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Humanities

Not Its Own Meaning: A Hermeneutic of the World

Bernardo Kastrup

Published Aug 2, 2017• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The contemporary cultural mindset posits that the world has no intrinsic semantic value. The meaning we see in it is supposedly projected onto the world by ourselves. Underpinning this view is the mainstream physicalist ontology, according to which mind is an emergent property or epiphenomenon of brains. As such, since the world beyond brains isn’t mental, it cannot a priori evoke anything beyond itself. But a consistent series of recent experimental results suggests strongly that the world may in fact be mental in nature, a hypothesis openly discussed in the field of foundations of physics. In this essay, these experimental results are reviewed and their hermeneutic implications discussed. If the world is mental, it points to something beyond its face-value appearances and is amenable to interpretation, just as ordinary dreams. In this case, the project of a Hermeneutic of Everything is metaphysically justifiable.

DOI
10.3390/h6030055

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The contemporary cultural mindset posits that the world has no intrinsic semantic value. The meaning we see in it is supposedly projected onto the world by ourselves. Underpinning this view is the mainstream physicalist ontology, according to which mind is an emergent property or epiphenomenon of brains. As such, since the world beyond brains isn’t mental, it cannot a priori evoke anything beyond itself. But a consistent series of recent experimental results suggests strongly that the world may in fact be mental in nature, a hypothesis openly discussed in the field of foundations of physics. In this essay, these experimental results are reviewed and their hermeneutic implications discussed. If the world is mental, it points to something beyond its face-value appearances and is amenable to interpretation, just as ordinary dreams. In this case, the project of a Hermeneutic of Everything is metaphysically justifiable.
In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have confirmed that — as predicted by quantum mechanics — reality is contextual, which contradicts at least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can — at least in principle — accommodate (a) our experience of ourselves as distinct individual minds sharing a world beyond the control of our volition; and (b) the empirical fact that this world is contextual despite being seemingly shared. By combining a modern formulation of the ontology of idealism with the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the present paper attempts to provide a viable explanatory framework for both points. In the process of doing so, the paper also addresses key philosophical qualms of the relational interpretation.
Although this book is about the implications for social science of a quantum approach to the mind, much of that potential stems from its ability to integrate consciousness – a particular aspect of the mind – into a naturalistic worldview. And when it comes to the hard problem, quantum brain theory is only a necessary condition for such integration, not sufficient. Necessary, because it would enable the body to exploit for macro-level purposes a physical but non- material space for consciousness at the quantum level – collapse of the wave function – that does not exist in classical physics. Insufficient, however, because quantum brain theory embodies an objective, third-person standpoint and as such can tell us no more than classical brain theory can about why brains have a subjective, first-person point of view in the first place. The explanatory gap is still there, in other words, only now pushed down into quantum theory. To cross this gap, therefore, in addition to a new physics of the brain we will need a new meta -physics as well. As I argue in this chapter, it is this metaphysics that does the real work in solving the mind–body problem. Most social scientists have an instinctive aversion to ‘metaphysics,’ which in our world connotes wooly-headed and speculative thinking that has no place in science. Yet in moving onto this terrain the situation is both worse and better than that. It is worse because we have no choice. The Neuron Doctrine itself is based on a metaphysic, materialism, which looks increasingly unlikely to ever explain consciousness; and in thinking about the meaning of quantum theory metaphysical debate can hardly be avoided, precisely because physics provides little guidance for choosing among its interpretations. So the only question is whether to change our metaphysics of the brain from classical to quantum.
Epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics fail to address the puzzle posed by the occurrence of probabilities in a fundamental physical theory. This is a puzzle about the physical world, not a puzzle about our relation to the physical world. Its solution requires a new concept of physical space, presented in this article. An examination of how the mind and the brain construct the phenomenal world reveals the psychological and neurobiological reasons why we think about space in ways that are inadequate to the physical world. The resulting notion that space is an intrinsically partitioned expanse has up to now stood in the way of a consistent ontological interpretation.
If all aspects of the mind-brain relationship were adequately explained by classical physics, then there would be no need to propose alternative views. But faced with possibly unresolvable puzzles like qualia and free will, other approaches are required. We propose a non-substance dualism theory, following a suggestion by Heisenberg, whereby the world consists of both ontologically real Possibles that do not obey Aristotle’s law of the excluded middle, and ontologically real Actuals, that do obey the law of the excluded middle. Measurement converts Possibles into Actuals. This quantum-oriented approach solves numerous puzzles about the mind-brain relationship, but it also raises the intriguing possibility that some aspects of mind are nonlocal, and that mind plays an active role in the physical world. We suggest that the mind-brain relationship is partially quantum, and we present evidence supporting that proposition.
There are two languages in which we speak about what it means to be. The first is the language of physics. It speaks of wave functions and probability amplitudes, of coherence and decoherence, of superposition and collapse. It describes the world from outside — as an object to be measured, predicted, controlled. In this language, the brain is an electrochemical system, neurons are signal processors, and consciousness is either an emergent property or an illusion to be explained away. The second is the language of experience. It speaks of pain and joy, of fear and love, of the redness of red and the taste of morning coffee. It describes the world from inside — as something lived, felt, undergone. In this language, the brain is not experienced at all. What is experienced is: being here, in this moment, as this self. For four hundred years, since Descartes split mind from matter, we have assumed these languages describe different things. The physical and the mental. The objective and the subjective. The measurable and the ineffable. This book argues that assumption is wrong. The two languages describe the same thing. Not two things that mysteriously interact. Not two aspects that somehow correlate. The same thing — seen from different angles. This is not a metaphor. It is not an analogy. It is not a poetic gesture toward unity. It is a claim about the structure of reality.
Contemporary physics finds itself pondering questions about mind and consciousness, an uncomfortable area for theorists. But historically, key figures at the founding of quantum theory assumed that reality was composed of two parts, mind and matter, which interacted with each other according to some new laws that they specified. This departure from the prior (classical-physicalist) assumption that mind was a mere side effect of brain activity was such a startling proposal that it basically split physics in two, with one camp insisting that mind will ultimately be explained via physical processes in the brain and the other camp embracing mind as innate in creation and the key to understanding reality in its completeness. Henry Stapp made important contributions toward a coherent explanation by advocating John von Neumann’s orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. von Neumann postulated that at its basis, quantum mechanics requires both a psychological and physical component. He was left, however, with a dualist view in which the psychological and physical aspects of QM remained unresolved. In this article, the relevant issues are laid out with the aim of finding a nondual explanation that allows mind and matter to exist as features of the same universal consciousness, in the hope that the critical insights of Planck, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, von Neumann, and Stapp will be recognized and valued, with the aim of an expanded physics that goes beyond physicalist dogma.