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Simulation of the Quantum Hybrid Attack in Q

Florian Guski

Published Jan 1, 2018• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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Springer eBooks•Nov 14, 2007•0 citations

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Background: Quantum technologies are evolving rapidly, we are now in the era referred as Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ). Currently, research is focused on Quantum Error Correction and Quantum Hardware concerning security aspects. Aim: In this paper, we aim to investigate the attack surface in a hybrid quantum-classical scenario from an attacker perspective. It is the most common scenario regarding quantum computing in the software engineering community. Method: We perform a poisoning attack on both the classical and quantum implementation of the Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm, to compare them and test its effectiveness. We also perform a "noise simulation" attack, where the attacker exploits a feature exclusive to quantum hardware, to increase decoherence in the system, worsening overall performance. Results: We found that the quantum implementation of the SVM algorithm is also vulnerable to poisoning attacks. The severity of the attack is hard to compare and is reduced when performing data preprocessing techniques. We were able to test how simulating noise can worsen the performance of a model: the idea is to simulate noise in the official library used to perform local computation by simulating qubits, effectively worsening the model’s performance. Conclusion: Our findings showed how hybrid quantum-classical system can be exploited by an attacker. As future work, it will be interesting to explore related security aspects.

International Conference on Evaluation and Assessment in Software Engineering (EASE)•Jun 17, 2025•1 citation

Detecting man-in-the-middle attacks via hybrid quantumclassical protocol in software-defined network

Thakwan Akram Jawad, Awan Nahel Mahmood, Abdulhameed N. Hameed

Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks became one of the most risk attacks on OpenFlow communication channel in software-defined networking, its detection is a very hard task due there is no authentication in OpenFlow protocol. This channel is the most important in the network and is responsible for sending the control commands from the controller to the switches, so once the OpenFlow channel is hacked, the entire network is controlled by the attacker. Therefore, we propose a complementary solution to transport layer security protocol to detect man-in-the-middle attacks based on hybrid quantum-classical protocol. Based on the hybrid protocol, an easy-toimplement authentication between controller and switches depends on quantum and classical security layers. Also, detect eavesdropping on channel depending on quantum parameters. In this paper, we implement a simulation of hybrid protocol using a software-defined networking emulator for monitoring the OpenFlow channel to detect attacks, and the results showed the ease of detecting the eavesdrop and verifying the authentication of the other party with a hybrid method to get a high level of authentication.

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FGSM Attack Transferability from Simulation to Quantum Hardware in Network Intrusion Detection

Zeeshan Ajmal, Kimmo Halunen, Marc Maußner +2 more

Quantum computers are now available through cloud platforms, and recent work has proposed using them to detect network intrusions. It is not yet clear how easily such systems can be attacked. We train a hybrid variational quantum classifier (VQC) on the Friday DDoS subset of CICIDS2017 and test it against two attacks: label flipping during training and FGSM evasion at prediction time. We run the tests in simulation and on IBM hardware, the Fez superconducting processor (Heron r2). We find that two models with similar accuracy can differ greatly in how easily they are attacked. A model that decides with little confidence loses half its detections to a very small change in the input, while a model trained to decide with more confidence needs a much larger change before it fails. Attacks built in simulation against the more confident model also work on real hardware, and the device classifies every unaltered attack sample correctly. Simulated device noise does not reduce accuracy, but it does reduce the model's confidence and makes attacks easier, so accuracy alone does not show how exposed a model is. Label flipping has no measurable effect until 15% of attack labels are changed. These results show that device noise should not be treated as a defense and that reported weaknesses in these classifiers depend partly on how they were trained.

arXiv:2610.40701•Oct 28, 2026•0 citations
Background: Quantum technologies are evolving rapidly, we are now in the era referred as Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ). Currently, research is focused on Quantum Error Correction and Quantum Hardware concerning security aspects. Aim: In this paper, we aim to investigate the attack surface in a hybrid quantum-classical scenario from an attacker perspective. It is the most common scenario regarding quantum computing in the software engineering community. Method: We perform a poisoning attack on both the classical and quantum implementation of the Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm, to compare them and test its effectiveness. We also perform a "noise simulation" attack, where the attacker exploits a feature exclusive to quantum hardware, to increase decoherence in the system, worsening overall performance. Results: We found that the quantum implementation of the SVM algorithm is also vulnerable to poisoning attacks. The severity of the attack is hard to compare and is reduced when performing data preprocessing techniques. We were able to test how simulating noise can worsen the performance of a model: the idea is to simulate noise in the official library used to perform local computation by simulating qubits, effectively worsening the model’s performance. Conclusion: Our findings showed how hybrid quantum-classical system can be exploited by an attacker. As future work, it will be interesting to explore related security aspects.
Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks became one of the most risk attacks on OpenFlow communication channel in software-defined networking, its detection is a very hard task due there is no authentication in OpenFlow protocol. This channel is the most important in the network and is responsible for sending the control commands from the controller to the switches, so once the OpenFlow channel is hacked, the entire network is controlled by the attacker. Therefore, we propose a complementary solution to transport layer security protocol to detect man-in-the-middle attacks based on hybrid quantum-classical protocol. Based on the hybrid protocol, an easy-toimplement authentication between controller and switches depends on quantum and classical security layers. Also, detect eavesdropping on channel depending on quantum parameters. In this paper, we implement a simulation of hybrid protocol using a software-defined networking emulator for monitoring the OpenFlow channel to detect attacks, and the results showed the ease of detecting the eavesdrop and verifying the authentication of the other party with a hybrid method to get a high level of authentication.
Quantum computers are now available through cloud platforms, and recent work has proposed using them to detect network intrusions. It is not yet clear how easily such systems can be attacked. We train a hybrid variational quantum classifier (VQC) on the Friday DDoS subset of CICIDS2017 and test it against two attacks: label flipping during training and FGSM evasion at prediction time. We run the tests in simulation and on IBM hardware, the Fez superconducting processor (Heron r2). We find that two models with similar accuracy can differ greatly in how easily they are attacked. A model that decides with little confidence loses half its detections to a very small change in the input, while a model trained to decide with more confidence needs a much larger change before it fails. Attacks built in simulation against the more confident model also work on real hardware, and the device classifies every unaltered attack sample correctly. Simulated device noise does not reduce accuracy, but it does reduce the model's confidence and makes attacks easier, so accuracy alone does not show how exposed a model is. Label flipping has no measurable effect until 15% of attack labels are changed. These results show that device noise should not be treated as a defense and that reported weaknesses in these classifiers depend partly on how they were trained.