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International journal of network security

Adaptively-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in Standard Model.

Mojahed Mohamed, Xiaofen Wang, Xiaosong Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2018• 0 citations
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Hierarchical ID-based authenticated key exchange (HID-AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to establish a common session key between parties with authentication based on their IDs with the hierarchical delegation of key generation functionality. All existing HID-AKE schemes are selective ID secure, and the only known standard model scheme relies on a non-standard assumption such as the q-type assumption. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of HID-AKE that is adaptive ID secure in the HID-eCK model (maximal-exposure-resilient security model) without random oracles. One of the concrete instantiations of our generic construction achieves the first adaptive ID secure HID-AKE scheme under the (standard) k-lin assumption in the standard model. Furthermore, it has the advantage that the computational complexity of pairing and exponentiation operations and the communication complexity do not depend on the depth of the hierarchy. Also, the other concrete instantiation achieves the first HID-AKE scheme based on lattices (i.e., post-quantum).

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A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.

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Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model

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Nowadays many crucial network applications rely on the existence of a confidential channel established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks.With the rapid development of cyber technology, novel attacks to cryptosystem emerge in an endless stream.This has also led to the development of AKE solutions to provide increasingly stronger security guarantees.In this thesis we focus on provision of practical constructions for AKE protocols which are provably secure in a strong sense without resorting to random oracles.We first we present three new efficient compilers to generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries.Our compilers are not only a useful tool for the design of new AKE systems with many additional security properties in a modular and less error-prone fashion, but they also help to relax the assumptions on existing, practical key exchange mechanisms which are not known to be provably secure AKE protocols.Security of our compilers is shown in a strong modified CK model where the adversary is allowed to reveal either long-term secret key or state information of the protocol participants.On the second, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure two party AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS trick.A generic construction satisfying those requirements is given based on well-known cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency.Then a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting (i.e.without knowing any cryptographic information about its communication peer).Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous works which are eCK secure in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and to implement codes of protocol which need to be resilience of state leakage.Finally, we generalize our one-round two party AKE construction to group case that yields an efficient tripartite AKE protocol based on bilinear maps and a candidate group AKE protocol (with more than three members) based on multilinear maps.Up to now they are the first solutions which can be proved secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles.Meanwhile we make first step to show how to simplify the security proof for one-round group AKE under g-eCK model.i

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations
Hierarchical ID-based authenticated key exchange (HID-AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to establish a common session key between parties with authentication based on their IDs with the hierarchical delegation of key generation functionality. All existing HID-AKE schemes are selective ID secure, and the only known standard model scheme relies on a non-standard assumption such as the q-type assumption. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of HID-AKE that is adaptive ID secure in the HID-eCK model (maximal-exposure-resilient security model) without random oracles. One of the concrete instantiations of our generic construction achieves the first adaptive ID secure HID-AKE scheme under the (standard) k-lin assumption in the standard model. Furthermore, it has the advantage that the computational complexity of pairing and exponentiation operations and the communication complexity do not depend on the depth of the hierarchy. Also, the other concrete instantiation achieves the first HID-AKE scheme based on lattices (i.e., post-quantum).
A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.
Nowadays many crucial network applications rely on the existence of a confidential channel established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks.With the rapid development of cyber technology, novel attacks to cryptosystem emerge in an endless stream.This has also led to the development of AKE solutions to provide increasingly stronger security guarantees.In this thesis we focus on provision of practical constructions for AKE protocols which are provably secure in a strong sense without resorting to random oracles.We first we present three new efficient compilers to generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries.Our compilers are not only a useful tool for the design of new AKE systems with many additional security properties in a modular and less error-prone fashion, but they also help to relax the assumptions on existing, practical key exchange mechanisms which are not known to be provably secure AKE protocols.Security of our compilers is shown in a strong modified CK model where the adversary is allowed to reveal either long-term secret key or state information of the protocol participants.On the second, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure two party AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS trick.A generic construction satisfying those requirements is given based on well-known cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency.Then a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting (i.e.without knowing any cryptographic information about its communication peer).Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous works which are eCK secure in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and to implement codes of protocol which need to be resilience of state leakage.Finally, we generalize our one-round two party AKE construction to group case that yields an efficient tripartite AKE protocol based on bilinear maps and a candidate group AKE protocol (with more than three members) based on multilinear maps.Up to now they are the first solutions which can be proved secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles.Meanwhile we make first step to show how to simplify the security proof for one-round group AKE under g-eCK model.i