Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Additivity Requirements in Classical and Quantum Probability

John Earman

Published May 4, 2017• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The discussion of different principles of additivity (finite vs. countable vs. complete additivity) for probability functions has been largely focused on the personalist interpretation of probability. Very little attention has been given to additivity principles for physical probabilities. The form of additivity for quantum probabilities is determined by the algebra of observables that characterize a physical system and the type of quantum state that is realizable and preparable for that system. We assess arguments designed to show that only normal quantum states are realizable and preparable and, therefore, quantum probabilities satisfy the principle of complete additivity. We underscore the little remarked fact that unless the dimension of the Hilbert space is incredibly large, complete additivity in ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics (but not in relativistic quantum field theory) reduces to countable additivity. We then turn to ways in which knowledge of quantum probabilities may constrain rational credence about quantum events and, thereby, constrain the additivity principle satisfied by rational credence functions.

Related papers

Rational Quantum Mechanics

Sergio Da Silva

AbstractStandard quantum mechanics is formulated using complex Hilbert spaces, real-valued probabilities, continuous one-parameter dynamics, and—where particles and fields have continuous degrees of freedom —function spaces constructed over continua such as R3 . In that precise mathematical sense, the real and complex continua are deeply embedded in the standard theory. It does not follow, however, that experiments have demonstrated the physical existence of an uncountable set of exact real numbers, still less that individual quantum systems physically “store” infinitely many digits. Every preparation, control operation, and measurement has finite precision, and many quantum predictions can be approximated arbitrarily closely using countable or finite descriptions.This distinction matters because the continuum is sometimes blamed for quantum theory's conceptual strangeness. That diagnosis is mostly unsupported. Superposition, interference, uncertainty, noncommutativity, entanglement, contextuality, Bell-inequality violations, and no-cloning already occur in finite-dimensional quantum systems and do not depend in any straightforward way on continuous position space or arbitrary irrational numbers. Restricting a Hilbert space to rational, algebraic, computable, or finitely specified states therefore does not automatically produce classical physics. Indeed, dense restricted subsets can approximate ordinary quantum predictions to arbitrary finite accuracy, although turning such a subset into a complete physical theory requires much more: closed dynamics, a composition rule, a measurement theory, robustness, and new empirical predictions.A particularly developed contemporary alternative is Tim Palmer's Invariant Set Theory and its recent formulation as Rational Quantum Mechanics (RaQM). RaQM is not accurately described as simply “quantum mechanics with irrational numbers banned.” It restricts the bases in which states are physically defined through number-theoretic rationality conditions, represents admissible states using finite bit strings, invokes a fractal invariant state space equipped with a non-Euclidean, p-adic-like metric, and violates Bell measurement independence at the level of exact counterfactual settings. Palmer's 2026 proposal further predicts a finite qubit-information capacity and an eventual saturation of quantum computational advantage. These are genuine, potentially falsifiable proposals, but they remain speculative and have not displaced standard quantum theory.The strongest conclusion is consequently asymmetric. There is a serious foundational question about whether the continuum is an ontological feature of nature or an extraordinarily efficient mathematical completion. Finite precision prevents existing experiments from proving a literal continuum. But there is presently little evidence that continuum mathematics causes quantum phenomena. Any discrete replacement must still account quantitatively for interference, contextuality, Bell correlations, entanglement, spectroscopy, atomic structure, and quantum computation. Discreteness can change quantum physics only when it is accompanied by additional physical postulates—and those postulates, rather than discreteness alone, must ultimately face experiment.

•Oct 17, 2026•0 citations

Summing to Uncertainty: On the Necessity of Additivity in Deriving the Born Rule

Jiaxuan Zhang

The emergence of intrinsic probability has long been one of the most important and puzzling problems in quantum mechanics, and the law most directly related to this problem is the Born rule. For a century, there have been many attempts to derive the Born rule as a theorem rather than postulating it. However, existing derivations of the Born rule are each based on different frameworks and have attracted different criticisms. The assumptions from which they start are also highly divergent, and the connections between them have not been sufficiently studied. These possible connections are very likely to be the key to answering questions about the origin of probability in quantum mechanics. This paper focuses on proving the necessity and indispensability of the additivity assumption in the derivation of the Born rule. This supports the view that the Born rule cannot be derived solely from other non-probabilistic quantum or additional postulates. We first prove that additivity cannot be derived from two other commonly used non-probabilistic additional assumptions, non-contextuality and normalization. Then we analyze the crucial role of the additivity assumption in five important existing derivations of the Born rule. These include Gleason's Theorem, Busch's extension of Gleason's Theorem, the Deutsch-Wallace Theorem, Zurek's envariance proof, and the Finkelstein-Hartle Theorem. We show that these derivations either depend heavily on the additivity assumption or lead to obvious loopholes due to the lack of additivity. We also point out some problems arised from the lack of a non-contextuality assumption. Our results provide a novel insight into the important role of additivity assumption in quantum measurement, as well as into the origin of probability in quantum mechanics.

quant-pharXiv:2603.06211•Physical Review A•Mar 9, 2026•3 citations

Changing the Logic of Science. a Bayesian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

John Hemp

Abstract In the 1950s and 1960s it was causing interest among physicists that in the formalism of quantum mechanics (complex-valued) ‘probability amplitudes’ obeyed laws similar to the laws obeyed by probabilities in the ordinary probability calculus. But this did not then lead decisively to the claim that probabilities should be represented by complex numbers. It became fashionable instead to regard probability amplitudes as an abstract concept from which actual probabilities could be derived by taking the squared moduli of the amplitudes. In this monograph, however, we make another attempt to show how probability amplitudes might after all be identified with actual probabilities. To do this, probability itself is interpreted in a rational Bayesian manner (i.e. as an extension of logic) and a new (complex-valued) probability theory is formulated that incorporates the uncertainty principle (i.e. that takes account of the fact that acquisition of knowledge of a quantum mechanical process generally interferes with it). Taking this probability theory as the new logic of science, and assuming certain physical laws and properties of matter, an interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is built up. It is consistent with the usual quantum mechanical formalism but allows a clear distinction to be made between the physical world and our knowledge of it.

•Feb 1, 2018•0 citations

The Relation between Credence and Chance: Lewis' "Principal Principle" Is a Theorem of Quantum Probability Theory

John Earman

David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. Given the generally accepted updating rule for quantum probabilities, there is a straight forward sense in which the Principal Principle is a theorem of quantum probability theory for any credence function satisfying a suitable additivity requirement. No additional principle of rationality is needed to bring credence into line with objective chance.

•Jun 26, 2018•5 citations

The Quantum Mechanical Formalism Derived from the Probabilistic Nature of Quantitative Physical Predictions

Hans Rudolf Tschudi

It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.

•Mar 5, 2026•0 citations

Credence and Chance in Quantum Theory

John Earman

David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. This paper develops an account of how chance works in quantum theory that reveals a connection between credence and quantum chance quite unlike what is envisioned in the philosophical literature: as a theorem of quantum probability, updating a completely additive chance function on a knowledge of chance brings credence into line with chance. The account also suggests a way of construing the Humean supervenience of chance that has the virtue of dissolving some puzzles about the "undermining" of chances. A number of interpretative moves in quantum theory are needed to generate the account of quantum chance on offer here, and they can all be disputed. But engaging in these disputes is part and parcel of naturalized metaphysics, and as such it can be more productive than engaging in the battle of intuitions among analytical metaphysicians about how chance ought to work this and other possible worlds.

•Sep 13, 2017•1 citation
The discussion of different principles of additivity (finite vs. countable vs. complete additivity) for probability functions has been largely focused on the personalist interpretation of probability. Very little attention has been given to additivity principles for physical probabilities. The form of additivity for quantum probabilities is determined by the algebra of observables that characterize a physical system and the type of quantum state that is realizable and preparable for that system. We assess arguments designed to show that only normal quantum states are realizable and preparable and, therefore, quantum probabilities satisfy the principle of complete additivity. We underscore the little remarked fact that unless the dimension of the Hilbert space is incredibly large, complete additivity in ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics (but not in relativistic quantum field theory) reduces to countable additivity. We then turn to ways in which knowledge of quantum probabilities may constrain rational credence about quantum events and, thereby, constrain the additivity principle satisfied by rational credence functions.
AbstractStandard quantum mechanics is formulated using complex Hilbert spaces, real-valued probabilities, continuous one-parameter dynamics, and—where particles and fields have continuous degrees of freedom —function spaces constructed over continua such as R3 . In that precise mathematical sense, the real and complex continua are deeply embedded in the standard theory. It does not follow, however, that experiments have demonstrated the physical existence of an uncountable set of exact real numbers, still less that individual quantum systems physically “store” infinitely many digits. Every preparation, control operation, and measurement has finite precision, and many quantum predictions can be approximated arbitrarily closely using countable or finite descriptions.This distinction matters because the continuum is sometimes blamed for quantum theory's conceptual strangeness. That diagnosis is mostly unsupported. Superposition, interference, uncertainty, noncommutativity, entanglement, contextuality, Bell-inequality violations, and no-cloning already occur in finite-dimensional quantum systems and do not depend in any straightforward way on continuous position space or arbitrary irrational numbers. Restricting a Hilbert space to rational, algebraic, computable, or finitely specified states therefore does not automatically produce classical physics. Indeed, dense restricted subsets can approximate ordinary quantum predictions to arbitrary finite accuracy, although turning such a subset into a complete physical theory requires much more: closed dynamics, a composition rule, a measurement theory, robustness, and new empirical predictions.A particularly developed contemporary alternative is Tim Palmer's Invariant Set Theory and its recent formulation as Rational Quantum Mechanics (RaQM). RaQM is not accurately described as simply “quantum mechanics with irrational numbers banned.” It restricts the bases in which states are physically defined through number-theoretic rationality conditions, represents admissible states using finite bit strings, invokes a fractal invariant state space equipped with a non-Euclidean, p-adic-like metric, and violates Bell measurement independence at the level of exact counterfactual settings. Palmer's 2026 proposal further predicts a finite qubit-information capacity and an eventual saturation of quantum computational advantage. These are genuine, potentially falsifiable proposals, but they remain speculative and have not displaced standard quantum theory.The strongest conclusion is consequently asymmetric. There is a serious foundational question about whether the continuum is an ontological feature of nature or an extraordinarily efficient mathematical completion. Finite precision prevents existing experiments from proving a literal continuum. But there is presently little evidence that continuum mathematics causes quantum phenomena. Any discrete replacement must still account quantitatively for interference, contextuality, Bell correlations, entanglement, spectroscopy, atomic structure, and quantum computation. Discreteness can change quantum physics only when it is accompanied by additional physical postulates—and those postulates, rather than discreteness alone, must ultimately face experiment.
The emergence of intrinsic probability has long been one of the most important and puzzling problems in quantum mechanics, and the law most directly related to this problem is the Born rule. For a century, there have been many attempts to derive the Born rule as a theorem rather than postulating it. However, existing derivations of the Born rule are each based on different frameworks and have attracted different criticisms. The assumptions from which they start are also highly divergent, and the connections between them have not been sufficiently studied. These possible connections are very likely to be the key to answering questions about the origin of probability in quantum mechanics. This paper focuses on proving the necessity and indispensability of the additivity assumption in the derivation of the Born rule. This supports the view that the Born rule cannot be derived solely from other non-probabilistic quantum or additional postulates. We first prove that additivity cannot be derived from two other commonly used non-probabilistic additional assumptions, non-contextuality and normalization. Then we analyze the crucial role of the additivity assumption in five important existing derivations of the Born rule. These include Gleason's Theorem, Busch's extension of Gleason's Theorem, the Deutsch-Wallace Theorem, Zurek's envariance proof, and the Finkelstein-Hartle Theorem. We show that these derivations either depend heavily on the additivity assumption or lead to obvious loopholes due to the lack of additivity. We also point out some problems arised from the lack of a non-contextuality assumption. Our results provide a novel insight into the important role of additivity assumption in quantum measurement, as well as into the origin of probability in quantum mechanics.
Abstract In the 1950s and 1960s it was causing interest among physicists that in the formalism of quantum mechanics (complex-valued) ‘probability amplitudes’ obeyed laws similar to the laws obeyed by probabilities in the ordinary probability calculus. But this did not then lead decisively to the claim that probabilities should be represented by complex numbers. It became fashionable instead to regard probability amplitudes as an abstract concept from which actual probabilities could be derived by taking the squared moduli of the amplitudes. In this monograph, however, we make another attempt to show how probability amplitudes might after all be identified with actual probabilities. To do this, probability itself is interpreted in a rational Bayesian manner (i.e. as an extension of logic) and a new (complex-valued) probability theory is formulated that incorporates the uncertainty principle (i.e. that takes account of the fact that acquisition of knowledge of a quantum mechanical process generally interferes with it). Taking this probability theory as the new logic of science, and assuming certain physical laws and properties of matter, an interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is built up. It is consistent with the usual quantum mechanical formalism but allows a clear distinction to be made between the physical world and our knowledge of it.
David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. Given the generally accepted updating rule for quantum probabilities, there is a straight forward sense in which the Principal Principle is a theorem of quantum probability theory for any credence function satisfying a suitable additivity requirement. No additional principle of rationality is needed to bring credence into line with objective chance.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.
David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. This paper develops an account of how chance works in quantum theory that reveals a connection between credence and quantum chance quite unlike what is envisioned in the philosophical literature: as a theorem of quantum probability, updating a completely additive chance function on a knowledge of chance brings credence into line with chance. The account also suggests a way of construing the Humean supervenience of chance that has the virtue of dissolving some puzzles about the "undermining" of chances. A number of interpretative moves in quantum theory are needed to generate the account of quantum chance on offer here, and they can all be disputed. But engaging in these disputes is part and parcel of naturalized metaphysics, and as such it can be more productive than engaging in the battle of intuitions among analytical metaphysicians about how chance ought to work this and other possible worlds.