Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Springer eBooks

Underdetermination, Realism and Objectivity in Quantum Mechanics

Dennis Dieks

Published Jan 1, 2017• 6 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_16

Related papers

Underdetermination, Realism, and Theory Appraisal: An Epistemological Reflection on Quantum Mechanics

Darrin W.S. Belousek

Foundations of Physics•Apr 1, 2005•18 citations

Chapter Fifteen: Objectivity and Realism in Quantum Mechanics

Patrick A. Heelan

Peter Lang eBooks•Oct 13, 2016•0 citations

Underdetermination, Conventionalism and Realism: The Copenhagen vs. the Bohm Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

James T. Cushing

Boston studies in the philosophy of science•Jan 1, 1993•18 citations

METAPHYSICAL UNDERDETERMINATION AND LOGICAL DETERMINATION: THE CASE OF QUANTUM MECHANICS

Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

The ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics’ is the thesis that our best scientific theories do not uniquely determine their ontologies. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is famously thought to exemplify this kind of underdetermination: it may be seen as compatible with both an ontology of individual objects and with an ontology of non-individual objects. A possible way out of the dilema thus created consists in adopting some version of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a view according to which the metaphysically relevant aspect of the theory is its structure, not the nature of the objects dealt with. According to OSR, particular objects may be dispensed with (eliminated or re-conceptualized) in favor of the structure of the theory. In this paper we shall argue that the underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics is a consequence of a too strict naturalism in ontology. As a result, when a mitigated ontological naturalism is taken into account, underdetermination does not appear to have such dark consequences for object-oriented ontologies in quantum mechanics.

•Mar 5, 2014•0 citations

Realism in quantum mechanics

Stanley Gudder

Foundations of Physics•Aug 1, 1989•16 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Realism

Peter Kosso

Foundations of Science•Mar 1, 2000•13 citations
The ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics’ is the thesis that our best scientific theories do not uniquely determine their ontologies. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is famously thought to exemplify this kind of underdetermination: it may be seen as compatible with both an ontology of individual objects and with an ontology of non-individual objects. A possible way out of the dilema thus created consists in adopting some version of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a view according to which the metaphysically relevant aspect of the theory is its structure, not the nature of the objects dealt with. According to OSR, particular objects may be dispensed with (eliminated or re-conceptualized) in favor of the structure of the theory. In this paper we shall argue that the underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics is a consequence of a too strict naturalism in ontology. As a result, when a mitigated ontological naturalism is taken into account, underdetermination does not appear to have such dark consequences for object-oriented ontologies in quantum mechanics.