We propose an efficient commutative group action suitable for non-interactive key exchange in a post-quantum setting. Our construction follows the layout of the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov cryptosystem, but we apply it to supersingular elliptic curves defined over a large prime field $$\mathbb F_p$$ , rather than to ordinary elliptic curves. The Diffie–Hellman scheme resulting from the group action allows for public-key validation at very little cost, runs reasonably fast in practice, and has public keys of only 64 bytes at a conjectured AES-128 security level, matching NIST’s post-quantum security category I.
We propose an efficient commutative group action suitable for non-interactive key exchange in a post-quantum setting. Our construction follows the layout of the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov cryptosystem, but we apply it to supersingular elliptic curves defined over a large prime field Fp , rather than to ordinary elliptic curves. The Diffie–Hellman scheme resulting from the group action allows for public-key validation at very little cost, runs reasonably fast in practice, and has public keys of only 64 bytes at a conjectured AES-128 security level, matching NIST’s post-quantum security category I.
We analyze the Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman protocol (CSIDH), a novel supersingular isogeny-based key establishment protocol. Our analysis is from three perspectives: \n \nQuantum Cryptanalysis. Building upon quantum attacks on ordinary isogeny-based cryptography, we propose a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for inverting the complex multiplication group action for supersingular elliptic curves, which uses only polynomial quantum space. This improves upon previously-known algorithms which required subexponential quantum space. \n \nOptimization. We develop more efficient algorithms for evaluating the class group action in the context of CSIDH. We consider "strategies"—formerly only considered for Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH)—in the context of CSIDH, and develop systematic methods for optimizing "permutations" of the small primes used in CSIDH, which previously had been treated only in an ad hoc fashion. We also develop a systematic technique to optimize the CSIDH keyspace. These optimizations are complementary to prior work on optimizing CSIDH, including improved field arithmetic, Splitting Isogenies into Multiple Batches (SIMBA), and the two-point method. We apply our optimizations to the CSIDH-512 parameter set and give experimental results. \n \nFault Attacks. We consider physical attacks on static/ephemeral CSIDH in which limited information about which isogenies are "real" and which are "dummy" is revealed. We determine bounds on the number of fault injections required to recover the static secret key, and show that simply reordering the real and dummy isogenies from the ubiquitous "real-then-dummy" ordering to a dynamic random ordering dramatically increases the number of faults required, with negligible impact on the running time of the key exchange protocol (in contrast with prior fault attack countermeasures, which prevent fault attacks entirely at the cost of doubling the running time for key exchange).
The Signal protocol can be considered state-of-the-art when it comes to secure messaging, but advances in quantum computing stress the importance of finding post-quantum resistant alternatives to its asymmetric cryptographic primitives. The aim is to determine whether existing post-quantum cryptography can be used as a drop-in replacement for the public-key cryptography currently used in the Signal protocol and what the performance trade-offs may be. An implementation of the Signal protocol using commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) key exchange operations in place of elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is proposed. The benchmark results on a Samsung Galaxy Note 8 mobile device equipped with a 64-bit Samsung Exynos 9 (8895) octa-core CPU shows that it takes roughly 8 seconds to initialize a session using CSIDH-512 and over 40 seconds using CSIDH-1024, without platform specific optimization. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed implementation is the first post-quantum resistant Signal protocol implementation and the first evaluation of using CSIDH as a drop-in replacement for ECDH in a communication protocol.
The article presents the author’s works in the field of modifications and modeling of the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) algorithm on non-cyclic supersingular Edwards curves and its predecessor Couveignes-Rostovtsev-Stolbunov (CRS) scheme on ordinary non-cyclic Edwards curves are reviewed. Lower estimates of the computational speed gains of the modified algorithms over the original ones are obtained. The most significant results were obtained by choosing classes of non-cyclic Edwards curves connected as quadratic twist pairs instead of cyclic complete Edwards curves, as well as the method of algorithm randomization as an alternative to “constant time CSIDH”. It is shown that in the CSIDH and Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (CSIKE) algorithms, there are two independent cryptosystems with the possibility of parallel computation, eliminating the threat of side-channel attacks. There are four such cryptosystems for the CRS scheme. Integral lower bound estimates of the performance gain of the modified CSIDH algorithm are obtained at 1.5 × 29, and for the CRS scheme are 3 × 29.
Our modern world is dependent on online communications and transactions. To ensure privacy in these digital actions, it is extremely common to use protocols such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme. Unfortunately, these systems have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks from a quantum adversary. This means that an overhaul of the field of cryptography is needed in order to anticipate and mitigate this threat.Over the past years, the community has begun to answer this call by proposing and analyzing new techniques that are conjectured to be quantum safe. One such example is the study of cryptographic group actions. These mappings mimic some of the structure from the Diffie-Hellman protocol,but abstract it enough so that new mathematical operations can be employed that avoid quantum attacks. Currently, the main examples of group actions come from isogenies, codes, and lattices.In order for a protocol to be used in the real-world we would hope for it to be secure, fast, and requiring little storage. This means that in these early stages of research and development of cryptographic group actions, it is essential to begin to answer some of the questions surrounding security and efficiency. This thesis contributes to this effort by focusing on these aspects across different group actions that have been proposed for use in the literature.It is certainly true that each individual group action needs its own study of security. When designers are trying to achieve some advanced functionalities in a protocol, they may sometimes alter the underlying security assumptions.Each time this is done, the new assumptions need their own careful study as well. In this thesis we consider four different variants of group action security assumptions spanning the isogeny, tensor, linear code, and matrix code group actions. We analyze their security by either offering concrete attacks or giving a polynomial time reduction to a more well-studied assumption. This helps to indicate whether a problem is appropriate for use in cryptography, and what parameters to use if so.In addition to security, this thesis is also inscribed in the effort to study the efficiency of group actions by including three works studying the isogeny group action and related subroutines. They span the core isogeny problem for oriented elliptic curves, evaluating isogenies from a kernel generator, and supersingularity testing. With an effort from the community to improve overall runtimes, we can hope to get closer to reasonable speeds for real-life use.By studying the security and efficiency of cryptographic group actions, this thesis shines light on group actions as a promising framework for post-quantum cryptographic solutions.
Quantum computing threatens classical key exchange protocols such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH). Post-quantum schemes like Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) offer quantum resistance but at notable computational and communication costs. We propose DualSecure Key Exchange (DSKE), a hybrid protocol that integrates the classical security of ECDH with the quantum resistance of SIDH. Methodology: DSKE jointly derives two shared secrets -KECDH via elliptic-curve scalar multiplication over a 256-bit prime field and KSIDHvia supersingular isogeny mappings—then fuses them using a secure KDF (e.g., SHA-3): K=KDF(KECDH || KSIDH). We formalize core operations and asymptotics (ECDH O(n3); SIDH O(mlog m)), specify key materials, and fix parameter choices aligned with established baselines (e.g., Curve25519 for ECDH and standard SIKE/SIDH parameter sets) to ensure reproducibility. Experimental settings: Evaluations were conducted on an Intel Core i7 with 16 GB RAM using Python-based cryptographic libraries, with repeated trials for timing stability. Results: DSKE achieves runtime = 6.6 ms versus ECDH = 1.2 ms and SIDH = 5.4 ms; communication = 512 bytes versus ECDH = 128 bytes and SIDH = 384 bytes; and key size 1024 bits (hybrid) versus 256 bits (ECDH) and 768 bits (SIDH). Comparative analysis against SIKE further contextualizes DSKE’s efficiency–security trade-off. Security strength follows the minimum of the constituent levels; with a 256-bit prime for ECDH (=128-bit classical) and standard SIDH/SIKE parameters (targeting =128-bit quantum), the fused key maintains an effective 128-bit level under the stated assumptions and KDF construction. These results indicate that DSKE offers a balanced pathway toward post-quantum readiness, particularly for long-lived, security-critical deployments that can tolerate modest overheads for dual-layer protection.
Public key cryptography is crucial in current Internet technology.In practice, Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) cryptography based on Prime Factorization Problem, and Elliptic Curve cryptography based on Discrete Logarithm Problem are typically used.However, both these systems are broken in polynomial time using quantum computers.Therefore, new cryptosystems that are secure against adversaries using quantum computers (postquantum cryptography) should be developed.Isogeny-based cryptography exhibits considerable potential for use in post-quantum cryptography.It is based on Isogeny Problem that is a problem finding an isogeny from two elliptic curves.The greatness of isogeny-based cryptography is that the key length is short and hence compact secure communication is realizable.However, isogeny-based cryptography is yet to mature, and some problems remain.Although isogeny-based cryptography is considered one of the notable candidates for post-quantum cryptography, it has several problems due to its short history.In this thesis, we focus on two problems.The first one is the lack of studies on the security of isogenybased cryptosystems.Another one is that isogeny-based cryptosystems are less efficient than other candidates for post-quantum cryptography.Because of the insufficiency of studies about security, an IND-CPA secure isogeny-based public key encryption scheme without using random functions (idealized hash functions) is yet to be obtained.Some schemes have been proposed for isogeny-based public key encryption schemes; however, these schemes are only OW-CPA secure, which is the minimum security for public key encryption.Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) key exchange is an isogeny-based key exchange scheme based on group actions.Because this scheme is similar to Diffie-Hellman key exchange that has many applications, CSIDH is considered a useful scheme.CSIDH plays a crucial role in cryptography that uses group actions, and there are some applications of CSIDH for signatures and high-level cryptosystems.However, a simple public key encryption scheme based on CSIDH does not have IND-CPA security, whereas ElGamal encryption derived from Diffie-Hellman key exchange has IND-CPA security.This is because CSIDH has less mathematical structure than Diffie-Hellman, and a mathematically natural construction of key encryption based on CSIDH is yet to be obtained.In this thesis, we propose a novel public key encryption scheme, namely SiGamal.This scheme is constructed by adding auxiliary points to CSIDH key exchange.These auxiliary points extend a mathematical structure of CSIDH, and SiGamal is compatible with this extended mathematical structure.Therefore, SiGamal is a more natural ElGamal-like key encryption scheme based on CSIDH.Because SiGamal requires auxiliary points, it requires larger data than CSIDH and is less efficient.However, SiGamal has IND-CPA security without using hash functions under a new security assumption, namely the P-CSSDDH assumption.As an application of this scheme, we proposed Naor-Reingold type pseudo random function based on SiGamal.This pseudo random function (PRF) does not require hash functions, and it costs approximately 8T 3π times SiGamal, where T is the Hamming weight of the input of the PRF.Finally, experiments are conducted to verify the efficiency of SiGamal.In our experiments, the computational costs of a group action in SiGamal-512 with a 256-bit plaintext space are approximately 2.62 times that in CSIDH-512.The second problem of isogeny-based cryptography is that isogeny-based cryptosystems are more inefficient than other candidates of post-quantum cryptosystems.The inefficiency of isogeny-based cryptography could be attributed to computations of group ficients . . . . . . . . . . . .