Deniable encryption, first introduced by Canetti et al . 1997, allows equivocation of encrypted communication. In this work, the authors generalise its study to functional encryption (FE). The authors’ results are summarised as follows: They first put forward and motivate the concept of receiver‐deniable FE, for which they consider two models. In the first model, as previously considered by O'Neill et al . 2011 in the case of identity‐based encryption, a receiver gets assistance from the master authority to generate a fake secret key. In the second model, there are ‘normal’ and ‘deniable’ secret keys, and a receiver in possession of a deniable secret key can produce a fake but authentic‐looking normal key on its own. In the first model, they show a compiler from any FE scheme for circuits to a FE scheme having receiver deniability. In addition, they show an efficient receiver‐deniable FE scheme for Boolean formulae from bilinear maps. In the second (multi‐distributional) model, they present a specific FE scheme for circuits having receiver deniability. To the authors’ knowledge, a scheme in the multi‐distributional model was not previously known even for the special case of identity‐based encryption. Finally, they construct the first sender (non‐multi‐distributional) deniable FE scheme.
Deniable encryption, first introduced by Canetti et al . 1997, allows equivocation of encrypted communication. In this work, the authors generalise its study to functional encryption (FE). The authors’ results are summarised as follows: They first put forward and motivate the concept of receiver‐deniable FE, for which they consider two models. In the first model, as previously considered by O'Neill et al . 2011 in the case of identity‐based encryption, a receiver gets assistance from the master authority to generate a fake secret key. In the second model, there are ‘normal’ and ‘deniable’ secret keys, and a receiver in possession of a deniable secret key can produce a fake but authentic‐looking normal key on its own. In the first model, they show a compiler from any FE scheme for circuits to a FE scheme having receiver deniability. In addition, they show an efficient receiver‐deniable FE scheme for Boolean formulae from bilinear maps. In the second (multi‐distributional) model, they present a specific FE scheme for circuits having receiver deniability. To the authors’ knowledge, a scheme in the multi‐distributional model was not previously known even for the special case of identity‐based encryption. Finally, they construct the first sender (non‐multi‐distributional) deniable FE scheme.
Abstract. The primitive of deniable encryption was first introduced by Canetti et al. (CRYPTO, 1997). Deniable encryption is a regular public key encryption scheme with the added feature that after running the protocol honestly and transmitting a message m, both Sender and Receiver may produce random coins showing that the transmitted ciphertext was an encryption of any message m ′ in the message space. Deniable encryption is a key tool for constructing incoercible protocols, since it allows a party to send one message and later provide apparent evidence to a coercer that a different message was sent. In addition, deniable encryption may be used to obtain adaptively-secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols and is secure under selective-opening attacks. Different flavors such as sender-deniable and receiver-deniable encryption, where only the Sender or Receiver can produce fake random coins, have been considered. Recently, several open questions regarding the feasibility of deniable encryption have been resolved (c.f. (O’Neill et al., CRYPTO, 2011), (Bendlin et al., ASIACRYPT, 2011)). A fundamental remaining open question is whether it is possible to construct sender-deniable Encryption Schemes with super-polynomial security, where an adversary has negligible advantage in distinguishing real and fake openings. The primitive of simulatable public key encryption (PKE), introduced by Damg˚ard and Nielsen (CRYPTO, 2000), is a public key encryption scheme with additional properties that allow oblivious sampling of public keys and
Functional encryption (FE) is an advanced form of traditional public-key encryption that enables complex computations to be performed directly on encrypted data, revealing only the final result of the computation. This thesis presents new constructions for two variants of FE, targeting specific limitations of the standard FE model. The proposed schemes advance the state of the art along (a subset of) the axes expressiveness, security, computational assumptions, and efficiency.First, standard FE requires encrypting the entire input in one shot. In practice, however, it may be desirable to encrypt portions of the data independently, for example at separate locations or by different parties. To address this, we study the multi-client extension of FE, focusing on attribute-based functionalities that provide fine-grained access control to data. Our constructions support a range of policy classes, including \NC0 and conjunction policies, and achieve varying levels of security assuming matrix DDH on pairings, LWE, or public-coin evasive LWE.Second, standard FE relies on a trusted authority to issue secret keys, which is often difficult to implement and undesirable in decentralized environments. To overcome this, we investigate the recently introduced primitive of registered functional encryption (RFE). In RFE, each user independently generates a public/secret key pair and registers their public key along with a function to an auditable key curator. We provide two types of results: constructions for restricted function classes under the standard matrix DDH assumption, and schemes supporting powerful function classes---including both unbounded depth circuits and Turing machines---under a nonstandard lattice-based assumption. Notably, we study RFE for uniform models of computation for the first time in the literature.
Deniable ring authentication protocol allows a sender to deny an authentication and his identity is anonymous to the receiver. In this work,we propose a new deniable ring authentication protocol based on the multi-receiver encryption scheme. The receiver encrypts an authentication key with multi-receiver encryption scheme and sends it to the sender. The sender decrypts it using his private key to obtain the authentication key and uses this key to authenticate messages. This protocol only requires two communication rounds and its deniability holds in the concurrent setting without requiring timing assumption due to the multi-receiver encryption.
Computational security in cryptography has a risk that computational assumptions underlying the security are broken in the future. One solution is to construct information-theoretically-secure protocols, but many cryptographic primitives are known to be impossible (or unlikely) to have information-theoretical security even in the quantum world. A nice compromise (intrinsic to quantum) is certified everlasting security, which roughly means the following. A receiver with possession of quantum encrypted data can issue a certificate that shows that the receiver has deleted the encrypted data. If the certificate is valid, the security is guaranteed even if the receiver becomes computationally unbounded. Although several cryptographic primitives, such as commitments and zero-knowledge, have been made certified everlasting secure, there are many other important primitives that are not known to be certified everlasting secure. In this paper, we introduce certified everlasting FE. In this primitive, the receiver with the ciphertext of a message m and the functional decryption key of a function f can obtain f(m) and nothing else. The security holds even if the adversary becomes computationally unbounded after issuing a valid certificate. We, first, construct certified everlasting FE for P/poly circuits where only a single key query is allowed for the adversary. We, then, extend it to q-bounded one for NC1 circuits where q-bounded means that q key queries are allowed for the adversary with an a priori bounded polynomial q. For the construction of certified everlasting FE, we introduce and construct certified everlasting versions of secret-key encryption, public-key encryption, receiver non-committing encryption, and a garbling scheme, which are of independent interest.
In recent years, there has been great interest in Functional Encryption (FE), a generaliza-tion of traditional encryption where a token enables a user to learn a specific function of the encrypted data and nothing else. In this paper we put forward a new generalization of FE that we call M ergeable FE (mFE). In a mFE system, given a ciphertext c1 encrypting m1 and a ciphertext c2 encrypting m2, it is possible to produce in an oblivious way (i.e., given only the public-key and without knowledge of the messages, master secret-key or any other aux-iliary information) a ciphertext encrypting the string m1||m2 under the security constraint that this new ciphertext does not leak more information about the original messages than what may be leaked from the new ciphertext using the tokens. For instance, suppose that the adversary is given the token for the function f(·) defined so that for strings x ∈ {0, 1}n, f(x) 4 = g(x) for some function g: {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and for strings y = (x1||x2) ∈ {0, 1}2n, f(x1||x2) 4 = g(x1) ∨ g(x2). Furthermore, suppose that the adversary gets a ciphertext c
Deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to deny his/her involvement after the protocol run and a receiver can identify the true source of a given message.Meanwhile, the receiver has no ability to convince any third party of the fact that the message was sent by the specific sender.However, most of the proposed protocols didn't achieve confidentiality of the transmitted message.But, in some special application scenarios such as e-mail system, electronic voting and Internet negotiations, not only the property of deniable authentication but also message confidentiality are needed.To settle this problem, in this paper, we present a non-interactive identity-based deniable authenticated encryption (IBDAE) scheme using pairings.We give the security model and formal proof of the presented IBDAE scheme in the random oracle model under bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption.