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Lecture notes in computer science

Cryptanalysis Against Symmetric-Key Schemes with Online Classical Queries and Offline Quantum Computations

Akinori Hosoyamada, Yu Sasaki

Published Jan 1, 2018• 62 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_11

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Quantum attacks on Feistel constructions have attracted much attention from worldwide crytologists. To reduce the time complexity of quantum attacks on rrr-round (r≥7r \ge 7r≥7) Feistel construction, we propose a novel quantum meet-in-the-middle (QMITM) attack. For 7-round Feistel construction, we introduce quantum computing in the offline computation of the classic meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack [Guo2016], i.e., propose a quantum claw finding algorithm based on quantum walk, which speeds up the process of finding a match in the offline computation phase. The keys in 7-round Feistel construction could be recovered by the match at last. Furthermore, to attack rrr-round (r>7r > 7r>7), we use amplitude amplification algorithm to search the last r−7r-7r−7 rounds of keys. Compared with other quantum attacks in Q2 model, our attack reduces the time complexity from O(20.25nr−n)O({2^{0.25nr - n}})O(20.25nr−n) to O(22n/3+(r−7)n/4)O({2^{2n/3 + (r - 7)n/4}})O(22n/3+(r−7)n/4), and is significantly better than classic attacks. Moreover, our attack only needs to make classical online queries, without quantum superposition queries in other quantum attacks, which is more practical.
In this paper, we propose a new practical identity-based encryption scheme which is suitable for wireless sensor network (WSN). We call it Receiver-Bounded Online/Offline Identity-based Encryption (RB-OOIBE). It splits the encryption process into two parts – the offline and the online part. In the offline part, all heavy computations are done without the knowledge of the receiver’s identity and the plaintext message. In the online stage, only light computations such as modular operation and symmetric key encryption are required, together with the receiver’s identity and the plaintext message. Moreover, since each offline ciphertext can be re-used for the same receiver, the number of offline ciphertexts the encrypter holds only confines the number of receivers instead of the number of messages to be encrypted. In this way, a sensor node (with limited computation power and limited storage) in WSN can send encrypted data easily: A few offline ciphertexts can be computed in the manufacturing stage while the online part is light enough for the sensor to process. We propose an efficient construction for this new notion. The scheme can be proven selective-ID CCA secure in the standard model. Compared to previous online/offline identity-based encryption schemes, our scheme is exempt from a high storage requirement, which is proportional to the number of messages to be sent. The improvement is very significant if many messages are sent to few receivers. 1.
In this paper, we prove the security of symmetric-key constructions in an adversary model called the Q1MK model, which combines the Q1 model, where the adversary makes classical online queries and quantum offline queries, and the multi-key (multi-user) setting. Specifically, under this model, we prove the security of two symmetric-key constructions: the tweakable Even-Mansour cipher (TEM) and the FX construction (FX), as starting points for understanding the post-quantum security of symmetric-key constructions in this adversary model. Our security proofs are based on the hybrid argument technique introduced by Alagic et al. at EUROCRYPT 2022. First, we prove that in order to break TEM in the Q1MK model, Ω(2Κ/3) classical and quantum queries are needed, regardless of the number of target Κ-bit keys. Then, before turning to the Q1MK security analysis of FX, we revisit the security proof of FX in the standard Q1 model proposed in version 20230317:200508 of ePrint 2022/1097 and tighten it. By the modified proof, we show that in order to break FX with (Κ + n)-bit secret key in the Q1 model, Ω(2(Κ+n)/3) classical and quantum queries are needed. We then apply this proof to the Q1MK setting, and we show that in order to break FX in the Q1MK model, Ω(2(Κ + n - u)/3) classical and quantum queries are needed, when 2u ( 2Κ) independent keys are in use.