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IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

On the Secret Key Capacity of Sibling Hidden Markov Models

Mohammad Reza Khalili Shoja, George T. Amariucai, Zhengdao Wang, Shuangqing Wei, Jing Wei Deng

Published Jul 12, 2018• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Traditional approaches to secret key establishment based on common randomness have been based on certain restrictive assumptions, such as considering the available common randomness to consist of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) repetitions of correlated random variables. Unfortunately, the i.i.d assumption does not generally reflect the conditions of real-life scenarios. For this reason, the current paper investigates the key-establishment potential of a more pragmatic model, in which all parties have access to imperfect information about a common source modeled as a Markov chain. Each party's information thus comes in the form of a hidden Markov model and, since the different parties share the same underlying Markov chain, we call the overall model a sibling hidden Markov model (SHMM). This paper studies upper and lower bounds on the secret key capacity for various types of SHMM. The difficulty of the problem emerges from its prohibitive computational cost. To address this obstacle, we represent the joint probability of the observations as the L1norm of a Markov random matrix, and use its convergence to a Lyapunov exponent.

DOI
10.1109/tifs.2018.2855638

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Traditional approaches to secret key establishment based on common randomness have been based on certain restrictive assumptions, such as considering the available common randomness to consist of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) repetitions of correlated random variables. Unfortunately, the i.i.d assumption does not generally reflect the conditions of real-life scenarios. For this reason, the current paper investigates the key-establishment potential of a more pragmatic model, in which all parties have access to imperfect information about a common source modeled as a Markov chain. Each party's information thus comes in the form of a hidden Markov model and, since the different parties share the same underlying Markov chain, we call the overall model a sibling hidden Markov model (SHMM). This paper studies upper and lower bounds on the secret key capacity for various types of SHMM. The difficulty of the problem emerges from its prohibitive computational cost. To address this obstacle, we represent the joint probability of the observations as the L1norm of a Markov random matrix, and use its convergence to a Lyapunov exponent.
Secret key establishment from common randomness has been traditionally investigated under cartain limiting assumptions, of which the most ubiquitous appears to be that the information available to all parties comes in the form of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of some correlated random variables. Unfortunately, models employing the i.i.d assumption are often not accurate representations of real scenarios. A more capable model would represent the available information as correlated hidden Markov models (HMMs), based on the same underlying Markov chain. Such a model accurately reflects the scenario where all parties have access to imperfect observations of the same source random process, exhibiting a certain time dependency. In this paper, we derive a computationally-efficient asymptotic converse bound for the secret key capacity of the correlated-HMM scenario. The main obstacle, not only for our model, but also for other non-i.i.d cases, is the computational complexity. We address this by converting the initial bound to a product of Markov random matrices, and using recent results regarding its convergence to a Lyapunov exponent. The methods developed in the paper are easily extensible to derive a secret-key capacity lower bound.
Establishing secret common randomness between two or multiple devices in a network resides at the root of communication security. In its most frequent form of key establishment, the problem is traditionally decomposed into a randomness generation stage (randomness purity is subject to employing often costly true random number generators) and an information-exchange agreement stage, which relies either on public-key infrastructure or on symmetric encryption (key wrapping).\nThis dissertation has been divided into two main parts. In the first part, an algorithm called KERMAN is proposed to establish secret-common-randomness for ad-hoc networks, which works by harvesting randomness directly from the network routing metadata, thus achieving both pure randomness generation and (implicitly) secret-key agreement. This algorithm relies on the route discovery phase of an ad-hoc network employing the Dynamic Source Routing protocol, is lightweight, and requires relatively little communication overhead. The algorithm is evaluated for various network parameters, and different levels of complexity, in OPNET network simulator. The results show that, in just ten minutes, thousands of secret random bits can be generated network-wide, between different pairs in a network of fifty users.\nThe proposed algorithm described in this first part of this research study has inspired study of the problem of generating a secret key\nbased on a more practical model to be explored in the second part of this dissertation. Indeed, secret key establishment from common randomness has been traditionally investigated under certain limiting assumptions, of which the most ubiquitous appears to be that the information available to all parties comes in the form of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of some correlated andom variables. Unfortunately, models employing the i.i.d assumption are often not accurate representations of real scenarios. A more capable model would represent the available information as correlated hidden Markov models (HMMs), based on the same underlying Markov chain. Such a model accurately reflects the scenario where all parties have access to imperfect observations of the same source random process, exhibiting a certain time dependency. In the second part of the dissertation , a computationally-efficient asymptotic bounds for the secret key capacity of the correlated-HMM scenario has been derived. The main obstacle, not only for this model, but also for other non-i.i.d cases, is the computational complexity. This problem has been addressed by converting the initial bound to a product of Markov random matrices, and using recent results regarding its convergence to a Lyapunov exponent.
We study the problem of information-theoretically secure secret key agreement under the well-known source model and channel model. In both of these models the parties wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from an eavesdropper with unlimited computational resources. In the channel model, the first party can choose a sequence of inputs to a discrete memoryless channel, which has outputs at the other parties and at the eavesdropper. After each channel use, the parties can engage in arbitrarily many rounds of interactive authenticated communication over a public channel. At the end, each party should be able to generate the key. In the source model, the parties wishing to generate a secret key (as well as the eavesdropper) receive a certain number of independent identically distributed copies of jointly distributed random variables after which the parties are allowed interactive authenticated public communication, at the end of which each party should be able to generate the key. We derive new lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate under the source model and the channel model, and introduce a technique for proving that a given expression bounds the secrecy rate from above in the channel model. Our lower bounds strictly improve what is essentially the best known lower bound in both the source model and the channel model. Our upper bound in the channel model strictly improves the current state of art upper bound. We do not know whether our new upper bound in the source model represents an strict improvement but it includes the current best known bound as a special case.
The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing dependent random variables X and Y, respectively, but not sharing a secret key initially, is considered. An enemy who knows the random variable Z, jointly distributed with X and Y according to some probability distribution P/sub XYZ/, can also receive all messages exchanged by the two parties over a public channel. The goal of a protocol is that the enemy obtains at most a negligible amount of information about S. Upper bounds on H(S) as a function of P/sub XYZ/ are presented. Lower bounds on the rate H(S)/N (as N to infinity ) are derived for the case in which X=(X/sub 1/, . . ., X/sub N/), Y=(Y/sub 1/, . . ., Y/sub N/) and Z=(Z/sub 1/, . . ., Z/sub N/) result from N independent executions of a random experiment generating X/sub i/, Y/sub i/ and Z/sub i/ for i=1, . . ., N. It is shown that such a secret key agreement is possible for a scenario in which all three parties receive the output of a binary symmetric source over independent binary symmetric channels, even when the enemy's channel is superior to the other two channels.>
For pt.I see ibid., vol.49, no.4, p.822-31(2003). In the first part, we showed that when two parties, willing to generate a secret key, but connected only by a completely insecure communication channel, have access to independent repetitions of some random experiment, then the possibility of secret-key agreement depends on a certain property, called simulatability, of the probability distribution modeling the parties' initial knowledge. More generally, the simulatability condition is important in the context of identification and authentication among parties sharing some correlated but not necessarily identical partially secret keys. Unfortunately, this condition is a priori not very useful since it is not clear how to decide efficiently whether it is satisfied or not for a given distribution P/sub XYZ/. We introduce a new formalism, based on a mechanical model for representing the involved quantities, that allows for dealing with discrete joint distributions of random variables and their manipulations by noisy channels. We show that this representation leads to a simple and efficient characterization of the possibility of secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries.
Abstract—We study the secret-key capacity in a joint source-channel coding setup—the terminals are connected over a discrete memoryless channel and have access to side information, modelled as a pair of discrete memoryless source sequences. As our main result, we establish the upper and lower bounds on the secret-key capacity. In the lower bound expression, the equivocation terms of the source and channel components are functionally additive even though the coding scheme generates a single secret-key by jointly taking into account the source and channel equivocations. Our bounds coincide, thus establishing the capacity, when the underlying wiretap channel can be decomposed into a set of independent, parallel, and reversely degraded channels. For the case of parallel Gaussian channels and jointly Gaussian sources we show that Gaussian codebooks achieve the secret-key capacity. In addition, when the eavesdropper also observes a correlated side information sequence, we establish the secret-key capacity when both the source and channel of the eavesdropper are a degraded version of the legitimate receiver. We finally also treat the case when a public discussion channel is available, propose a separation based coding scheme, and establish its optimality when the channel output symbols of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are conditionally independent given the input. Index Terms—Information theoretic security, joint sourcechannel coding, public discussion, secret-key agreement, wiretap channel. I.