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Lecture notes in computer science

Ratcheted Encryption and Key Exchange: The Security of Messaging

Mihir Bellare, Asha Camper Singh, Joseph Jaeger, Maya Nyayapati, Igors Stepanovs

Published Jan 1, 2017• 78 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_21

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Signal is a new security protocol and accompanying app that provides end-to-end encryption for instant messaging. The core protocol has recently been adopted by WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Google Allo among many others, the first two of these have at least 1 billion active users. Signal includes several uncommon security properties (such as "future secrecy" or "post-compromise security"), enabled by a novel technique called ratcheting in which session keys are updated with every message sent. Despite its importance and novelty, there has been little to no academic analysis of the Signal protocol. We conduct the first security analysis of Signal's key agreement and double ratchet as a multi-stage key exchange protocol. We extract from the implementation a formal description of the abstract protocol, and define a security model which can capture the "ratcheting" key update structure. We then prove the security of Signal's core in our model, demonstrating several standard security properties. We have found no major flaws in the design, and hope that our presentation and results can serve as a starting point for other analyses of this widely adopted protocol.
In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that many of its implementations provide, without notification, a weaker property for group messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject messages indefinitely. We show for the first time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic, asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratcheting Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time. ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable security guarantees. It has seen significant interest from industry, and forms the basis for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.
Abstract Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and classical key exchange protocols are conventionally deployed to derive symmetric key material for classical ciphers. In this work, we present an alternative architectural framework in which QKD initializes and synchronizes an endpoint state rather than encrypting payloads directly. By evolving this endpoint state across time, classical payloads can be replaced by non-semantic triggers on the transport wire, where reconstruction occurs entirely locally. We formalize the information-theoretic properties of this state-driven relational messaging framework, detail the complete Alice–Bob protocol exchange, and evaluate its defensive posture against conventional ciphertext transport. We demonstrate that because QKD synchronizes state updates rather than encrypting raw message volume, the required quantum key rate decouples state security from classical payload throughput. Finally, we include three theoretical appendices: Appendix A formalizes Interpretation Secure Key Distribution (ISKD) as a classical state fallback that maintains structural tamper detection; Appendix B provides a formal comparison distinguishing QKD and ISKD from classical public-key exchanges such as Diffie-Hellman; and Appendix C formalizes the theoretical timing dynamics, state transition modes, and the distinction between deterministic ratchets and QKD entropy-injected ratchets.