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Quantum intuitionistic logic and the Gelfand representation theorem

Dion M. F. Hartmann

Published Jan 1, 2017• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The subject of this thesis is on the shared horizon of theoretical physics and logic: Quantum logic. In 1936, Birkhofff and von Neumann already formulated a quantum logic. But, this logic has some undesirable properties concerning the interpretation of the logical conjunction and disjunction as ``and'' and ``or''. Therefor, Landsman has recently set out to develop a new logic for quantum mechanics, which is set up inside a topos and thus is intuitionistic. \n\nThe construction of Landsmans intuitionistic quantum logic relies on the Gelfand representation theorem. However, to apply the theorem a constructive proof is needed. Coquand and Spitters recently published such a proof, but the material that was published is too condensed for our taste. So in this thesis we attempt to expand on this constructive proof of the Gelfand representation theorem and check all details the original authors left out. As a result, more insight is gained in the constructive proof of the Gelfand representation theorem, providing a stronger foundation for intuitionistic quantum logic.

Related papers

Intuitionistic Quantum Logic of an n-level System

Martijn Caspers, Chris Heunen, Nicolaas P. Landsman +1 more

A decade ago, Isham and Butterfield proposed a topos-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics, which meanwhile has been extended by Döring and Isham so as to provide a new mathematical foundation for all of physics. Last year, three of the present authors redeveloped and refined these ideas by combining the C*-algebraic approach to quantum theory with the so-called internal language of topos theory (Heunen et al. in arXiv:0709.4364 ). The goal of the present paper is to illustrate our abstract setup through the concrete example of the C*-algebra M n (ℂ) of complex n×n matrices. This leads to an explicit expression for the pointfree quantum phase space Σ n and the associated logical structure and Gelfand transform of an n-level system. We also determine the pertinent non-probabilisitic state-proposition pairing (or valuation) and give a very natural topos-theoretic reformulation of the Kochen–Specker Theorem. In our approach, the nondistributive lattice ℘(M n (ℂ)) of projections in M n (ℂ) (which forms the basis of the traditional quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann) is replaced by a specific distributive lattice $\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})$ of functions from the poset $\mathcal{C}(M_{n}(\mathbb{C}))$ of all unital commutative C*-subalgebras C of M n (ℂ) to ℘(M n (ℂ)). The lattice $\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})$ is essentially the (pointfree) topology of the quantum phase space Σ n , and as such defines a Heyting algebra. Each element of $\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})$ corresponds to a “Bohrified” proposition, in the sense that to each classical context $C\in\mathcal{C}(M_{n}(\mathbb{C}))$ it associates a yes-no question (i.e. an element of the Boolean lattice ℘(C) of projections in C), rather than being a single projection as in standard quantum logic. Distributivity is recovered at the expense of the law of the excluded middle (Tertium Non Datur), whose demise is in our opinion to be welcomed, not just in intuitionistic logic in the spirit of Brouwer, but also in quantum logic in the spirit of von Neumann.

arXiv:0902.3201•Foundations of Physics•Apr 20, 2009•40 citations

A proposal for a new approach to Quantum Logic

Antonino Drago, Antonio Venezia

In order to solve the problem of which is the real logic of Quantum Mechanics (QM), we suggest to study the mutual relationships between the physical theory (as a whole, that is both its experimental part and its theoretical part), its mathematics and its logic. That results to be a more general problem than what is considered by traditional studies on Quantum Logic (QL). These studies focus attention on the problem of the relationship between the experimental part of the physical theory and only its mathematics, from which logic is then derived. The new approach, that we suggest, generalises the interpretation that one of us (A. D.) successfully tested on the foundations of classical physical theories. The foundations of a theory are interpreted in terms of two options on the kind of mathematics, either classical one or constructive one, and the kind of logic, either classical logic or intuitionistic logic. It is remarkable that each theory making use of intuitionistic logic – i. e. L. Carnot’s classical mechanics, S. Carnot’s thermodynamics, Lobacevskij’s non-Euclidean geometry is organised in order to solve an universal problem (expressed by a double negated sentence), rather than in an entirely deductive way; hence, a non-classical logic does not belong exclusively to QM. From an historical and foundational analysis about QM, we conclude that in QM it is the law of double negation and not modular law (introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann without giving physical evidence to it) which fails, i. e. which represents the true difference between Classical Logic (CL) and QL. We have looked for previous works on QL supporting our suggestion; in the past Destouches-Fevrier (1948), Fine (1974), Bell-Hallett (1981), Gauthier (1983), Adelman-Corbett (1995) already defended this thesis on the relevance of double negation law for QL. Under this light, QL results to have the same logic of a classical theory organised in a problematic manner. Hence, QM has to be referred to intuitionistic logic, in the same way every theory which is developed around a fundamental problem, expressed by a double negated sentence, does. In particular, by following the founder of intuitionism, Brouwer, we reject the identification of intuitionistic logic with an entirely deductive system; rather, the logical system of QL, as a theory, is organised in such a way to put a crucial problem to be solved. In agreement with this kind of organisation, among the several QM formulations we choose Heisenberg’s formulation, which was ignored by previous authors on QL. This formulation is aimed to solve the problem of quantum measurement, that originates the uncertainty methodological principle. Moreover, it is remarkable that it makes use of an operational mathematics (discrete matrices only). We interpret its characteristic arguing about its principal problem through double negated sentences; it results to be a moving from arguments belonging to non-classical logic expressed by a double negated sentence to the recognition of a suitable mathematics for QM formulation. In sum, QL shows how it is possible to state the relationship between QM and mathematics. This point has been almost ignored by the most traditional approaches to QL, which rather drew it from an a priori mathematics of QM (commonly, Hilbert space). As a verification of our approach, we show that even both Lobachevskij’s geometry and S. Carnot’s thermodynamics argued in order to achieve mathematical formulas expressing the content of the basic double negated sentences of respective theory. In the same way the recent book on QM by T. F. Jordan formalised his matrix mechanics. 1. Logic in classical physics and in Quantum Mechanics An historical analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM) shows that there were at the origin of the theory two distinct formulations: Matrix Mechanics (Heisenberg, 1925) and Wave Mechanics (Schroedinger, 1926). Although Dirac subsumed these two formulations in a comprehensive mathematical framework (Hilbert space), we think that the organisation of the principles is different in Matrix Mechanics from that in Wave Mechanics, and this difference implies different logics. So we think that in order to characterise the logic of QM it is necessary to distinguish between this two formulations. In Matrix Mechanics, Heisenberg’s basic idea was to explain atomic spectra not in terms of atomic orbits (as Old Quantum Theory tried to make), but only by means of the study of experimental data; i. e., frequencies and intensities of light both emitted and absorbed by matter. Through a

•Jan 1, 2002•3 citations

Bohrification

Chris Heunen, Nicolaas P. Landsman, Bas Spitters

The aim of this chapter is to construct new foundations for quantum logic and quantum spaces. This is accomplished by merging algebraic quantum theory and topos theory (encompassing the theory of locales or frames, of which toposes in a sense form the ultimate generalization). In a nutshell, the relation between these fields is as follows. First, our mathematical interpretation of Bohr's `doctrine of classical concepts' is that the empirical content of a quantum theory described by a noncommutative (unital) C*-algebra A is contained in the family of its commutative (unital) C*-algebras, partially ordered by inclusion. Seen as a category, the ensuing poset C(A) canonically defines the topos [C(A); Set] of covariant functors from C(A) to the category Set of sets and functions. This topos contains the `Bohri??cation' A of A, defined as the tautological functor C 7! C, as an internal commutative C*-algebra. Second, according to the topos-valid Gelfand duality theorem of Banaschewski and Mulvey, A has a Gelfand spectrum S(A), which is a locale internal to the topos [C(A); Set]. We interpret its external description SA (in the sense of Joyal and Tierney), as the `Bohrified' phase space of the physical system described by A. As in classical physics, the open subsets of SA correspond to (atomic) propositions, so that the `Bohrified' quantum logic of A is given by the Heyting algebra structure of SA. The key difference between this logic and its classical counterpart is that the former does not satisfy the law of the excluded middle, and hence is intuitionistic. When A contains sufficiently many projections (as in the case where A is a von Neumann algebra, or, more generally, a Rickart C*-algebra), the intuitionistic quantum logic SA of A may also be compared with the traditional quantum logic Proj(A), i.e. the orthomodular lattice of projections in A. This time, the main di??erence is that SA is distributive (even when A is noncommutative), while Proj(A) is not. This chapter is a streamlined synthesis of our earlier papers in Comm. Math. Phys. (arXiv:0709.4364), Found Phys. (arXiv:0902.3201) and Synthese (arXiv:0905.2275). See also [51].

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 18, 2011•17 citations

Topos Quantum Logic and Mixed States

Andreas Döring

The topos approach to the formulation of physical theories includes a new form of quantum logic. We present this topos quantum logic, including some new results, and compare it to standard quantum logic, all with an eye to conceptual issues. In particular, we show that topos quantum logic is distributive, multi-valued, contextual and intuitionistic. It incorporates superposition without being based on linear structures, has a built-in form of coarse-graining which automatically avoids interpretational problems usually associated with the conjunction of propositions about incompatible physical quantities, and provides a material implication that is lacking from standard quantum logic. Importantly, topos quantum logic comes with a clear geometrical underpinning. The representation of pure states and truth-value assignments are discussed. It is briefly shown how mixed states fit into this approach.

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The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been a problem since its founding days. A large contribution to the discussion of possible interpretations of quantum mechanics is given by the so-called impossibility proofs for hidden variable models; models that allow a realist interpretation. In this thesis some of these proofs are discussed, like von Neumann's Theorem, the Kochen-Specker Theorem and the Bell-inequalities. Some more recent developments are also investigated, like Meyer's nullification of the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the MKC-models and Conway and Kochen's Free Will Theorem. This last one is taken to suggest that the problems that arise for certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are not limited to realist interpretations only, but also affect certain instrumentalist interpretations. It is argued that one may arrive at a more satisfying interpretation of quantum mechanics if one adopts a logic that seems more compatible with the instrumentalist viewpoint namely, intuitionistic logic. The motivations for adopting this form of logic rather than classical logic or quantum logic are linked to some of the philosophical ideas of Bohr. In particular a new interpretation of Bohr's notion of complementarity is proposed. Finally some possibilities are explored for linking the intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics to the mathematical formalism of the theory.

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FROM INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC TO DYNAMIC OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC

Sonja Smets

Research within the operational approach to the logical foundations of physics has recently pointed out a new perspective in which quantum logic can be viewed as an intuitionistic logic with an additional operator to capture its essential, i.e., non-distributive, properties. In this paper we will offer an introduction to this approach. We will focus further on why quantum logic has an inherent dynamic nature which is captured in the meaning of “orthomodularity” and on how it motivates physically the introduction of dynamic implication operators, each for which a deduction theorem holds with respect to a dynamic conjunction. As such we can offer a positive answer to the many who pondered about whether quantum logic should really be called a logic. Doubts to answer the question positively were in first instance due to the former lack of an implication connective which satisfies the deduction theorem within quantum logic.

BRILL eBooks•Jan 1, 2007•7 citations
The subject of this thesis is on the shared horizon of theoretical physics and logic: Quantum logic. In 1936, Birkhofff and von Neumann already formulated a quantum logic. But, this logic has some undesirable properties concerning the interpretation of the logical conjunction and disjunction as and'' and or''. Therefor, Landsman has recently set out to develop a new logic for quantum mechanics, which is set up inside a topos and thus is intuitionistic. \n\nThe construction of Landsmans intuitionistic quantum logic relies on the Gelfand representation theorem. However, to apply the theorem a constructive proof is needed. Coquand and Spitters recently published such a proof, but the material that was published is too condensed for our taste. So in this thesis we attempt to expand on this constructive proof of the Gelfand representation theorem and check all details the original authors left out. As a result, more insight is gained in the constructive proof of the Gelfand representation theorem, providing a stronger foundation for intuitionistic quantum logic.
A decade ago, Isham and Butterfield proposed a topos-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics, which meanwhile has been extended by Döring and Isham so as to provide a new mathematical foundation for all of physics. Last year, three of the present authors redeveloped and refined these ideas by combining the C*-algebraic approach to quantum theory with the so-called internal language of topos theory (Heunen et al. in arXiv:0709.4364 ). The goal of the present paper is to illustrate our abstract setup through the concrete example of the C*-algebra M n (ℂ) of complex n×n matrices. This leads to an explicit expression for the pointfree quantum phase space Σ n and the associated logical structure and Gelfand transform of an n-level system. We also determine the pertinent non-probabilisitic state-proposition pairing (or valuation) and give a very natural topos-theoretic reformulation of the Kochen–Specker Theorem. In our approach, the nondistributive lattice ℘(M n (ℂ)) of projections in M n (ℂ) (which forms the basis of the traditional quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann) is replaced by a specific distributive lattice O(Σn)\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})O(Σn​) of functions from the poset C(Mn(C))\mathcal{C}(M_{n}(\mathbb{C}))C(Mn​(C)) of all unital commutative C*-subalgebras C of M n (ℂ) to ℘(M n (ℂ)). The lattice O(Σn)\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})O(Σn​) is essentially the (pointfree) topology of the quantum phase space Σ n , and as such defines a Heyting algebra. Each element of O(Σn)\mathcal{O}(\Sigma_{n})O(Σn​) corresponds to a “Bohrified” proposition, in the sense that to each classical context C∈C(Mn(C))C\in\mathcal{C}(M_{n}(\mathbb{C}))C∈C(Mn​(C)) it associates a yes-no question (i.e. an element of the Boolean lattice ℘(C) of projections in C), rather than being a single projection as in standard quantum logic. Distributivity is recovered at the expense of the law of the excluded middle (Tertium Non Datur), whose demise is in our opinion to be welcomed, not just in intuitionistic logic in the spirit of Brouwer, but also in quantum logic in the spirit of von Neumann.
In order to solve the problem of which is the real logic of Quantum Mechanics (QM), we suggest to study the mutual relationships between the physical theory (as a whole, that is both its experimental part and its theoretical part), its mathematics and its logic. That results to be a more general problem than what is considered by traditional studies on Quantum Logic (QL). These studies focus attention on the problem of the relationship between the experimental part of the physical theory and only its mathematics, from which logic is then derived. The new approach, that we suggest, generalises the interpretation that one of us (A. D.) successfully tested on the foundations of classical physical theories. The foundations of a theory are interpreted in terms of two options on the kind of mathematics, either classical one or constructive one, and the kind of logic, either classical logic or intuitionistic logic. It is remarkable that each theory making use of intuitionistic logic – i. e. L. Carnot’s classical mechanics, S. Carnot’s thermodynamics, Lobacevskij’s non-Euclidean geometry is organised in order to solve an universal problem (expressed by a double negated sentence), rather than in an entirely deductive way; hence, a non-classical logic does not belong exclusively to QM. From an historical and foundational analysis about QM, we conclude that in QM it is the law of double negation and not modular law (introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann without giving physical evidence to it) which fails, i. e. which represents the true difference between Classical Logic (CL) and QL. We have looked for previous works on QL supporting our suggestion; in the past Destouches-Fevrier (1948), Fine (1974), Bell-Hallett (1981), Gauthier (1983), Adelman-Corbett (1995) already defended this thesis on the relevance of double negation law for QL. Under this light, QL results to have the same logic of a classical theory organised in a problematic manner. Hence, QM has to be referred to intuitionistic logic, in the same way every theory which is developed around a fundamental problem, expressed by a double negated sentence, does. In particular, by following the founder of intuitionism, Brouwer, we reject the identification of intuitionistic logic with an entirely deductive system; rather, the logical system of QL, as a theory, is organised in such a way to put a crucial problem to be solved. In agreement with this kind of organisation, among the several QM formulations we choose Heisenberg’s formulation, which was ignored by previous authors on QL. This formulation is aimed to solve the problem of quantum measurement, that originates the uncertainty methodological principle. Moreover, it is remarkable that it makes use of an operational mathematics (discrete matrices only). We interpret its characteristic arguing about its principal problem through double negated sentences; it results to be a moving from arguments belonging to non-classical logic expressed by a double negated sentence to the recognition of a suitable mathematics for QM formulation. In sum, QL shows how it is possible to state the relationship between QM and mathematics. This point has been almost ignored by the most traditional approaches to QL, which rather drew it from an a priori mathematics of QM (commonly, Hilbert space). As a verification of our approach, we show that even both Lobachevskij’s geometry and S. Carnot’s thermodynamics argued in order to achieve mathematical formulas expressing the content of the basic double negated sentences of respective theory. In the same way the recent book on QM by T. F. Jordan formalised his matrix mechanics. 1. Logic in classical physics and in Quantum Mechanics An historical analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM) shows that there were at the origin of the theory two distinct formulations: Matrix Mechanics (Heisenberg, 1925) and Wave Mechanics (Schroedinger, 1926). Although Dirac subsumed these two formulations in a comprehensive mathematical framework (Hilbert space), we think that the organisation of the principles is different in Matrix Mechanics from that in Wave Mechanics, and this difference implies different logics. So we think that in order to characterise the logic of QM it is necessary to distinguish between this two formulations. In Matrix Mechanics, Heisenberg’s basic idea was to explain atomic spectra not in terms of atomic orbits (as Old Quantum Theory tried to make), but only by means of the study of experimental data; i. e., frequencies and intensities of light both emitted and absorbed by matter. Through a
The aim of this chapter is to construct new foundations for quantum logic and quantum spaces. This is accomplished by merging algebraic quantum theory and topos theory (encompassing the theory of locales or frames, of which toposes in a sense form the ultimate generalization). In a nutshell, the relation between these fields is as follows. First, our mathematical interpretation of Bohr's `doctrine of classical concepts' is that the empirical content of a quantum theory described by a noncommutative (unital) C*-algebra A is contained in the family of its commutative (unital) C*-algebras, partially ordered by inclusion. Seen as a category, the ensuing poset C(A) canonically defines the topos [C(A); Set] of covariant functors from C(A) to the category Set of sets and functions. This topos contains the `Bohri??cation' A of A, defined as the tautological functor C 7! C, as an internal commutative C*-algebra. Second, according to the topos-valid Gelfand duality theorem of Banaschewski and Mulvey, A has a Gelfand spectrum S(A), which is a locale internal to the topos [C(A); Set]. We interpret its external description SA (in the sense of Joyal and Tierney), as the `Bohrified' phase space of the physical system described by A. As in classical physics, the open subsets of SA correspond to (atomic) propositions, so that the `Bohrified' quantum logic of A is given by the Heyting algebra structure of SA. The key difference between this logic and its classical counterpart is that the former does not satisfy the law of the excluded middle, and hence is intuitionistic. When A contains sufficiently many projections (as in the case where A is a von Neumann algebra, or, more generally, a Rickart C*-algebra), the intuitionistic quantum logic SA of A may also be compared with the traditional quantum logic Proj(A), i.e. the orthomodular lattice of projections in A. This time, the main di??erence is that SA is distributive (even when A is noncommutative), while Proj(A) is not. This chapter is a streamlined synthesis of our earlier papers in Comm. Math. Phys. (arXiv:0709.4364), Found Phys. (arXiv:0902.3201) and Synthese (arXiv:0905.2275). See also [51].
The topos approach to the formulation of physical theories includes a new form of quantum logic. We present this topos quantum logic, including some new results, and compare it to standard quantum logic, all with an eye to conceptual issues. In particular, we show that topos quantum logic is distributive, multi-valued, contextual and intuitionistic. It incorporates superposition without being based on linear structures, has a built-in form of coarse-graining which automatically avoids interpretational problems usually associated with the conjunction of propositions about incompatible physical quantities, and provides a material implication that is lacking from standard quantum logic. Importantly, topos quantum logic comes with a clear geometrical underpinning. The representation of pure states and truth-value assignments are discussed. It is briefly shown how mixed states fit into this approach.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been a problem since its founding days. A large contribution to the discussion of possible interpretations of quantum mechanics is given by the so-called impossibility proofs for hidden variable models; models that allow a realist interpretation. In this thesis some of these proofs are discussed, like von Neumann's Theorem, the Kochen-Specker Theorem and the Bell-inequalities. Some more recent developments are also investigated, like Meyer's nullification of the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the MKC-models and Conway and Kochen's Free Will Theorem. This last one is taken to suggest that the problems that arise for certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are not limited to realist interpretations only, but also affect certain instrumentalist interpretations. It is argued that one may arrive at a more satisfying interpretation of quantum mechanics if one adopts a logic that seems more compatible with the instrumentalist viewpoint namely, intuitionistic logic. The motivations for adopting this form of logic rather than classical logic or quantum logic are linked to some of the philosophical ideas of Bohr. In particular a new interpretation of Bohr's notion of complementarity is proposed. Finally some possibilities are explored for linking the intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics to the mathematical formalism of the theory.
Research within the operational approach to the logical foundations of physics has recently pointed out a new perspective in which quantum logic can be viewed as an intuitionistic logic with an additional operator to capture its essential, i.e., non-distributive, properties. In this paper we will offer an introduction to this approach. We will focus further on why quantum logic has an inherent dynamic nature which is captured in the meaning of “orthomodularity” and on how it motivates physically the introduction of dynamic implication operators, each for which a deduction theorem holds with respect to a dynamic conjunction. As such we can offer a positive answer to the many who pondered about whether quantum logic should really be called a logic. Doubts to answer the question positively were in first instance due to the former lack of an implication connective which satisfies the deduction theorem within quantum logic.