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IEEE Access

Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol in the Continual Leakage eCK Model

Jui‐Di Wu, Yuh‐Min Tseng, Sen‐Shan Huang

Published Jan 1, 2018• 19 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Based on users’ permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are used to construct a common session key between two session parties while authenticating each other. Recently, the design of leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) resisting side-channel attacks has received significant attention from researchers. By side-channel attacks, an adversary is allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of private (secret) keys during the computation rounds of LR-AKA protocols. However, most LR-AKA protocols have a restriction, namely, the overall fractional leakage information must be bounded. In this paper, we propose an efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. Security analysis is given to demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the generic bilinear group model. By comparisons, our protocol is better than the previously proposed LR-AKA protocols in terms of computation cost, security model, and leakage properties.

DOI
10.1109/access.2018.2799298

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•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations
Based on users’ permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are used to construct a common session key between two session parties while authenticating each other. Recently, the design of leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) resisting side-channel attacks has received significant attention from researchers. By side-channel attacks, an adversary is allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of private (secret) keys during the computation rounds of LR-AKA protocols. However, most LR-AKA protocols have a restriction, namely, the overall fractional leakage information must be bounded. In this paper, we propose an efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. Security analysis is given to demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the generic bilinear group model. By comparisons, our protocol is better than the previously proposed LR-AKA protocols in terms of computation cost, security model, and leakage properties.
Identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) protocol is an important cryptographic primitive, which is used to establish a session key between two communication participants while authenticating each other. Indeed, most of the existing ID-AKE protocols do not concern with side-channel attacks in the sense that adversaries could obtain partial information of ephemeral/permanent secret keys of users. Recently, several leakage-resilient ID-AKE (LR-ID-AKE) protocols have been proposed to address such attacks. However, these LR-ID-AKE protocols have a restriction that the total leakage information during the life time of the LR-ID-AKE protocol must be bounded to some ratio of ephemeral/permanent secret keys. In this paper, the authors define a new adversary model, termed as identity-based continuous-leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk (ID-CL-eCK) model. Using the key refreshing procedure (i.e., the multiplicative blinding technique) of permanent secret keys, the first LR-ID-AKE protocol resilient to continuous key leakage is proposed, and it possesses overall unbounded leakage property. Comparisons are given to demonstrate that the proposed protocol is better than the previously proposed ID-AKE protocols in terms of security models and leakage properties. Under the generic bilinear group model, security analysis is made to show that the proposed LR-ID-AKE protocol is secure against adversaries in the new ID-CL-eCK model.
We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of such information is bounded by some parameter ℓ. We construct a variety of leakage-resilient public-key systems including the first known identification schemes (ID), signature schemes and authenticated key agreement protocols (AKA). Our main result is an efficient three-round leakage-resilient AKA in the Random-Oracle model. This protocol ensures that session keys are private and authentic even if (1) the adversary leaks a large fraction of the long-term secret keys of both users prior to the protocol execution and (2) the adversary completely learns the long-term secret keys after the protocol execution. In particular, our AKA protocol provides qualitatively stronger privacy guarantees than leakage-resilient public-encryption schemes (constructed in prior and concurrent works), since such schemes necessarily become insecure if the adversary can perform leakage attacks after seing a ciphertext. Moreover, our schemes can be flexibly extended to the Bounded-Retrieval Model, allowing us to tolerate very large absolute amount of adversarial leakage ℓ (potentially many gigabytes of
Among the existing identity-based authenticated key agreement ID-AKA protocols, there are only a few of them that can resist to leakage of ephemeral secret keys, which is about the protection of the session secret key after the ephemeral secret keys of users are compromised. However, all these ID-AKA protocols with leakage of ephemeral secret keys resistance require expensive bilinear pairing operations. In this paper, we present a pairing-free ID-AKA protocol with ephemeral secrets leakage resistance. We also provide a full proof of its security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, which not only can capture resistance to leakage of ephemeral secret keys but also can capture other basic security properties such as master key forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance. Compared with the existing ID-AKA protocols, our scheme is a good trade-off between security and efficiency. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Certificateless public-key cryptography has conquered both the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography and the key escrow problem in the ID-based public-key cryptography. Certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) protocol is an important primitive of the certificateless public-key cryptography. A CLAKE protocol is employed to provide both mutual authentication and establishing a session key between two participators. Indeed, all conventional public-key cryptographies have encountered a new kind of attack, named “side-channel attacks”. Fortunately, leakage-resilient cryptography is a flexible approach to withstand such attacks. However, the design of leakage-resilient CLAKE (LR-CLAKE) protocols is not studied. In the article, by extending the well-known extended-Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, we present the security notions (adversary model) of LR-CLAKE protocols, called continual-leakage-resilient eCK (CLReCK) model. The first LR-CLAKE protocol withstanding side-channel attacks is proposed. By employing the proof technique of the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we formally prove the security of our protocol in the CLReCK model.
The extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for authenticated key exchange protocols that capture leakage of various kinds of secret information like the long-term private key and session-specific secret state. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS like trick. A generic construction GC-KKN satisfying those requirements is first given relying on standard cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency. On the second a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting. Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous eCK secure protocols in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and implement algorithms of protocol which require to be resilience of state leakage.