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Leibniz international proceedings in informatics

Two-Party Direct-Sum Questions Through the Lens of Multiparty Communication Complexity

Itay Hazan, Eyal Kushilevitz

Published Jan 1, 2017• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Direct-sum questions in (two-party) communication complexity ask whether two parties, Alice and Bob, can compute the value of a function f on l inputs (x_1,y_1),...,(x_l,y_l) more efficiently than by applying the best protocol for f, independently on each input (x_i,y_i). In spite of significant efforts to understand these questions (under various communication-complexity measures), the general question is still far from being well understood. In this paper, we offer a multiparty view of these questions: The direct-sum setting is just a two-player system with Alice having inputs x_1,...,x_l, Bob having inputs y_1,...,y_l and the desired output is f(x_1,y_1),...,f(x_l,y_l). The naive solution of solving the l problems independently, is modeled by a network with l (disconnected) pairs of players Alice i and Bob i, with inputs x_i,y_i respectively, and communication only within each pair. Then, we consider an intermediate ("star") model, where there is one Alice having l inputs x_1,...,x_l and l players Bob_1,...,Bob_l holding y_1,...,y_l, respectively (in fact, we consider few variants of this intermediate model, depending on whether communication between each Bob i and Alice is point-to-point or whether we allow broadcast). Our goal is to get a better understanding of the relation between the two extreme models (i.e., of the two-party direct-sum question). If, for instance, Alice and Bob can do better (for some complexity measure) than solving the l problems independently, we wish to understand what intermediate model already allows to do so (hereby understanding the "source" of such savings). If, on the other hand, we wish to prove that there is no better solution than solving the l problems independently, then our approach gives a way of breaking the task of proving such a statement into few (hopefully, easier) steps. We present several results of both types. Namely, for certain complexity measures, communication problems f and certain pairs of models, we can show gaps between the complexity of solving f on l instances in the two models in question; while, for certain other complexity measures and pairs of models, we can show that such gaps do not exist (for any communication problem f). For example, we prove that if only point-to-point communication is allowed in the intermediate "star" model, then significant savings are impossible in the public-coin randomized setting. On the other hand, in the private-coin randomized setting, if Alice is allowed to broadcast messages to all Bobs in the "star" network, then some savings are possible. While this approach does not lead yet to new results on the original two-party direct-sum question, we believe that our work gives new insights on the already-known direct-sum results, and may potentially lead to more such results in the future.

DOI
10.4230/lipics.disc.2017.26

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Advanced Topics

Eyal Kushilevitz, Noam Nisan

In this chapter we consider several, more advanced, topics related to the two-party communication model. Direct Sum The direct-sum problem is the following: Alice gets two inputs x f ∈ X f and x g ∈ X g . Bob gets two inputs y f ∈ Y f and y g ∈ Y g . They wish to compute both f ( x f , y f ) and g ( x g , y g ). The obvious solution would be for Alice and Bob to use the best protocol for f to compute the first value, f ( x f , y f ) and the best protocol for g to compute the second value, g ( x g , y g ). We stress that the two subproblems are totally independent. Thus one would tend to conjecture that nothing better than the obvious solution can be done: Alice and Bob cannot “save” any communication over the obvious protocol. As we shall see, in some cases and for some measures of complexity, this intuition is wrong. Denote by D ( f , g ) the (deterministic) communication complexity of this computation. Similarly, we define all other complexity measures such as R ( f , g ), N ( f , g ), and so forth. We also use the notation D ( f ℓ ) as the (deterministic) communication complexity of computing f and ℓ instances; that is, computing f ( x 1 , y 1 ), f ( x 2 , y 2 ), …, f ( x ℓ , y ℓ Open Problem 4.1: Can D ( f , g ) be smaller than D ( f ) + D ( g )? How much smaller can it be? How much smaller can D ( f ℓ ) be compared to ℓ · D ( f )? In some cases we are not interested in computing both f and g but rather some function of the two.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Dec 28, 1996•0 citations

New Results in the Simultaneous Message Passing Model via Information Theoretic Techniques

Rahul Jain, Hartmut Klauck

Consider the following simultaneous message passing (SMP) model for computing a relation f sube X times Y times Z. In this model Alice, on input x isin X and Bob, on input y isin Y, send one message each to a third party Referee who then outputs a z isin Z such that (x, y, z) isin f. We first show optimal direct sum results for all relations / in this model, both in the quantum and classical settings, in the situation where we allow shared resources (shared entanglement in quantum protocols and public coins in classical protocols) between Alice and Referee and Bob and Referee and no shared resource between Alice and Bob. This implies that, in this model, the communication required to compute k simultaneous instances of /, with constant success overall, is at least k-times the communication required to compute one instance with constant success. This in particular implies an earlier direct sum result, shown by Chakrabarti, Shi, Wirth and Yao [CSWY01] for the equality function (and a class of other so-called robust functions), in the classical SMP model with no shared resources between any parties. Furthermore we investigate the gap between the SMP model and the one-way model in communication complexity and exhibit a partial function that is exponentially more expensive in the former if quantum communication with entanglement is allowed, compared to the latter even in the deterministic case.

IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity (CCC)•Jul 1, 2009•21 citations

Communication Memento: Memoryless Communication Complexity

Srinivasan Arunachalam, Supartha Podder

We study the communication complexity of computing functions $F:\{0,1\}^n\times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ in the memoryless communication model. Here, Alice is given $x\in \{0,1\}^n$, Bob is given $y\in \{0,1\}^n$ and their goal is to compute F(x,y) subject to the following constraint: at every round, Alice receives a message from Bob and her reply to Bob solely depends on the message received and her input x; the same applies to Bob. The cost of computing F in this model is the maximum number of bits exchanged in any round between Alice and Bob (on the worst case input x,y). In this paper, we also consider variants of our memoryless model wherein one party is allowed to have memory, the parties are allowed to communicate quantum bits, only one player is allowed to send messages. We show that our memoryless communication model capture the garden-hose model of computation by Buhrman et al. (ITCS'13), space bounded communication complexity by Brody et al. (ITCS'13) and the overlay communication complexity by Papakonstantinou et al. (CCC'14). Thus the memoryless communication complexity model provides a unified framework to study space-bounded communication models. We establish the following: (1) We show that the memoryless communication complexity of F equals the logarithm of the size of the smallest bipartite branching program computing F (up to a factor 2); (2) We show that memoryless communication complexity equals garden-hose complexity; (3) We exhibit various exponential separations between these memoryless communication models. We end with an intriguing open question: can we find an explicit function F and universal constant c>1 for which the memoryless communication complexity is at least $c \log n$? Note that $c\geq 2+\varepsilon$ would imply a $Ω(n^{2+\varepsilon})$ lower bound for general formula size, improving upon the best lower bound by Nečiporuk in 1966.

arXiv:2005.04068•Leibniz international proceedings in informatics•May 8, 2020•3 citations

Direct product theorems for classical communication complexity via subdistribution bounds: extended abstract

Rahul Jain, Hartmut Klauck, Ashwin Nayak

A basic question in complexity theory is whether the computational resources required for solving k independent instances of the same problem scale as k times the resources required for one instance. We investigate this question in various models of classical communication complexity. We introduce a new measure, the subdistribution bound , which is a relaxation of the well-studied rectangle or corruption bound in communication complexity. We nonetheless show that for the communication complexity of Boolean functions with constant error, the subdistribution bound is the same as the latter measure, up to a constant factor. We prove that the one-way version of this bound tightly captures the one-way public-coin randomized communication complexity of any relation, and the two-way version bounds the two-way public-coin randomized communication complexity from below. More importantly, we show that the bound satisfies the strong direct product property under product distributions for both one- and two-way protocols, and the weak direct product property under arbitrary distributions for two-way protocols. These results subsume and strengthen, in a unified manner, several recent results on the direct product question. The simplicity and broad applicability of our technique is perhaps an indication of its potential to solve yet more challenging questions regarding the direct product problem.

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•May 17, 2008•36 citations

On Protocol Security in the Cryptographic Model

Copyright C, Jesper Buus Nielsen

It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.

•Jan 1, 2003•10 citations

More Communication Lower Bounds for Information-Theoretic MPC

Ivan Damgård, Boyang Li, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach

We prove two classes of lower bounds on the communication complexity of information-theoretically secure multiparty computation. The first lower bound applies to perfect passive secure multiparty computation in the standard model with n = 2t+1 parties of which t are corrupted. We show a lower bound that applies to secure evaluation of any function, assuming that each party can choose to learn or not learn the output. Specifically, we show that there is a function H^* such that for any protocol that evaluates y_i = b_i ⋅ f(x₁,...,x_n) with perfect passive security (where b_i is a private boolean input), the total communication must be at least 1/2 ∑_{i = 1}ⁿ H_f^*(x_i) bits of information. The second lower bound applies to the perfect maliciously secure setting with n = 3t+1 parties. We show that for any n and all large enough S, there exists a reactive functionality F_S taking an S-bit string as input (and with short output) such that any protocol implementing F_S with perfect malicious security must communicate Ω(nS) bits. Since the functionalities we study can be implemented with linear size circuits, the result can equivalently be stated as follows: for any n and all large enough g ∈ ℕ there exists a reactive functionality F_C doing computation specified by a Boolean circuit C with g gates, where any perfectly secure protocol implementing F_C must communicate Ω(n g) bits. The results easily extends to constructing similar functionalities defined over any fixed finite field. Using known techniques, we also show an upper bound that matches the lower bound up to a constant factor (existing upper bounds are a factor lg n off for Boolean circuits). Both results also extend to the case where the threshold t is suboptimal. Namely if n = kt+s the bound is weakened by a factor O(s), which corresponds to known optimizations via packed secret-sharing.

Leibniz international proceedings in informatics•Jan 1, 2021•5 citations
Direct-sum questions in (two-party) communication complexity ask whether two parties, Alice and Bob, can compute the value of a function f on l inputs (x_1,y_1),...,(x_l,y_l) more efficiently than by applying the best protocol for f, independently on each input (x_i,y_i). In spite of significant efforts to understand these questions (under various communication-complexity measures), the general question is still far from being well understood. In this paper, we offer a multiparty view of these questions: The direct-sum setting is just a two-player system with Alice having inputs x_1,...,x_l, Bob having inputs y_1,...,y_l and the desired output is f(x_1,y_1),...,f(x_l,y_l). The naive solution of solving the l problems independently, is modeled by a network with l (disconnected) pairs of players Alice i and Bob i, with inputs x_i,y_i respectively, and communication only within each pair. Then, we consider an intermediate ("star") model, where there is one Alice having l inputs x_1,...,x_l and l players Bob_1,...,Bob_l holding y_1,...,y_l, respectively (in fact, we consider few variants of this intermediate model, depending on whether communication between each Bob i and Alice is point-to-point or whether we allow broadcast). Our goal is to get a better understanding of the relation between the two extreme models (i.e., of the two-party direct-sum question). If, for instance, Alice and Bob can do better (for some complexity measure) than solving the l problems independently, we wish to understand what intermediate model already allows to do so (hereby understanding the "source" of such savings). If, on the other hand, we wish to prove that there is no better solution than solving the l problems independently, then our approach gives a way of breaking the task of proving such a statement into few (hopefully, easier) steps. We present several results of both types. Namely, for certain complexity measures, communication problems f and certain pairs of models, we can show gaps between the complexity of solving f on l instances in the two models in question; while, for certain other complexity measures and pairs of models, we can show that such gaps do not exist (for any communication problem f). For example, we prove that if only point-to-point communication is allowed in the intermediate "star" model, then significant savings are impossible in the public-coin randomized setting. On the other hand, in the private-coin randomized setting, if Alice is allowed to broadcast messages to all Bobs in the "star" network, then some savings are possible. While this approach does not lead yet to new results on the original two-party direct-sum question, we believe that our work gives new insights on the already-known direct-sum results, and may potentially lead to more such results in the future.
In this chapter we consider several, more advanced, topics related to the two-party communication model. Direct Sum The direct-sum problem is the following: Alice gets two inputs x f ∈ X f and x g ∈ X g . Bob gets two inputs y f ∈ Y f and y g ∈ Y g . They wish to compute both f ( x f , y f ) and g ( x g , y g ). The obvious solution would be for Alice and Bob to use the best protocol for f to compute the first value, f ( x f , y f ) and the best protocol for g to compute the second value, g ( x g , y g ). We stress that the two subproblems are totally independent. Thus one would tend to conjecture that nothing better than the obvious solution can be done: Alice and Bob cannot “save” any communication over the obvious protocol. As we shall see, in some cases and for some measures of complexity, this intuition is wrong. Denote by D ( f , g ) the (deterministic) communication complexity of this computation. Similarly, we define all other complexity measures such as R ( f , g ), N ( f , g ), and so forth. We also use the notation D ( f ℓ ) as the (deterministic) communication complexity of computing f and ℓ instances; that is, computing f ( x 1 , y 1 ), f ( x 2 , y 2 ), …, f ( x ℓ , y ℓ Open Problem 4.1: Can D ( f , g ) be smaller than D ( f ) + D ( g )? How much smaller can it be? How much smaller can D ( f ℓ ) be compared to ℓ · D ( f )? In some cases we are not interested in computing both f and g but rather some function of the two.
Consider the following simultaneous message passing (SMP) model for computing a relation f sube X times Y times Z. In this model Alice, on input x isin X and Bob, on input y isin Y, send one message each to a third party Referee who then outputs a z isin Z such that (x, y, z) isin f. We first show optimal direct sum results for all relations / in this model, both in the quantum and classical settings, in the situation where we allow shared resources (shared entanglement in quantum protocols and public coins in classical protocols) between Alice and Referee and Bob and Referee and no shared resource between Alice and Bob. This implies that, in this model, the communication required to compute k simultaneous instances of /, with constant success overall, is at least k-times the communication required to compute one instance with constant success. This in particular implies an earlier direct sum result, shown by Chakrabarti, Shi, Wirth and Yao [CSWY01] for the equality function (and a class of other so-called robust functions), in the classical SMP model with no shared resources between any parties. Furthermore we investigate the gap between the SMP model and the one-way model in communication complexity and exhibit a partial function that is exponentially more expensive in the former if quantum communication with entanglement is allowed, compared to the latter even in the deterministic case.
We study the communication complexity of computing functions F:{0,1}n×{0,1}n→{0,1}F:\{0,1\}^n\times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}F:{0,1}n×{0,1}n→{0,1} in the memoryless communication model. Here, Alice is given x∈{0,1}nx\in \{0,1\}^nx∈{0,1}n, Bob is given y∈{0,1}ny\in \{0,1\}^ny∈{0,1}n and their goal is to compute F(x,y) subject to the following constraint: at every round, Alice receives a message from Bob and her reply to Bob solely depends on the message received and her input x; the same applies to Bob. The cost of computing F in this model is the maximum number of bits exchanged in any round between Alice and Bob (on the worst case input x,y). In this paper, we also consider variants of our memoryless model wherein one party is allowed to have memory, the parties are allowed to communicate quantum bits, only one player is allowed to send messages. We show that our memoryless communication model capture the garden-hose model of computation by Buhrman et al. (ITCS'13), space bounded communication complexity by Brody et al. (ITCS'13) and the overlay communication complexity by Papakonstantinou et al. (CCC'14). Thus the memoryless communication complexity model provides a unified framework to study space-bounded communication models. We establish the following: (1) We show that the memoryless communication complexity of F equals the logarithm of the size of the smallest bipartite branching program computing F (up to a factor 2); (2) We show that memoryless communication complexity equals garden-hose complexity; (3) We exhibit various exponential separations between these memoryless communication models. We end with an intriguing open question: can we find an explicit function F and universal constant c>1 for which the memoryless communication complexity is at least clog⁡nc \log nclogn? Note that c≥2+εc\geq 2+\varepsilonc≥2+ε would imply a Ω(n2+ε)Ω(n^{2+\varepsilon})Ω(n2+ε) lower bound for general formula size, improving upon the best lower bound by Nečiporuk in 1966.
A basic question in complexity theory is whether the computational resources required for solving k independent instances of the same problem scale as k times the resources required for one instance. We investigate this question in various models of classical communication complexity. We introduce a new measure, the subdistribution bound , which is a relaxation of the well-studied rectangle or corruption bound in communication complexity. We nonetheless show that for the communication complexity of Boolean functions with constant error, the subdistribution bound is the same as the latter measure, up to a constant factor. We prove that the one-way version of this bound tightly captures the one-way public-coin randomized communication complexity of any relation, and the two-way version bounds the two-way public-coin randomized communication complexity from below. More importantly, we show that the bound satisfies the strong direct product property under product distributions for both one- and two-way protocols, and the weak direct product property under arbitrary distributions for two-way protocols. These results subsume and strengthen, in a unified manner, several recent results on the direct product question. The simplicity and broad applicability of our technique is perhaps an indication of its potential to solve yet more challenging questions regarding the direct product problem.
It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.
We prove two classes of lower bounds on the communication complexity of information-theoretically secure multiparty computation. The first lower bound applies to perfect passive secure multiparty computation in the standard model with n = 2t+1 parties of which t are corrupted. We show a lower bound that applies to secure evaluation of any function, assuming that each party can choose to learn or not learn the output. Specifically, we show that there is a function H^* such that for any protocol that evaluates y_i = b_i ⋅ f(x₁,...,x_n) with perfect passive security (where b_i is a private boolean input), the total communication must be at least 1/2 ∑_{i = 1}ⁿ H_f^*(x_i) bits of information. The second lower bound applies to the perfect maliciously secure setting with n = 3t+1 parties. We show that for any n and all large enough S, there exists a reactive functionality F_S taking an S-bit string as input (and with short output) such that any protocol implementing F_S with perfect malicious security must communicate Ω(nS) bits. Since the functionalities we study can be implemented with linear size circuits, the result can equivalently be stated as follows: for any n and all large enough g ∈ ℕ there exists a reactive functionality F_C doing computation specified by a Boolean circuit C with g gates, where any perfectly secure protocol implementing F_C must communicate Ω(n g) bits. The results easily extends to constructing similar functionalities defined over any fixed finite field. Using known techniques, we also show an upper bound that matches the lower bound up to a constant factor (existing upper bounds are a factor lg n off for Boolean circuits). Both results also extend to the case where the threshold t is suboptimal. Namely if n = kt+s the bound is weakened by a factor O(s), which corresponds to known optimizations via packed secret-sharing.