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Joint International Information Technology, Mechanical and Electronic Engineering Conference (JIMEC)

CCA-Secure Leveled FHE From Multi-Identity Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Weili Wang, Bin Hu, Xiufeng Zhao

Published Jan 1, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper proposes a generic construction of CCA-secure fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme.First, we introduce a new primitive called multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption, which works in the multi-identity setting; that is, homomorphic evaluation can performed on ciphertexts created with different identities.Then, we propose an IND-sID-CPA secure multi-identity leveled FHE scheme over lattice.Finally, we present CCA-secure FHE from our proposed multi-identity FHE scheme and strongly EUF-CMA secure signature.The security analysis shows that our FHE scheme is CCA2-secure when the evaluation key is unavailable to the adversary, and remains CCA1-secure when the evaluation key is exposed in the standard model.

DOI
10.2991/jimec-17.2017.111

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•Jan 1, 2019•0 citations
This paper proposes a generic construction of CCA-secure fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme.First, we introduce a new primitive called multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption, which works in the multi-identity setting; that is, homomorphic evaluation can performed on ciphertexts created with different identities.Then, we propose an IND-sID-CPA secure multi-identity leveled FHE scheme over lattice.Finally, we present CCA-secure FHE from our proposed multi-identity FHE scheme and strongly EUF-CMA secure signature.The security analysis shows that our FHE scheme is CCA2-secure when the evaluation key is unavailable to the adversary, and remains CCA1-secure when the evaluation key is exposed in the standard model.
The lattice-based multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption scheme combines the quantum security of lattice cryptography with the advantage of identity-based encryption. However, existing schemes face challenges such as large key sizes, inefficient ciphertext expansion processes, and reliance on outdated trapdoor designs, limiting their compactness and practicality. In this study, we propose a novel Compact Multi-Identity Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme (WZ-MIBFHE) that eliminates the need for fresh ciphertexts during expansion. First, we construct a compact identity-based encryption scheme by combining the YJW23 trapdoor and ABB10 under the standard model, proving its IND-sID-CPA security. The scheme is then adapted to ensure correctness and security when integrated with the decomposition method for ciphertext expansion. This adaptation also utilizes approximation errors to reduce overall noise. Finally, we expand the modified IBE scheme’s ciphertext using the decomposition method to construct the WZ-MIBFHE scheme. Compared to existing methods, WZ-MIBFHE reduces the lattice dimension to nlogq+logbq, improves public and private key sizes, and significantly lowers ciphertext expansion rates by removing the need for fresh ciphertexts. These improvements enhance both the compactness and efficiency of the scheme, making it a promising solution for multi-identity homomorphic encryption.
Fully data using only public information. So far, most FHE schemes are CPA secure. In PKC 2017, Canetti et al. extended the generic transformation of Boneh, Canetti, Halevi and Katz to turn any multi-key identity-based FHE scheme into a CCA1-secure FHE scheme. Their main construction of multi-key identity-based FHE is from probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation (PIO) and statistical trapdoor encryption. We show that the above multi-key identity-based FHE is not secure by giving an attack. Then we give a solution to avoid the attack and redesign a more succinct and efficient multi-key identity-based FHE scheme. Compared with the scheme of Canetti et al., ours has smaller secret key of one identity and more efficient homomorphic operations. Thus we obtain a more efficient CCA1 secure FHE scheme.
Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE), a generalization of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), enables a computation over encrypted data under multiple keys. The first MKFHE schemes were based on the NTRU primitive, however these early NTRU based FHE schemes were found to be insecure due to the problem of over-stretched parameters. Recently, in the case of standard (non-multi key) FHE a secure version, called FINAL, of NTRU has been found. In this work we extend FINAL to an MKFHE scheme, this allows us to benefit from some of the performance advantages provided by NTRU based primitives. Thus, our scheme provides competitive performance against current state-of-the-art multi-key TFHE, in particular reducing the computational complexity from quadratic to linear in the number of keys.
Abstract Based on the learning with errors over rings (RLWE) assumption, a leveled fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) by the approximate eigenvector method under the same public key is proposed, which security can be reduced to the shortest vector problem on ideal lattices in the worst case. And the leveled FHE under different public keys is realized by the secret key switching without dimension reduction. Combine the public key of leveled FHE with the identity, we bring forward an efficient identity‐based leveled FHE scheme from the RLWE assumption. The security analysis shows that our identity‐based leveled FHE scheme is selective‐ID secure against chosen‐plaintext attacks in the random oracle model. And the efficiency analysis and simulation results show that the proposed identity‐based leveled FHE scheme is much more efficient than Gentry's and Wang's identity‐based cryptosystems based on the learning with errors assumption. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) has important applications in cloud computing. However, almost all fully homomorphic encryption schemes share two common flaws that they all use large-scale secret keys and some operations are inefficient. In this paper, the 'special b' variant of the learning with errors problem (bLWE) is presented, and helps us construct the first circularly secure key switching process which can replace the key switching process and similar re-linearisation process used by the existing FHE schemes. Then, we present an efficient FHE. Compared with Brakerski's scheme, our scheme reduces L secret keys to one and is more efficient. Finally, we prove the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) security of the fully homomorphic scheme and the circular security of key switching process in standard model under the learning with errors problem (LWE) assumption.
Since Gentry's breakthrough construction of fully homomorphic encryption from lattice-based assumptions (STOC 2009), homomorphic cryptography has attracted a lot of attention. In short, homomorphic cryptography schemes allow performing computation on encrypted data without knowing anything about the underlying plaintext. This branch of cryptography has become increasingly useful in building new protocols and schemes with intriguing security and functionality features. In this thesis, we continue to study the applications of homomorphic cryptography and the lattice-based techniques underlying them in realizing new and enhanced cryptographic primitives. We obtain the following results: -We construct the first noninteractive zero knowledge argument (and proof) system for all of NP from standard lattice assumptions. Noninteractive zero knowledge argument systems have found many applications in enhancing the functionality as well as the security of cryptographic schemes and protocols. Constructing noninteractive zero knowledge arguments from lattice assumption has been a long standing open question. We finally close this problem. -We consider multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. Traditional fully homomorphic encryption schemes allow computation on plaintext encrypted under a single key. The notion of multi-key fully homomorphic encryption allows homomorphic computation on data encrypted under different keys. We construct multi-key FHE schemes which are naturally dynamic: ciphertexts under new keys can join even during the homomorphic computation. -Finally, we focus on constrained pseudorandom functions (C-PRFs), which are pseudorandom functions (PRFs) with additional functional capabilities. We propose a new approach for building C-PRFs from lattices, and also significantly enhance the underlying lattice parameters.