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Lecture notes in computer science

High-Throughput Secure Three-Party Computation for Malicious Adversaries and an Honest Majority

Jun Furukawa, Yehuda Lindell, Ariel Nof, Or Weinstein

Published Jan 1, 2017• 155 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-56614-6_8

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In this paper, we describe a new information-theoretic protocol (and a computationally-secure variant) for secure three-party computation with an honest majority. The protocol has very minimal computation and communication; for Boolean circuits, each party sends only a single bit for every AND gate (and nothing is sent for XOR gates). Our protocol is (simulation-based) secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and achieves privacy in the client/server model in the presence of malicious adversaries. On a cluster of three 20-core servers with a 10Gbps connection, the implementation of our protocol carries out over 1.3 million AES computations per second, which involves processing over 7 billion gates per second. In addition, we developed a Kerberos extension that replaces the ticket-granting-ticket encryption on the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT-Kerberos with our protocol, using keys/ passwords that are shared between the servers. This enables the use of Kerberos while protecting passwords. Our implementation is able to support a login storm of over 35,000 logins per second, which suffices even for very large organizations. Our work demonstrates that high-throughput secure computation is possible on standard hardware.
Secure multiparty computation enables a set of parties to securely carry out a joint computation of their private inputs without revealing anything but the output. In the past few years, the efficiency of secure computation protocols has increased in leaps and bounds. However, when considering the case of security in the presence of malicious adversaries (who may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification), we are still very far from achieving high efficiency. In this paper, we consider the specific case of three parties and an honest majority. We provide general techniques for improving efficiency of cut-and-choose protocols on multiplication triples and utilize them to significantly improve the recently published protocol of Furukawa et al. (ePrint 2016/944). We reduce the bandwidth of their protocol down from 10 bits per AND gate to 7 bits per AND gate, and show how to improve some computationally expensive parts of their protocol. Most notably, we design cache-efficient shuffling techniques for implementing cut-and-choose without randomly permuting large arrays (which is very slow due to continual cache misses). We provide a combinatorial analysis of our techniques, bounding the cheating probability of the adversary. Our implementation achieves a rate of approximately 1.15 billion AND gates per second on a cluster of three 20-core machines with a 10Gbps network. Thus, we can securely compute 212,000 AES encryptions per second (which is hundreds of times faster than previous work for this setting). Our results demonstrate that high-throughput secure computation for malicious adversaries is possible.
Secure three-party computation with an honest majority is among the most efficient secure computation settings and is widely used in practice. However, achieving malicious security incurs significant overhead, often an order of magnitude higher than semi-honest protocols. Covert security provides a security–efficiency trade-off by detecting malicious behavior with a certain probability (e.g., 50%), deterring rational adversaries. Existing covert protocols mainly target two-party or dishonest-majority settings, with little work on efficient honest-majority three-party solutions. We present ECHO, a family of concretely efficient protocols for covertly secure honest-majority three-party computation. We explore the design space of cheating detection and identification, and develop optimized protocols for both arithmetic and Boolean circuits, targeting different performance goals such as low latency and reduced communication. For arithmetic circuits over rings, our asymmetric-MAC-based protocol achieves an online phase only 1.26× slower than the semi-honest baseline and over 5.59× faster than MAC-based maliciously secure protocol. For Boolean circuits, our method improves over the best malicious protocol by 5×. We also applied ECHO on practical PPML tasks. ECHO approaches semi-honest performance while providing up to 8× speedup over malicious security.