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IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)

Secret key agreement using a virtual wiretap channel

Setareh Sharifian, Fuchun Lin, Reihaneh Safavi–Naini

Published May 1, 2017• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Key agreement using physical layer properties of communication channels is a well studied problem. iJam is a physical layer key agreement protocol that achieves security by creating a “virtual” wiretap channel for the adversary through a subprotocol between the sender and the receiver that uses self-jamming by the receiver. The protocol was implemented and its security was shown through extensive experiments. The self-jamming subprotocol of iJam was later modelled as a wiretap channel and used for designing a secure message transmission protocol with provable security. We use the same wiretap model of the subprotocol to design secret key agreement protocols with provable security. We propose two protocols that use the wiretap channel once from Alice to Bob, and a protocol that uses two wiretap channels, one from Alice to Bob, and one in the opposite direction. We provide security proof and efficiency analysis for the protocols. The protocols effectively give physical layer security protocols that can be implemented and have provable security. We discuss our results and propose directions for future research.

DOI
10.1109/infocom.2017.8057119

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IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)•May 1, 2017•0 citations
Key agreement using physical layer properties of communication channels is a well studied problem. iJam is a physical layer key agreement protocol that achieves security by creating a “virtual” wiretap channel for the adversary through a subprotocol between the sender and the receiver that uses self-jamming by the receiver. The protocol was implemented and its security was shown through extensive experiments. The self-jamming subprotocol of iJam was later modelled as a wiretap channel and used for designing a secure message transmission protocol with provable security. We use the same wiretap model of the subprotocol to design secret key agreement protocols with provable security. We propose two protocols that use the wiretap channel once from Alice to Bob, and a protocol that uses two wiretap channels, one from Alice to Bob, and one in the opposite direction. We provide security proof and efficiency analysis for the protocols. The protocols effectively give physical layer security protocols that can be implemented and have provable security. We discuss our results and propose directions for future research.
Secure communication ensures the integrity and confidentiality of communication between connected devices. An information-theoretic approach to secure communication gives the strongest confidentiality guarantee by assuming that the attacker has unlimited computing power. The earliest formal model and definition of information-theoretic secure communication is by Shannon, who employed a secret key shared between communicating parties to provide confidentiality. An alternative elegant information-theoretic approach to secure communication views the natural characteristics of the environment (i.e., channel’s noise) as a resource to build security functionalities. This approach was first proposed by Wyner, and the corresponding secure communication model is called the wiretap channel model. These two approaches introduce two primary resources for providing information-theoretic secure communication: the shared secret key and physical properties of the communication medium. In this thesis, we study how to employ the above two resources for secure message transmission. We study this by using channel’s noise in the wiretap channel model. In this model, a sender is connected to the receiver and the adversary through two noisy channels. We propose a new wiretap encoding scheme with strong secrecy that provides perfect secrecy and reliability, asymptotically. The construction treats the noise in the adversary’s channel as a source of randomness that is extracted and used to hide the message from the adversary. We realize the wiretap channel model using cooperative jamming to evaluate the performance of wiretap codes in practice. We consider a model called keyed wiretap channel that unifies Wyner’s model with Shannon’s model of perfect secrecy for information systems, and propose a keyed encoding schemes with strong secrecy and other properties that are attractive in practice. We also study two-party information-theoretic secret key agreement when the two parties have access to samples of a common source of randomness and use a single message transmission to arrive at a shared random key. We propose a secret key agreement protocol in this setting, prove its security, and show its superior performance compared to other known protocols with the same properties. Finally, we propose an information-theoretic secret key agreement over a virtual wiretap channel created by cooperative jamming.
The wiretap channel is a setting where one aims to obtain information-theoretic security of communicated data under the sole assumption that the channel from a sender Alice to an eavesdropper Eve is “noisier” than that from Alice to a receiver Bob. However, in practice, the difference between the two channels in terms of noise may be much smaller because of the wide spread application of high-performance communication technologies. Thus, establishing a wiretap channel over real channels is a challenging task. In this paper, we report a wiretap channel in the form of a “protocol” (a so-called virtual wiretap channel) realized by using a highly precise wireless clock-synchronization technology called the wireless two-way interferometry (abbreviated as Wi-Wi). Wi-Wi technology has already been implemented in wireless communication devices, and it measures the clock time difference and signal propagation time in a situation where the precisions of both values are mutually affected. That is, Alice or Bob can induce a noise on Eve's clock time difference measurement by physically introducing noise in the signal propagation time between Alice and Bob. We analyzed the proposed wiretap channel referred to as the Wi-Wi wiretap channel experimentally, and estimated its parameters (e.g., the error probabilities). We confirmed that the Wi-Wi wiretap channel works well as a virtual wiretap channel by simulating and experimentally demonstrating a well-known, provably secure, optimal wiretap code over it. The results show that Wi-Wi wiretap channel can serve as a physical layer security, useful for synchronized Internet of Things (IoT) devises.
Wyner [96] proved that unconditionally secure communication over noisy channels is possible if the wiretapping channel is noisier than the main channel. The work has developed the following belief: Physical-channel characteristics are great resources to build security functionalities in the information-theoretic framework. We follow this belief and investigate the three problems of secret key establishment, manipulation detection, and distance bounding verification over physical-layer channels. We investigate secret key establishment (SKE) between Alice and Bob when they are connected through a pair of noisy wiretap channels with leakage to Eve. Our results show the possibility of SKE even in cases where the main channels are noisier than Eve's channels. We then notice two implicit assumptions of this work: (i) local randomness is freely available, and (ii) the wiretap channels are independent. We remove Assumption (i) by considering no local randomness for the parties. The results appreciate the role of noise as a single resource for randomness derivation and key generation in this setting. Regarding the second assumption, we consider the general two-way wiretap channel, where simultaneous data transmission can help achieve higher key rates. We show under what condition our security requirements can be strengthened without sacrificing the SK capacity. We consider manipulation detection against physical-layer adversaries noticing their limitations. We define leakage-resilient algebraic manipulation detection (LR-AMD) codes and prove optimal LR-AMD code constructions in general and special leakage scenarios. We show two applications of these codes: (i) robust nonperfect secret sharing and (ii) manipulation detection over wiretap channels. We then discuss how these codes can be composed with other primitives to guarantee bitwise manipulation detection and SKE against active adversaries over binary wiretap channels. Distance bounding verification (DBV) allows a verifier to check an upper bound on a claimed distance from a prover. We study DBV over physical channels with security against distance fraud (DFA), ma a fraud (MFA) and terrorist fraud (TFA) attacks. We show efficient DFA- and MFA-secure protocols only using physical channel properties. We further prove that TFA-security becomes feasible if the parties' communication is limited by the bounded retrieval model (BRM).
Physical layer (PHY) security has aroused great research interest in recent years, exploiting physical uncertainty of wireless channels to provide communication secrecy without placing any computational restrictions on the adversaries under the information-theoretic security model. Particularly, researches have been focused on investigating Wyner's Wiretap Channel for constructing practical wiretap codes that can achieve simultaneous transmission secrecy and reliability. While theoretically sound, PHY security through the wiretap channel has never been realized in practice, and the feasibility and physical limitations of implementing such channels in the real world are yet to be well understood. In this paper, we design and implement a practical opportunistic secret communication system over the wireless wiretap channel for the first time to our best knowledge. We show that, our system can achieve nearly perfect secrecy given a fixed codeword length by carefully controlling the structure of the parity-check matrix of wiretap codes to strike the proper balance between the transmission rate and secrecy. Our system is implemented and evaluated extensively on a USRP N210-based testbed. The experimental results demonstrate the physical limitations and the feasibility of building practical wiretap channels in both the worst channel case and the case where the sender has only the knowledge of instantaneous channel capacities. Our system design and implementation successfully attempts towards bridging the gap between the theoretical wiretap channel and its practice, alleviating the unrealistic and strong assumptions imposed by the theoretical model.
In Wyner wiretap II model of communication, Alice and Bob are connected by a channel that can be eavesdropped by an adversary with unlimited computation who can select a fraction of communication to view, and the goal is to provide perfect information theoretic security. Information theoretic security is increasingly important because of the threat of quantum computers that can effectively break algorithms and protocols that are used in today's public key infrastructure. We consider interactive protocols for wiretap II channel with active adversary who can eavesdrop and add adversarial noise to the eavesdropped part of the codeword. These channels capture wireless setting where malicious eavesdroppers at reception distance of the transmitter can eavesdrop the communication and introduce jamming signal to the channel. We derive a new upperbound R ≤ 1 - ρ for the rate of interactive protocols over two-way wiretap II channel with active adversaries, and construct a perfectly secure protocol family with achievable rate 1 - 2ρ + ρ2. This is strictly higher than the rate of the best one round protocol which is 1 - 2ρ, hence showing that interaction improves rate. We also prove that even with interaction, reliable communication is possible only if ρ <; 1/2. An interesting aspect of this work is that our bounds will also hold in network setting when two nodes are connected by n paths, a ρ of which is corrupted by the adversary. We discuss our results, give their relations to the other works, and propose directions for future work.