one example for this. Starting with a decision-theoretic formalization of risk and confidentiality, we cast the network augmentation task into a nonlinear optimization problem, whose computational complexity is studied. With the problem turning out NP-hard in at least two of its variants, we sketch heuristics that can help to keep calculations feasible in practical applications.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is revolutionizing cryptography by promising information-theoretic security through the immutable laws of quantum mechanics. Yet, the challenge of transforming these idealized security models into practical, resilient systems remains a pressing issue, especially as quantum computing evolves. In this review, we critically dissect and synthesize the latest advancements in QKD protocols and their security vulnerabilities, with a strong emphasis on rigorous security proofs. We actively categorize contemporary QKD schemes into three key classes: uncertainty principle-based protocols (e.g., BB84), hybrid architectures that enable secure direct communication (eg, three-stage protocol), and continuous-variable frameworks. We further include two modern classes of QKD protocols, namely Twin-field QKD and Device-Independent QKD, both of which were developed to have practical implementations over the last decade. Moreover, we highlight important experimental breakthroughs and innovative mitigation strategies, including the deployment of advanced Quantum Error Correction Codes (QECCs), that significantly enhance channel fidelity and system robustness. By mapping the current landscape, from sophisticated quantum attacks to state-of-the-art error correction methods, this review fills an important gap in the literature. To bring everything together, the relevance of this review concerning quantum augmented networks (QuANets) is also presented. This allows the readers to gain a comprehensive understanding of the security promises of quantum key distribution from theoretical proofs to experimental validations.
Security is one of the most important issues in communications. Security issues arising in communication networks include confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Attacks on the security of communication networks can be divided into two basic types: passive attacks and active attacks. An active attack corresponds to the situation in which a malicious actor intentionally disrupts the system. A passive attack corresponds to the situation in which a malicious actor attempts to interpret source information without injecting any information or trying to modify the information; i.e., passive attackers listen to the transmission without modifying it. Information Theoretic Security focuses on confidentiality issues, in which passive attacks are of primary concern. The information theoretic approach to achieving secure communication opens a promising new direction toward solving wireless networking security problems. Compared to contemporary cryptosystems, information theoretic approaches offer advantages such as eliminating the key management issue; are less vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle and achieve provable security that is robust to powerful eavesdroppers possessing unlimited computational resources, knowledge of the communication strategy employed including coding and decoding algorithms, and access to communication systems either through perfect or noisy channels. Information Theoretic Security surveys the research dating back to the 1970s which forms the basis of applying this technique in modern systems. It proceeds to provide an overview of how information theoretic approaches are developed to achieve secrecy for a basic wire-tap channel model as well as for its extensions to multiuser networks. It is an invaluable resource for students and researchers working in network security, information theory and communications.
This volume aims to assess the state-of-the-art in the field of Quantum Communication and Security and to identify new research challenges. The papers in this book concentrate mainly on quantum cryptography (both technical and experimental aspects and pure theory), general problems of theoretical quantum information and its realizations (laboratories and applied physics), and finally the related topics concerning quantum theory itself - the most fundamental questions. This publication is divided into four chapters: Quantum Cryptography; Theory of Quantum Information; Production of Entangled States, Experimental Techniques; and Quantum Communication and Computation. The editors hope to disseminate a broad spectrum of advances in quantum information and communication with this book.
Decision Support Systems 392 1.1 The problem of perfect end-to-end secrecy Quantum cryptography claims to bring perfect secrecy to a given line, but speaking honestly, it is no more than this.Using a carrier that is sufficiently fragile to rule out copying it, naturally raises the question of how much distance can be bridged?In fact, nowadays available quantum cryptography allows for communication over a distance of up to 144 km, as demonstrated by Schmitt-Manderbach et al. (2007), but arbitrary distances can yet not be bridged.Although theoretical results due to Lo & Chau (1999) indicate that the noise problem can be overcome, making arbitrary ranges theoretically possible, building networks is inevitable for a global roll-out.Existing solutions mostly rely on trusted relay for that matter.However, why attack the quantum line, if attacking a relay node is fully sufficient?Under the assumption of perfectly protected lines, recent results indicate that without preexisting secrets that are exclusively known to the sender and the receiver, end-to-endsecurity is only achievable under hard constraints on the network topology.To be more precise, let G be a graph that models a network.Let V(G), E(G) be the sets of vertices and edges of G, and assume the sender s and receiver r to be parts of G, that is {s, r} ⊆ V(G).The adversary can be modelled by a set A ⊆ 2 V(G)\{s, r} (the powerset of V(G)\{s, r}), that is we assume that a selection of subsets of vertices can be compromised.If k such sets can become conquered simultaneously, then we face a k-active adversary.An infected vertex v is assumed fully under the adversary's control, so a message passing through v can be read, blocked or modified and v is free to create as many new messages as desired.There is no limitation on computational power or knowledge of the adversary.If removing from G the vertices in any k sets in the adversary structure A cannot disconnect s and r in G, then we call the graph A (k) (s,r)-subconnected.If, by doing so, the network cannot be disconnected at all, then the graph is said to be A (k) -subconnected.Referring to these notions, a network permits perfectly secure message delivery from s to r if and only if the graph G is A (2) (s,r)-subconnected.The reader may consult Ashwin Kumar et al. (2002) for a proof.Different, yet no less stringent requirements are imposed by Wang & Desmedt (2008): among related results, the following necessary condition best highlights the difficulty of achieving unconditional security in a real-life network: if for u ≥ 1, 3(ku) + 1 ≥ k + 1 directed node-disjoint paths from s to r exist, then a necessary condition for perfectly secure message transmission from s to r against a k-active adversary is that there are u directed node disjoint paths (these u paths are also disjoint from the 3(ku) + 1 paths from s to r) from r to s.The described adversary model applies to many situations, as for example machines running certain software may all suffer from the same security holes.Networks equipped with devices from different vendors may be considered vulnerable if one vendor's devices turn out to be insecure.A k-active adversary would correspond to k vendors cooperating, or equivalently arise, if k vendors obtained the same malicious module from a single fraudulent manufacturer, turning a heterogeneous set of products into a possible backdoor for an adversary. Decision theory and system securityMany results either guarantee or rule out perfectly secret communication, but this might not be satisfactory.If perfectly secure communication is not possible, then how much is achievable with the given resources?A variety of security metrics has been proposed, but a measure of security is yet missing.This work summarizes a decision-theoretic approach to quantifying risk in terms that can be specified to best suit the application at hand.www.intechopen.
Recently,many important results on quantum secure communication,especially on quantum key distribution(QKD),have been achieved. QKD,being physically secure in theory,however,is not so easy in realizing an ideal QKD system. How to evaluate the security of QKD system in practice? Can free space QKD network provide secure communication under information war? Can QKD protect information security against quantum computer attack? Studies on all these problems both in theory and practice undoubtedly play an important role in practice.