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Security of Quantum Repeater Network Operation

Rodney Van Meter

Published Oct 3, 2016• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract : Much of the work on quantum networks, both entangled and unentangled, has been about the uses of quantum networks to enhance end host security. The most famous such application, of course, is quantum key distribution (QKD), detecting eavesdroppers and creating shared, secret random numbers for use as encryption keys (Bennett and Brassard, 1984). Typically the study of these applications involves information theoretic analysis of the amount of information that an attacker can glean from the use of the network. In this project, we addressed security and quantum networks from an entirely different angle: we investigated the security of the networks themselves. We wanted to know if a single mis-behaving node, or a small number of them, can disrupt operation of the network. Our work produced a first-of-its-kind taxonomy of potential attacks on quantum repeater network operations.

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Abstract In quantum networking, repeater hijacking menaces the security and utility of quantum applications. To deal with this problem, it is important to take a measure of the impact of quantum repeater hijacking. First, we quantify the work of each quantum repeater with regards to each quantum communication. Based on this, we show the costs for repeater hijacking detection using distributed quantum state tomography and the amount of work loss and rerouting penalties caused by hijacking. This quantitative evaluation covers both purification-entanglement swapping and quantum error correction repeater networks. Naive implementation of the checks necessary for correct network operation can be subverted by a single hijacker to bring down an entire network. Fortunately, the simple fix of randomly assigned testing can prevent such an attack.

arXiv:1701.04587•Quantum Science and Technology•Apr 30, 2018•19 citations

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The main purpose of a quantum key distribution network is to provide secret keys to any users or applications requiring a high level of security, ideally such as to offer the best protection against any computational attack, even of a quantum nature. The keys shared through a point-to-point link between a source and a detector using a quantum key distribution protocol can be proven information-theoretically secure based on the quantum information theory. However, evaluating the security of a quantum key distribution network, especially if it is based on relay nodes, goes far beyond the quantum security of its single quantum links, involving aspects of conventional security for devices and their communication channels. In this contribution, we perform a rigorous threat analysis based on the most recent recommendations and practical network deployment security issues. We show that, at least in the current state of our understanding of quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution networks can only offer computational security and that their security in practical implementations in the shorter term requires resorting to post-quantum cryptography.

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Focus on Quantum Cryptography

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In our modern era of telecommunications and the Internet, information has become a valuable commodity. Sometimes it must therefore be protected against theft - in this case, loss of secret information to an eavesdropper. Most of today's transactions are protected using encryption unproven to be secure against a computational attack by a classical computer and, in fact, the standardly used encryption algorithms are provably vulnerable to the mind-boggling parallelism of a quantum computer, should one ever be physically realized. Enter quantum cryptography. Underlying nearly all forms of encryption is the necessity for a truly secret key, a random string of zeros and ones; the basic notion of quantum cryptography is to employ single photon transmissions (or the closest attainable approximation to these) to distribute the random key material, while removing the threat of an undetected eavesdropper. Now, nearly twenty years since the seminal quantum cryptography paper by Bennett and Brassard (Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore) (New York: IEEE) pp 175-9), we take a look at several state-of-the-art implementations, and glimpse how future quantum cryptosystems might look. We start with papers from three of the world's leading experimental quantum cryptography efforts: Stucki et al and Bethune and Risk describe working systems for quantum key distribution (QKD) over telecommunications fibres (at 1550 nanometres and 1300 nanometres, respectively). The former's achievement of quantum key exchange over 67 kilometres of optical fibre is a world record, as is the experimental demonstration by Hughes et al of daylight free-space QKD over a 10 km atmospheric range. Next, Lütkenhaus and Jahma explore the possible vulnerabilities of such systems (which employ attenuated laser pulses instead of actual single photon states) to conceivable future eavesdropping technologies. Enzer et al have implemented a totally new protocol, using polarization-entangled photons, which in some circumstances can tolerate higher error rates than the traditional one of Bennett and Brassard; moreover, the use of entanglement provides a means of `automatic source verification'. Finally, looking to the future, Elliott gives a provocative view of how these technologies may be merged into network operation, and Shapiro describes a method to combine a novel source of entangled photons with a means to transfer the photons' quantum state to trapped-atom quantum memories. If realized, these systems could presage the world's first quantum network. Focus on Quantum Cryptography Contents Quantum key distribution over 67 km with a plug&play system D Stucki, N Gisin, O Guinnard, G Ribordy and H Zbinden Autocompensating quantum cryptography Donald S Bethune and William P Risk Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night Richard J Hughes, Jane E Nordholt, Derek Derkacs and Charles G Peterson Quantum key distribution with realistic states: photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack Norbert Lütkenhaus and Mika Jahma Entangled-photon six-state quantum cryptography Daphna G Enzer, Phillip G Hadley, Richard J Hughes, Charles G Peterson and Paul G Kwiat Building the quantum network Chip Elliott Architectures for long-distance quantum teleportation Jeffrey H Shapiro Ground to satellite secure key exchange using quantum cryptography J G Rarity, P R Tapster, P M Gorman and P Knight Method for decoupling error correction from privacy amplification Hoi-Kwong Lo Paul G Kwiat University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

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Increasing incidents of cyber attacks and evolution of quantum computing poses challenges to secure existing information and communication technologies infrastructure. In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) is being extensively researched, and is widely accepted as a promising technology to realize secure networks. Optical fiber networks carry a huge amount of information, and are widely deployed around the world in the backbone terrestrial, submarine, metro, and access networks. Thus, instead of using separate dark fibers for quantum communication, integration of QKD with the existing classical optical networks has been proposed as a cost-efficient solution, however, this integration introduces new research challenges. In this paper, we do a comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art QKD secured optical networks, which is going to shape communication networks in the coming decades. We elucidate the methods and protocols used in QKD secured optical networks, and describe the process of key establishment. Various methods proposed in the literature to address the networking challenges in QKD secured optical networks, specifically, routing, wavelength and time-slot allocation (RWTA), resiliency, trusted repeater node (TRN) placement, QKD for multicast service, and quantum key recycling are described and compared in detail. This survey begins with the introduction to QKD and its advantages over conventional encryption methods. Thereafter, an overview of QKD is given including quantum bits, basic QKD system, QKD schemes and protocol families along with the detailed description of QKD process based on the Bennett and Brassard-84 (BB84) protocol as it is the most widely used QKD protocol in the literature. QKD system are also prone to some specific types of attacks, hence, we describe the types of quantum hacking attacks on the QKD system along with the methods used to prevent them. Subsequently, the process of point-to-point mechanism of QKD over an optical fiber link is described in detail using the BB84 protocol. Different architectures of QKD secured optical networks are described next. Finally, major findings from this comprehensive survey are summarized with highlighting open issues and challenges in QKD secured optical networks.

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Secure communication and information protection become more and more important in the modern society. Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote legitimate users to share unconditionally secure keys. Different from the former ones, the security of these keys is based on the principles of quantum physics and could be proved. Combined with one-time pad encryption, QKD can provide us an effective way for secure communication and information protection[1, 2]. Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the famous BB84 protocol[3], QKD or quantum cryptography has become one of the most dynamic research fields. After about twenty years of development, experimental QKD has achieved significant improvements, such as the transmission distance increased from 32 cm[4]to 260 km[5], the speed increased from 200 Hz[4]to 10 GHz[6].

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Scott E. Vinay

In this work our aim has been to elucidate our theoretical developments that bolster the efficiency of quantum key distribution systems leading to more secure communication channels, as well as develop rigorous methods for their analysis. After a review of the necessary mathematical and physical preliminaries and a discussion of the present state of quantum communication technologies, we begin by investigating the Trojan Horse Attack, a form of side-channel attack that could threaten the security of existing key distribution protocols. We examine the secret key rates that may be achieved when an eavesdropper may use any Gaussian state in the presence of thermal noise, and prove that the coherent state is optimal in this case. We then allow the eavesdropper to use any separable state, and show that this gives a key rate bound close to that of the coherent state. \n \nWe develop a protocol for a quantum repeater that makes use of the double-heralding procedure for entanglement-generation. In our analysis, we include statistical effects on the key rate arising from probabilistic entanglement generation, which results in some quantum memories decohering while other sections complete their entanglement generation attempts. We show that this results in secure communication being possible over thousands of kilometres, allowing for intercontinental key distribution. \n \nFinally, we investigate in more depth the statistical issues that arise in general quantum repeater networks. We develop a framework based on Markov chains and probability generating functions, to show how one may easily calculate an analytic expression for the completion time of a probabilistic process. We then extend this method to show how one may track the distribution of the number of errors that accrue in operating such a process. We apply these methods to a typical quantum repeater network to get new tight bounds on the achievable key rates.

•Dec 1, 2018•0 citations
Abstract : Much of the work on quantum networks, both entangled and unentangled, has been about the uses of quantum networks to enhance end host security. The most famous such application, of course, is quantum key distribution (QKD), detecting eavesdroppers and creating shared, secret random numbers for use as encryption keys (Bennett and Brassard, 1984). Typically the study of these applications involves information theoretic analysis of the amount of information that an attacker can glean from the use of the network. In this project, we addressed security and quantum networks from an entirely different angle: we investigated the security of the networks themselves. We wanted to know if a single mis-behaving node, or a small number of them, can disrupt operation of the network. Our work produced a first-of-its-kind taxonomy of potential attacks on quantum repeater network operations.
Abstract In quantum networking, repeater hijacking menaces the security and utility of quantum applications. To deal with this problem, it is important to take a measure of the impact of quantum repeater hijacking. First, we quantify the work of each quantum repeater with regards to each quantum communication. Based on this, we show the costs for repeater hijacking detection using distributed quantum state tomography and the amount of work loss and rerouting penalties caused by hijacking. This quantitative evaluation covers both purification-entanglement swapping and quantum error correction repeater networks. Naive implementation of the checks necessary for correct network operation can be subverted by a single hijacker to bring down an entire network. Fortunately, the simple fix of randomly assigned testing can prevent such an attack.
The main purpose of a quantum key distribution network is to provide secret keys to any users or applications requiring a high level of security, ideally such as to offer the best protection against any computational attack, even of a quantum nature. The keys shared through a point-to-point link between a source and a detector using a quantum key distribution protocol can be proven information-theoretically secure based on the quantum information theory. However, evaluating the security of a quantum key distribution network, especially if it is based on relay nodes, goes far beyond the quantum security of its single quantum links, involving aspects of conventional security for devices and their communication channels. In this contribution, we perform a rigorous threat analysis based on the most recent recommendations and practical network deployment security issues. We show that, at least in the current state of our understanding of quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution networks can only offer computational security and that their security in practical implementations in the shorter term requires resorting to post-quantum cryptography.
In our modern era of telecommunications and the Internet, information has become a valuable commodity. Sometimes it must therefore be protected against theft - in this case, loss of secret information to an eavesdropper. Most of today's transactions are protected using encryption unproven to be secure against a computational attack by a classical computer and, in fact, the standardly used encryption algorithms are provably vulnerable to the mind-boggling parallelism of a quantum computer, should one ever be physically realized. Enter quantum cryptography. Underlying nearly all forms of encryption is the necessity for a truly secret key, a random string of zeros and ones; the basic notion of quantum cryptography is to employ single photon transmissions (or the closest attainable approximation to these) to distribute the random key material, while removing the threat of an undetected eavesdropper. Now, nearly twenty years since the seminal quantum cryptography paper by Bennett and Brassard (Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore) (New York: IEEE) pp 175-9), we take a look at several state-of-the-art implementations, and glimpse how future quantum cryptosystems might look. We start with papers from three of the world's leading experimental quantum cryptography efforts: Stucki et al and Bethune and Risk describe working systems for quantum key distribution (QKD) over telecommunications fibres (at 1550 nanometres and 1300 nanometres, respectively). The former's achievement of quantum key exchange over 67 kilometres of optical fibre is a world record, as is the experimental demonstration by Hughes et al of daylight free-space QKD over a 10 km atmospheric range. Next, Lütkenhaus and Jahma explore the possible vulnerabilities of such systems (which employ attenuated laser pulses instead of actual single photon states) to conceivable future eavesdropping technologies. Enzer et al have implemented a totally new protocol, using polarization-entangled photons, which in some circumstances can tolerate higher error rates than the traditional one of Bennett and Brassard; moreover, the use of entanglement provides a means of `automatic source verification'. Finally, looking to the future, Elliott gives a provocative view of how these technologies may be merged into network operation, and Shapiro describes a method to combine a novel source of entangled photons with a means to transfer the photons' quantum state to trapped-atom quantum memories. If realized, these systems could presage the world's first quantum network. Focus on Quantum Cryptography Contents Quantum key distribution over 67 km with a plug&play system D Stucki, N Gisin, O Guinnard, G Ribordy and H Zbinden Autocompensating quantum cryptography Donald S Bethune and William P Risk Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night Richard J Hughes, Jane E Nordholt, Derek Derkacs and Charles G Peterson Quantum key distribution with realistic states: photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack Norbert Lütkenhaus and Mika Jahma Entangled-photon six-state quantum cryptography Daphna G Enzer, Phillip G Hadley, Richard J Hughes, Charles G Peterson and Paul G Kwiat Building the quantum network Chip Elliott Architectures for long-distance quantum teleportation Jeffrey H Shapiro Ground to satellite secure key exchange using quantum cryptography J G Rarity, P R Tapster, P M Gorman and P Knight Method for decoupling error correction from privacy amplification Hoi-Kwong Lo Paul G Kwiat University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Increasing incidents of cyber attacks and evolution of quantum computing poses challenges to secure existing information and communication technologies infrastructure. In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) is being extensively researched, and is widely accepted as a promising technology to realize secure networks. Optical fiber networks carry a huge amount of information, and are widely deployed around the world in the backbone terrestrial, submarine, metro, and access networks. Thus, instead of using separate dark fibers for quantum communication, integration of QKD with the existing classical optical networks has been proposed as a cost-efficient solution, however, this integration introduces new research challenges. In this paper, we do a comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art QKD secured optical networks, which is going to shape communication networks in the coming decades. We elucidate the methods and protocols used in QKD secured optical networks, and describe the process of key establishment. Various methods proposed in the literature to address the networking challenges in QKD secured optical networks, specifically, routing, wavelength and time-slot allocation (RWTA), resiliency, trusted repeater node (TRN) placement, QKD for multicast service, and quantum key recycling are described and compared in detail. This survey begins with the introduction to QKD and its advantages over conventional encryption methods. Thereafter, an overview of QKD is given including quantum bits, basic QKD system, QKD schemes and protocol families along with the detailed description of QKD process based on the Bennett and Brassard-84 (BB84) protocol as it is the most widely used QKD protocol in the literature. QKD system are also prone to some specific types of attacks, hence, we describe the types of quantum hacking attacks on the QKD system along with the methods used to prevent them. Subsequently, the process of point-to-point mechanism of QKD over an optical fiber link is described in detail using the BB84 protocol. Different architectures of QKD secured optical networks are described next. Finally, major findings from this comprehensive survey are summarized with highlighting open issues and challenges in QKD secured optical networks.
Secure communication and information protection become more and more important in the modern society. Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote legitimate users to share unconditionally secure keys. Different from the former ones, the security of these keys is based on the principles of quantum physics and could be proved. Combined with one-time pad encryption, QKD can provide us an effective way for secure communication and information protection[1, 2]. Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the famous BB84 protocol[3], QKD or quantum cryptography has become one of the most dynamic research fields. After about twenty years of development, experimental QKD has achieved significant improvements, such as the transmission distance increased from 32 cm[4]to 260 km[5], the speed increased from 200 Hz[4]to 10 GHz[6].
In this work our aim has been to elucidate our theoretical developments that bolster the efficiency of quantum key distribution systems leading to more secure communication channels, as well as develop rigorous methods for their analysis. After a review of the necessary mathematical and physical preliminaries and a discussion of the present state of quantum communication technologies, we begin by investigating the Trojan Horse Attack, a form of side-channel attack that could threaten the security of existing key distribution protocols. We examine the secret key rates that may be achieved when an eavesdropper may use any Gaussian state in the presence of thermal noise, and prove that the coherent state is optimal in this case. We then allow the eavesdropper to use any separable state, and show that this gives a key rate bound close to that of the coherent state. \n \nWe develop a protocol for a quantum repeater that makes use of the double-heralding procedure for entanglement-generation. In our analysis, we include statistical effects on the key rate arising from probabilistic entanglement generation, which results in some quantum memories decohering while other sections complete their entanglement generation attempts. We show that this results in secure communication being possible over thousands of kilometres, allowing for intercontinental key distribution. \n \nFinally, we investigate in more depth the statistical issues that arise in general quantum repeater networks. We develop a framework based on Markov chains and probability generating functions, to show how one may easily calculate an analytic expression for the completion time of a probabilistic process. We then extend this method to show how one may track the distribution of the number of errors that accrue in operating such a process. We apply these methods to a typical quantum repeater network to get new tight bounds on the achievable key rates.