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Enhancing implementation security of QKD

Kiyoshi Tamaki

Published Oct 5, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) can achieve information-theoretic security, which is a provable security against any eavesdropping, given that all the devices the sender and the receiver employ operate exactly as the theory of security requires. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult for practical devices to meet all such requirements, and therefore more works have to be done toward guaranteeing information-theoretic security in practice, i.e., implementation security. In this paper, we review our recent efforts to enhance implementation security. We also have a brief look at a flaw in security proofs and present how to fix it.

DOI
10.1117/12.2280737

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can achieve information-theoretic security, which is a provable security against any eavesdropping, given that all the devices the sender and the receiver employ operate exactly as the theory of security requires. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult for practical devices to meet all such requirements, and therefore more works have to be done toward guaranteeing information-theoretic security in practice, i.e., implementation security. In this paper, we review our recent efforts to enhance implementation security. We also have a brief look at a flaw in security proofs and present how to fix it.
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic secure communications. In practice, however, it does not because most security proofs of QKD use assumptions that are not satisfied by the implementations, and thus their security is seriously threatened by quantum hacking. This includes, for instance, the assumption that the legitimate users of the system have a precise mathematical model to describe the behaviour of their apparatuses, that the systems are located in perfectly shielded labs which prevent any unwanted information to be leaked to the eavesdropper, and that all quantum devices and classical post-processing units are honest and follow the prescriptions of the protocol. Here, we review recent results that significantly relax these unrealistic and hardly feasible requirements, and pave the way towards achieving practical QKD with implementation security and enhanced performance.
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In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security. In practice, however, it does not due to the discrepancies between the assumptions used in the security proofs and the behavior of the real apparatuses. Recent years have witnessed a tremendous effort to fill the gap, but the treatment of correlations among pulses has remained a major elusive problem. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple yet general method to prove the security of QKD with arbitrarily long-range pulse correlations. Our method is compatible with those security proofs that accommodate all the other typical device imperfections, thus paving the way toward achieving implementation security in QKD with arbitrary flawed devices. Moreover, we introduce a new framework for security proofs, which we call the reference technique. This framework includes existing security proofs as special cases, and it can be widely applied to a number of QKD protocols.